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ABSTRACT: 
This report is an empirical analysis of the effectiveness of the marketing/promotion, non-
agricultural research, and agricultural research activities associated with the cotton checkoff 
program over the period of 1986/87 through 2004/05.  The analysis is based on a multi-equation, 
econometric, non-spatial, price equilibrium simulation model of U.S. and foreign fiber markets 
using annual data. The key average annual impacts of the cotton checkoff program on U.S. and 
foreign cotton and man-made fiber markets and their associated textile markets are reported.  
The results show that the returns to cotton producers as well as to cotton importers from the 
cotton checkoff program are positive.  The average discounted benefit-cost ratios (BCR) for the 
cotton checkoff program were found to be 5.7 for domestic cotton producers and 14.4 for 
importers.  The higher BCR for importers reflects revenue gains not only from additional sales of 
cotton fiber textiles but also from additional “spillover” sales of man-made fiber textiles 
prompted by the cotton checkoff program.  The results also show that U.S. taxpayers are better 
off because the cotton checkoff program has tended to reduce government outlays directed to 
cotton farmers. The analysis also finds that neither U.S. producers nor importers pay the full cost 
of the checkoff assessments. Finally, cotton checkoff expenditures on agricultural research were 
found to have positively and significantly affected U.S. cotton yields with no discernible effects 
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The cotton and textile industries are particularly important components of the U.S. food and fiber 
system. As a percent of the gross domestic product, personal consumption expenditures on 
clothing and accessories are slightly more than three percent. The U.S. cotton industry accounts 
for more than $40 billion in products and services annually, generating over 440,000 jobs from 
the farm level to the textile mill level of the marketing chain. In global markets, cotton is a 
prominent textile fiber.  Cotton accounts for over 40% of total world fiber production.  
 
Commodity checkoff programs are primarily government-established efforts to expand demand 
through collective action by domestic producers. Until the development of petroleum-derived 
synthetic fibers in the 1950s, cotton was unrivaled as the dominant fiber in clothing and home 
textiles in the United States. The introduction of polyester and nylon fibers led to a sustained 
decline in the demand for cotton for all uses beginning in 1960.  By 1966, the decline in cotton 
demand had progressed to the point that Congress intervened, passing the Cotton Research and 
Promotion Act (CRPA) of 1966 (PL89-502) establishing the Cotton Board and the Cotton 
Checkoff Program in an effort to arrest the erosion of consumer demand for cotton.  The 
legislative intent of the CRPA and of the Cotton Research and Promotion Amendments Act 
(CRPAA) of 1990 was to authorize and enable the establishment of an orderly procedure for the 
development of “an effective and coordinated program of research and promotion.”  The design 
of both Acts was to strengthen the competitive position of cotton vis-à-vis primarily man-made 
fibers and to expand domestic and foreign markets and uses for U.S. cotton. 
 
From 1967 to 1991, all domestic producers were required to pay cotton checkoff assessments. 
However, the 1966 Act allowed producers to request a refund. Over the period 1967 to 1991, up 
to one-third of the assessments collected were refunded. The CRPAA, enacted by Congress in 
November 1990 under Subtitle G of Title XIX of the Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade 
Act of 1990, contained two provisions amending funding procedures of the CRPA: (1) all cotton 
marketed in the United States, whether from domestic or foreign production, was to share in the 
cost of the research and promotion program and (2) the right of cotton producers to demand a 
refund of assessments was terminated. Since July 31, 1992, an assessment of one dollar per bale 
plus a fractional percentage of value (specifically five-tenths of one percent) is collected by first 
handlers on domestically produced (raw) cotton, imported (raw) cotton, and the cotton content of 
imported textile and apparel products.  
 
Between 1986 and 1991, about 65% of the cotton assessments collected (from $18.3 million up 
to $28.6 million in nominal terms over that period) was available for funding cotton checkoff 
activities and the remaining 35% was refunded on average each year.  By eliminating refunds, 
the 1990 amendments to the CRPA contributed to a substantial increase in annual cotton 
checkoff collections from $42 million in 1992 to $66 million in 2004.  
Since the CRPAA was implemented in the early 1990s, contributions by importers have grown 
to $25 million while contributions by producers have grown from about $30 million to $41 
million.  Early on, importer assessments accounted for about 30% of total collections with  
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producers paying the other 70%. Over time, however, the producer share has dropped reaching 
about 62% of total collections in 2004 while the importer share has increased to about 38%. 
 
Using the collected checkoff assessments, Cotton Incorporated (CI) finances a wide variety of 
research and promotion activities which can be grouped into four categories: (1) marketing and 
promotion, (2) agricultural research, (3) textile or non-agricultural research, and (4) 
administration.  The Cotton Incorporated (CI) total annual budget grew from $18.4 million in 
1986 to more than $66 million (unadjusted for inflation) in 2004.  About 67% of the collected 
assessments were used to finance marketing and promotion activities in 2004 and 16% to finance 
non-agricultural textile research activities.  Though a larger percentage of the budget goes to 
marketing/promotion than to textile research and development, that breakdown reflects both the 
cost of national advertising and program priorities. The remainder was spent on agricultural 
research activities (13%) and administration activities (5%). Marketing and promotion activities 
include television advertising campaigns, seasonal promotions, and special public relations 
programs. Textile research activities include technical processing and production support to mills 
(e.g., improvements in fiber quality and processing; fabric production; fabric development and 
ginning technology research) as well as product development and textile development (e.g., 
wrinkle-free cotton; stretch fabrics; and flame-resistant cotton). 
 
This study is a retrospective economic analysis of the Cotton Checkoff Research and Promotion 
Program to determine the market results and returns achieved through the investment of the 
checkoff funds collected by the Cotton Board.  Specifically, this study focuses on the answers to 
the following questions: 
●  What are the effects of the cotton checkoff program on the demand for raw cotton (mill level) 
and the demand for cotton fiber textile products (retail level)? 
●  What are the spillover effects of the cotton checkoff program on man-made fiber markets? 
●  What are the effects of the agricultural research programs funded by the cotton checkoff 
program? 
●  What is the incidence (that is, who pays the cost) of the cotton checkoff assessments on 
domestically produced cotton and on cotton fiber textile product imports? 
●  What is the overall return on investment associated with the cotton checkoff program to U.S. 
cotton producers and importers of cotton fiber textile products? 
●  What are the implications of cotton checkoff program activities for government cotton 
program costs? 
 
This report is the third in the series of economic evaluations of the cotton checkoff program and  
focuses on the period of 1986/87-2004/05.  The analysis in this report is an updated and revised 
version of a comprehensive study of the effects of the cotton checkoff program recently 
completed by the authors in connection with the legal defense of the program.  The analysis is 
conducted using a multi-equation, econometric simulation model of U.S. and foreign fiber 
markets originally developed by the Cotton Economics Research Institute (CERI) at Texas Tech 
University. The model was modified by the authors to account for the programmatic activities of 
the Cotton Board and, hence, is referred to as the modified CERI model or the MCERI model. 
Extensive and fundamentally important advances in the methodology for analyzing the cotton 
checkoff program were made in this analysis leading to the most accurate, reliable, and  
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defensible measurement of the impacts and returns from the cotton checkoff program to date.   A 
few of the more salient advances made include the following: 
 
●  The MCERI model used in this study is a more formal and structurally comprehensive model 
than used in previous studies.   
●  The model also explicitly includes both the raw cotton and man-made fiber markets as well 
as cotton and man-made fiber textile markets and their extensive market linkages and 
interrelationships. 
●  The analysis explicitly measures the “spillover” effects of the cotton checkoff program, that 
is, the impacts of the program on not only the cotton industry but also the man-made fiber 
industry.  
●  The MCERI model also explicitly accounts for the incidence of the checkoff assessments 
allowing a detailed measurement of the share of the costs of the assessments borne by U.S. 
producers, importers, foreign producers, foreign mills, and consumers.  
●  The MCERI model includes detailed representations of the complicated government cotton 
policy over the years so that the savings to taxpayers in terms of reduced government outlays 
to cotton farmers over time that are directly attributable to the cotton checkoff program can 
be measured.  
●  This study provides the first ever measurement of the impacts of agricultural research funded 
by the cotton checkoff program on cotton harvested acreages and yields in four production 
regions across the United States. 
●  This study provides both discounted and undiscounted average benefit-cost ratios (BCR) for 
both domestic producers as well as for importers over the period of 1986/87 through 
2004/05. 
●  Because the cotton checkoff program became mandatory in 1992, the BCR analysis is   
decomposed into two time periods: (1) the “voluntary contribution period” of 1986/87 
through 1991/92 and (2) the “mandatory contribution period” of 1992/93 through 2004/05.  
 
The MCERI model functions through the simultaneous interaction of supply, demand, trade, and 
price components across various commodities and regions of the world. The main components of 
the model include: (1) the U.S. and foreign cotton production; (2) U.S. and foreign man-made 
fiber production; (3) U.S. and foreign cotton and man-made fiber mill demands; (4) U.S. and 
foreign demands for cotton textiles and man-made fiber textiles; (5) world trade and price 
linkages for cotton, cotton textiles, man-made fiber, and man-made fiber textiles; and (6) 
international trade policy and U.S. government farm policy elements.  
 
According to the simulation analysis conducted with the MCERI model, the key average annual 
impacts of the  cotton checkoff program on world cotton and cotton fiber textile markets over the 
1986/87 to 2004/05 period were the following: 
 
●  A 4% increase in U.S. cotton production, mostly in western and southeastern states; 
●  A 2% increase in foreign cotton production; 
●  A 16% increase in U.S. cotton mill use and a 1% increase in foreign cotton mill use; 
●  A 7% decline in U.S. cotton exports offset somewhat by a 2% increase in foreign cotton 
exports;  
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●  A 13% increase in the average annual U.S. cotton farm price, a 14% increase in the U.S. 
cotton mill price, and a 2% increase in the world price of cotton (A-index); 
●  A 10 % increase in U.S. consumption of cotton fiber textiles along with a 5% increase in 
imports of cotton fiber textiles from foreign mills;  
●  A larger share of the U.S. consumption of cotton fiber textiles being supplied by foreign 
rather than domestic mills; and 
●  A 2% decline in the price of cotton fiber textiles. 
 
In U.S. man-made fiber and man-made fiber textile markets, the key average annual impacts of 
the cotton checkoff program over the entire simulation period (the spillover effects) included: 
 
●  A small negative impact on U.S. production of synthetics and cellulosics; 
●  A 3% reduction in U.S. man-made fiber mill use; 
●  A 1% decline in the U.S. polyester price; 
●  A 22% increase in net imports of man-made fiber textiles; 
●  A 1% decline in U.S. consumption of man-made fiber textiles; and 
●  A 5 % increase in the price of man-made fiber textiles. 
 
Over the voluntary period of the checkoff program (1986/87-1991/92), the simulation results 
indicate that the cumulative added net revenues to producers as a result of the cotton checkoff 
program were $220 million for all cotton producers, roughly $37 million per year and about 
0.9% of the farm receipts received by cotton producers, excluding government payments, during 
that time period. Benefits in terms of added net revenues were positive to non-participants in 
farm programs and negative for farm program participants during this period.  Because farm 
program participants during that period received deficiency and other government payments, 
their cotton farm revenues were relatively unaffected by any price increase achieved by the 
checkoff program. Non-participants in farm programs, however, benefited from the higher farm 
price of cotton induced by the checkoff program during that period. 
 
During the mandatory period (1992/93-2004/05), in contrast, both participants and non-
participants in farm programs benefited from the price increase and demand increase generated 
by the cotton checkoff program. Cumulative added net revenues for participants in the farm 
program during the mandatory period were close to $6.1 billion compared to $322 million for 
non-participants primarily due to the much larger number of participants than non-participants in 
cotton farm programs.  Added net revenues to cotton producers per year were almost $493 
million during the mandatory period representing about 10.4% of the farm receipts received by 
cotton producers during that period, excluding government payments.  Over the entire simulation 
period, the added average annual net revenues to cotton producers were nearly $350 million, 
about 7.5% of the farm receipts received by cotton producers, excluding government payments. 
 
The calculated undiscounted producer net benefit cost ratios (NBCR) during the voluntary and  
the mandatory periods of the cotton checkoff program were 0.6 and 9.2, respectively. The 
discounted NBCRs during those two periods are estimated at 0.5 and 7.5, respectively.  Over the 
entire simulation period, the undiscounted and discounted producer NBCRs were 7.6 and 5.7, 
respectively. Clearly, cotton producers have benefited from the cotton checkoff program, 
particularly in the mandatory stage of the program.  
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During the voluntary period which roughly corresponded to the period when deficiency 
payments were a major component of government farm policy, the cumulative reduction in 
government farm program costs due to the cotton checkoff program amounted to slightly less 
than $1.3 billion. Thus, during the voluntary period, had it not been for the cotton checkoff 
program, government cotton program costs would have been higher by about $221 million per 
year, an annual savings of about 22%. In the mandatory period, the cumulative reduction in 
government expenditures due to the cotton checkoff program amounted to slightly more than 
$6.5 billion or about $502 million per year, an annual savings of approximately 28%.  Over the 
entire period from 1986/87 to 2004/05, the cumulative savings in government cotton program 
outlays totaled about $7.8 billion, an annual savings of about $413 million or 27%. 
 
Combining the benefits accruing to domestic producers with the reduction in government outlays 
associated with the cotton checkoff program gives a total undiscounted BCR of 17.8 over the 
entire period (13.4 on a discounted basis) at the farm level. Over the voluntary period of the 
program, the total undiscounted and discounted BCRs were 10.0 and 9.1, respectively.  For the 
mandatory period, the total undiscounted and discounted BCRs were 19.5 and 16.0. respectively.  
Even after accounting for the sensitivity of the results to changes in key parameters in the model, 
the conclusion that both cotton producers and taxpayers (in the way of reductions in government 
outlays) are better off with the cotton checkoff program is still strongly supported by the 
empirical results. 
 
The cumulative retail sales revenues for cotton fiber textiles attributed to the checkoff program 
over the period 1992/2004 were nearly $140 billion, about $11 billion per year. The cumulative 
retail sales revenues for man-made fiber textiles attributed to the checkoff program over the same 
period were $118 billion, about $9 billion per year. The sum of the cumulative total revenue 
from retail sales of both cotton and man-made fiber textiles over the simulation period, then, was 
$258 billion, or nearly $20 billion per year. According to financial data of 18 major apparel and 
home furnishings retailers, the average pre-tax profits to sales ratio ranged from 4.2% to 6.5% 
from 1994 to 2003 with a median of roughly 5% over this period. Consequently, the additional 
profit to the retail textile industry per dollar spent by the Cotton Board was $19.5 undiscounted 
or $14.4 on a discounted basis. Again, even after accounting for the sensitivity of the results to 
key model parameters, the analysis clearly demonstrates that importers, like domestic producers, 
are better of with the cotton checkoff program. 
 
The BCRs for importers are found to be higher than those for producers indicating that importers 
have benefited more from the cotton checkoff program than have domestic producers on a per 
dollar invested basis. The higher return to importers is due largely to the spillover effects of 
cotton checkoff programs at retail to man-made fiber textile markets. That is, importers gained 
from the cotton checkoff program not only from additional sales of cotton fiber textiles but also 
from additional related sales of man-made fiber textiles. To put these importer BCR calculations 
into perspective with the extant literature, Capps et al. (1997) and Murray et al. (2001) found the 
undiscounted importer BCR to be in the interval of 3.63 to 5.59 and 1.90 to 3.40, respectively. 
The lower BCRs for importers in these earlier studies are largely explained by the fact that they 
did not account for the spillover benefits to the retail textile industry in additional man-made 
fiber textile sales that are captured in this study.  
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In considering the effects of the cotton checkoff program, the incidence of the assessment, that 
is, the share of the cost of the assessment paid by the various contributors, must be taken into 
account.  For producers, their assessment is tantamount to an added cost. For importers, their 
assessment is akin to a tariff. The annual average assessment paid by producers in each year was 
usually less than 1% of the farm price. The annual average assessment paid by importers was 
equivalent to about 0.03% to 0.05% of the price received by importers. A comparison of the 
producer and importer assessments demonstrates that they have not been equal over time.  On a 
per pound of fiber basis, the importer assessment exceeded the producer assessment in every 
year from 1992 to 2000 except for 1994 and 1995.  Since 2001, however, the annual per pound 
producer assessment has been greater than the importer assessment. On average, the analysis 
shows that 58% of the producer assessment was borne by U.S. cotton producers with about 42% 
borne by domestic buyers (mills) and foreign cotton buyers (mills).  With respect to the importer 
assessment, an average of 49% was borne by U.S. cotton fiber textile consumers and roughly 
51% by foreign cotton fiber textile sellers.  
 
While this study focuses primarily on cotton checkoff expenditures intended to shift out the mill 
demand for cotton and the retail demand for cotton fiber textiles, the study also analyzes the 
cotton production effects of the 13% of cotton checkoff dollars that are spent on agricultural 
research. The results indicate that over the period of crop years 1977/78-2004/05, cotton 
checkoff funded agricultural research activities positively and significantly affected yields with 
no statistically discernible effect on harvested acreage.   Over the long-run, percentage changes 
in yields due to a 1% change in inflation-adjusted agricultural research expenditures were 
calculated to have varied among U.S. cotton-producing regions from 0.04 in the Dryland 
Southwest to 0.18 in the Irrigated Southwest. The length of time required for such expenditures 
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This study is a retrospective economic analysis of the Cotton Checkoff Program to determine the 
market effects and returns achieved through the investment of the checkoff funds collected by 
the Cotton Board over the years 1986 through 2004.  Emphasis is placed on cotton checkoff 
investments in marketing and promotion activities and textile research (otherwise known as non-
agricultural research) activities although investments in agricultural research are also considered. 
 
Specifically, this study focuses on the answers to the following key questions: 
●  What are the effects of the cotton checkoff program on the demand for raw cotton (mill level) 
and the demand for cotton fiber textile products (retail level)? 
●  What are the spillover effects of the cotton checkoff program on man-made fiber markets? 
●  What are the effects of the agricultural research programs funded by the cotton checkoff 
program? 
●  What is the incidence (that is, who pays the cost) of the cotton checkoff assessments on 
domestically produced cotton and on cotton fiber textile product imports? 
●  What is the overall return on investment associated with the cotton checkoff program to U.S. 
cotton producers and importers of cotton fiber textile products? 
●  What are the implications of cotton checkoff program activities for government cotton 
program costs? 
 
Before analyzing the answers to these questions, however, this report begins with a brief 
discussion of the economic structure and government policy interventions in the U.S. cotton and 
cotton fiber textile industry as background to later discussions of the domestic and world market 
effects of the cotton checkoff program. 
 
THE U.S. COTTON AND COTTON FIBER TEXTILE INDUSTRY 
 
The U.S. food and fiber system – from the farmer to the consumer – is one of the largest sectors 
of the U.S. economy, producing output valued at $1,241.7 billion or 11.3% of the gross domestic 
product (GDP) and employing 23.2 million full-time workers or 16.0% of the total U.S. civilian 
employment in 2002 (Table 1).  The share of the GDP contributed by the food and fiber industry, 
however, has steadily declined from a high 14.4% in 1993 (Table 1).  Similarly, the share of U.S. 
civilian employment contributed by the agricultural sector has declined from 18.6% to 16.0% 
over that same period. 
 
The cotton and textile industries are key components of the U.S. food and fiber system.  The U.S. 
cotton industry accounts for more than $40 billion in products and services annually, generating 
over 440,000 jobs from the farm level to the textile mill level of the marketing chain.  From 2002 
to 2004, personal consumption expenditures on clothing and accessories accounted for an 
average of 4.2% of all personal consumption expenditures in the United States (BLS 2006).  As a 
percent of GDP, personal consumption expenditures on clothing and accessories were 3.2% over 
the same period (BLS 2006).  Cotton production alone added $3.1 billion to $5.5 billion annually 
to the U.S. economy between 2001 and 2004, accounting for  4% to 5% of the total value added 




Economic Structure of the U.S. Cotton Industry 
 
 
The U.S. cotton industry is composed of two interdependent sectors: (1) the cotton sector and (2) 
the cotton fiber textile sector.  The cotton sector includes the supply (production and ginning) 
and demand (milling and exporting) of cotton, represented by the top portion of the cotton-textile 
supply chain illustrated in Figure 1.   The cotton fiber textile sector includes the supply (milling, 
manufacturing, and importing) and demand (consumers) for cotton textiles, represented by the 
lower portion of Figure 1. Note that the milling industry represents the demand side of the cotton 
sector but the supply side of the cotton fiber textile sector.  
 
U.S. Cotton Production 
 
Since 1965, the U.S. cotton area planted and harvested has ranged from a low of 7-8 million 
acres to and high of 16-17 million acres and averaged 12.7 million acres and 11.7 million acres, 
respectively (Table 2).  Over the same period, cotton yields ranged from a low of 404 lb/acre in 
1980 to 855 lb/acre in 2004 with an average of 574 lb/acre.  U.S. cotton production ranged over 
that period from 3.6 billion lb to 11.2 billion lb and averaged 6.8 billion lb. Farm prices for 
cotton also varied widely between 1965 and 2004 from 21.8¢/lb to 76.5¢/lb and averaged 
51.4¢/lb.  Cotton farm receipts ranged from roughly $954 million to $6.8 billion and averaged 
$3.6 billion. 
 
Although roughly 80 countries produce cotton, India and China are currently the major 
competitors for the U.S. in the production of cotton (Table 3).  Together the three countries 
produce over half the cotton in the world. The U.S. ranks second to China in production but is 
the largest exporter, accounting for over 40% of global trade in raw cotton in 2004 which was 
more the double the share the U.S. had just a few years earlier (Table 4). The four other major 
foreign producers of cotton include: (1) the Former Soviet Union, (2) Brazil, (3) Turkey, and (4) 
Pakistan (see Table 3).  Between 1970 and 2004, these four countries plus China and India 
accounted for 75% of both total foreign cotton acreage harvested and total foreign cotton 
production (Table 5).  Over the past five years (2000 to 2004), India accounted for the largest 
share (30%) of total foreign cotton area harvested followed by China, (17%), Pakistan (11%), 
and the former Soviet Union (9%).  Nevertheless, over the same time period China was the 
largest foreign cotton producer (30% of total foreign production) followed by India (17%),   
Pakistan (11%), and the former Soviet Union (9%).  Cotton yields in Turkey, China, and Brazil 
were all about double the average yield in non-U.S. cotton producing countries and about 40% to 
50% higher than U.S. average yields over the same recent five year period.  Cotton yields in 
India were about half the average of non-U.S. countries and about 40% of U.S. yields.  Cotton 
yields in the Former Soviet Union and Pakistan were only about 75% of average U.S. yields. 
Annual harvested area of cotton outside the U.S. since 1965 has ranged from a low of 62.8 
million acres in 2002 to a high of 75.6 million acres in 2004 (Table 5). At the same time, cotton 
yields in foreign countries ranged from a low of 294 lb/acre in 1965 to a high of 617 lb/acre in 
2004.  Over the same time period, foreign cotton production ranged from 20.2 billion lb to 46.6 
billion lb.  Since 1965, the United States has accounted for an average of nearly 15% of the 
harvested acres of cotton in the world and nearly 20% of the world cotton production. U.S. 




U.S. cotton production competes not only with cotton production in other countries but also with 
the production of synthetic (man-made) fibers around the world.  Between 1980 to 2003, cotton 
accounted for over 40% of total world fiber production (Table 6).  However, cotton has lost 
global market share to synthetic fibers every year for nearly a decade. Since 1996, the synthetic 
fiber (principally polyester) share of world fiber production has been larger than the share 
accounted for by cotton.   
 
The U.S. cotton planting season typically occurs from February to June, depending on the region. 
U.S. cotton production regions include the Delta (Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, 
and Tennessee); the Southeast (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and 
Virginia); the Southwest (Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas); and the West (Arizona, California, and 
New Mexico). The aggregate of these regions represent the so-called “Cotton Belt.”  Of the 17 
Cotton Belt states, the major cotton producing state is Texas.  About 98% of the cotton produced 
in the U.S. is upland cotton.  The remainder is extra-long staple (ELS) cotton or American Pima 
cotton, generally grown in the western part of the Cotton Belt. 
 
U.S. Cotton Trade 
 
Since 1995, the U.S. has exported nearly half of its domestic production (Table 7) and is the 
leading world exporter of raw cotton. Except for 1995, 1996, and 1998, U.S. imports of raw 
cotton were almost nonexistent. Even in those three years, U.S. imports of raw cotton were only 
a fraction of the level of exports and an even smaller fraction of the level of domestic cotton 
supply. Between 1965 and 1984, Pakistan, China, Turkey, Brazil, Sudan, and Egypt were the 
major non-U.S. exporters of cotton (see Table 4). Since the mid-1980s, however, Uzbekistan and 
other African countries have emerged as the leading foreign cotton export competitors for the 
United States.  At times over the last 20 years, Pakistan, India, China, and most recently Brazil 
have played major roles in world cotton export markets.  The most consistent foreign cotton 
importing nations since at least the mid-1980s have been the EU-25, Russia, Japan, Indonesia, 
South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, and China (Table 8). Imports of raw cotton by the EU-25, 
Russia, and Japan have declined steadily over time while imports of raw cotton by Indonesia, 
Thailand, Pakistan, and China have risen dramatically.      
 
Cotton Milling and Textile Manufacturing 
 
Cotton bales are shipped from gins and warehouses located throughout the U.S. Cotton Belt to 
both foreign and domestic mills. Cotton merchants, located across the Cotton Belt, arrange the 
transfer of bales between these parties. Cotton is harvested throughout the Cotton Belt in a six-
month time period, beginning in south Texas in mid-July and ending in North Carolina and West 
Texas in December. Mills, however, use cotton on a continual basis. 
 
Domestic cotton textile mills are concentrated in four states: (1) Alabama; (2) Georgia; (3) North 
Carolina; and (4) South Carolina.  U.S. cotton mills generally have become vertically integrated 
with the largest companies combining spinning, weaving, and finishing (Glade, Meyer, and 
Stults 1996).  The National Cotton Council has identified 92 major product classifications as end 
uses for milled cotton grouped into three broad categories: (1) home furnishings; (2) apparel; and  
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(3) industrial products. Apparel is the predominant category, followed by home furnishings, and 
industrial products (Figure 2). 
 
U.S. mill use of cotton increased slowly from about 3.0 billion lb in the early 1980s to a little 
over 5.0 billion lb in the late 1990s and then declined rapidly ever since, dropping back to just 
3.1 billion lb in 2004 (Table 9).  Rapidly growing U.S. imports of cotton fiber textile (processed 
cotton) products from foreign mills drastically reduced the domestic (mill) share of total U.S. 
cotton consumption (expressed in raw cotton fiber equivalents) from a high of 70% in 1990 to 
just 30%  in 2004. 
Cotton Fiber Textile Trade 
 
U.S. trade in processed cotton (cotton textiles and apparel) has followed quite a different pattern 
from that of U.S. trade in raw cotton. Beginning in the late 1980s, U.S. cotton textile exports 
began to increase rapidly reaching a peak at 2.4 billion lb in 2000 and then stabilized at 2.1 
billion lb to 2.3 billion lb since that time (Table 9).  The growth of U.S. cotton textile exports, 
however, has not kept pace with the influx of cotton textile imports.  Imports have captured a 
large and growing share of U.S. cotton consumption, from 30%-35% in the 1960s to 70% in 
2004.   
 
The growth in net imports is due largely to strong growth in the U.S. demand for processed 
cotton products and the reduction in U.S. and world trade barriers primarily as a result of the 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) signed in 1994 as part of the Uruguay Round of the 
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations.  U.S. consumption of processed 
cotton products has more than doubled since the mid-1980s (Table 9).  Almost 75% of the 
imports consist of apparel while less than 20% are fabric and other textile products (USDAb).   
 
As barriers to world cotton and textile trade have declined, developing countries, where wages 
are much lower than those in the U.S., have gained a competitive edge in global cotton fiber 
product markets since apparel manufacturing is more labor intensive than textile processing.  
This growing competitive advantage has determined, in large part, the changing global pattern of 
cotton and textile production and manufacturing.  In recent years, that pattern has included U.S. 
raw cotton production and exports to developing countries, milling and manufacturing in foreign 
countries, and then importation of the cotton textile goods back into the domestic U.S. market.   
The global pattern of trade has also included fabric construction in the U.S., cutting and 
assembling in other countries, and then U.S. importation of the final cotton textile products. 
Unfortunately, reliable public and private estimates of how much apparel made of U.S.-produced 
cotton is imported back into the U.S. are not available.   
 
U.S. Processed Cotton and Man-Made Fiber Demand
1 
 
As indicated earlier, total domestic processed cotton fiber product consumption, defined as U.S. 
cotton mill use plus net imports of processed cotton (expressed on a raw cotton fiber equivalent 
basis), realized a dramatic increase from nearly 5.0 billion lb in 1986 to 10.3 billion lb in 2004 
(Table 9).  On a per capita basis, total domestic consumption of processed cotton rose from 20.7 
                                                 
1 Because wool accounted for only 1% to 2% of total fiber consumption during this period, the focus of this analysis 
centers on man-made fiber and cotton fiber.  
 
5
lb to 35.1 lb between 1986 to 2004.  Per capita consumption of U.S. mill output of processed 
cotton, on the other hand, rose from 13.9 lb to 19.9 lb between 1986 and 1997 and then 
afterwards declined precipitously to 10.7 lb in 2004 primarily due to the surge in processed 
cotton imports in recent years.  Between 1986 and 1996, per capita consumption of imported 
processed cotton products increased by 47% from 6.8 lb to 10.0 lb and then jumped by over 
140% between 1996 and 2004 to 24.4 lb.   
 
The U.S. per capita consumption of man-made fibers, including rayon (cellulosic fiber) and 
polyester (non-cellulosic fiber), has averaged 1.5 to 2 times higher than that of cotton since at 
least the mid-1980s (Table 10).  Since the mid-1980s, the annual U.S. per capita consumption of 
man-made fibers increased has increased somewhat from around 40-42 lb to near 50 lb.   
Polyester is the dominant man-made fiber in terms of domestic consumption.  
 
Like U.S. mill use of cotton, mill use of man-made fibers also has dropped in recent years while 
imports have risen.  Mill use of man-made fibers rose from 8.7 billion lb in 1986 to 11.1 billion 
lb in 1997 and then dropped to 10.2 billion lb by 2004 (Table 10).  Imports of man-made fibers, 
on the other hand, increased dramatically between 1986 and 2004.  The domestic (mill) share of 
total U.S. man-made fiber consumption declined from nearly 90% in the mid-1980s to about 
70% in  2004 while the import share jumped from 10% to nearly 30% over the same period. 
    
In terms of total fibers (cotton, man-made, wool, flax, and silk), annual per capita domestic 
consumption increased from 61.6 lb to 88.7 lb between 1986 and 2004 (Table 11).  U.S. per 
capita total fiber mill use peaked at 60.2 lb in 1997 and then dropped steadily to 45.7 lb in 2004.  
In contrast, per capita net imports of total fibers rose rapidly after 1996 from 16.1 lb to 43.0 lb in 
2004. The growth in the absolute volume of total fiber consumption was accompanied by an 
increase in the cotton share from almost 34% in 1986 to nearly 40% in 2004 and a decline in the 
share accounted for by man-made fiber over that same period from 66% to 55%. 
 
Cotton and Man-Made Fiber Prices
2 
 
Among the various potential determinants of the demand for any commodity, price is usually one 
of the most important.  Although consumption of all fibers is measured in pounds, a pound of 
cotton does not provide the same amount of textiles as a pound of other fibers, such as celluslosic 
or non-cellulosic man-made fibers.  Consequently, comparing the per pound prices of various 
fibers can provide a misleading view of their relative market values.  Thus, the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture (USDA) developed a method for adjusting the pounds of fiber used in 
manufacturing textiles so that the quantity of cotton needed to provide the same quantity of 
textiles could be estimated (Donald, Lowenstein, and Simon 1963). This adjustment of fiber 
consumption, known as “cotton equivalent” pounds, represents the quantity of cotton that would 
be needed to replace a pound of other fibers as raw material for textile production. USDA 
publishes estimates of domestic fiber consumption in cotton equivalent pounds. The prices of 
fibers are correspondingly converted to raw fiber equivalent prices. The  cotton price is divided 
by 0.90 and the rayon and polyester prices are divided by 0.96.  Rayon represents the class of 
                                                 
2 In this section, the prices of reference for the various fibers are in raw fiber equivalents.  The reference prices are: 
cotton - Strict Low Middling (SLM) 1 1/16" at Group B mill points, net weight; rayon - 1.5 and 3.0 denier, regular 
staple at f.o.b. producing plants; polyester - 1.5 denier, regular staple at f.o.b. producing plants.    
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cellulosic man-made fibers (rayon and acetate) while polyester represents the class of non-
cellulosic man-made fibers (polyester; acrylic; polypropylene; and nylon). 
 
To calculate the appropriate mill price for cotton to compare with those of competing fibers 
between 1991 and 2006, an adjustment must be made to account for user marketing certificates. 
The Upland Cotton User Marketing Certificate program, also known as “Step 2,” began in the 
fall of 1991 as an incentive for American produced cotton to be domestically consumed or 
exported (USDAc). Payments under the program were made in cash or certificates to domestic 
users on documented raw cotton consumption and to exporters on documented export shipments 
at a  payment rate equal to the difference between the U.S.-Northern Europe price and the 
Northern Europe price during the fourth week of the period, minus 1.25¢/lb  (the threshold) 
(USDAd). Available on a weekly basis, the payment was based on a comparison of the Northern 
Europe (Liverpool) current price (NE) to the five-day average of the lowest U.S. current quote 
(USNE).  Initially, the user certificate value (CV) was calculated as:  CV = (USNE – NE) – 1.25. 
 
The 2002 Farm Act suspended the application of the 1.25¢/lb threshold until August 1, 2006. 
Consequently, Step 2 payment calculations for the 2002-05 marketing years were based on the 
difference between the USNE and the NE prices.  If CV was less than zero in any week, then the 
certificate value for that week was zero.  Also, the subsidy was paid as long as the adjusted world 
price (AWP) was less than 130% of the cotton loan rate.  So, for a payment to occur, the 
certificate value (CV) had to be positive and the AWP also had to be less than 130% of the loan 
rate. On February 8, 2006, the President signed legislation repealing the Step 2 Program as of  
August 1, 2006.  The repeal terminated export subsidies and import substitution subsidies cited 
by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the findings of a dispute settlement panel. Thus, to 
calculate the “effective mill price” of cotton after 1991 until the termination of the Step 2 
program, the certificate value (CV) must be subtracted from the nominal mill price of cotton
3. 
 
The nominal mill price of cotton (raw fiber-equivalent basis) generally increased from the 1960s 
through the 1990s, hitting an average annual all-time high of 100.8¢/lb in 1995 (Figure 3). The 
record high price was short lived, however, as the cotton mill price raced downwards to an 
average annual low of 45.6¢/lb in 2002 and then recovered somewhat to 60.4¢/lb in 2004. The 
nominal raw fiber-equivalent mill prices of rayon and polyester followed a similar pattern over 
the years, generally increasing from just over 50¢/lb in 1975 to highs in the early to mid-1990s.  
The rayon price increased more rapidly, however, hitting a high of 127¢/lb in 1991 when the  
polyester price was only near 80¢/lb (Figure 3).  Both prices have tended to decline since the 
mid-1990s but the rayon price has shown more resistance to downward pressures. Consequently, 
the price of rayon was still nearly 60% above the price of polyester in 2004. 
 
The nominal farm price of cotton followed a much slower but still generally upward trend until  
the mid-1990s, hitting an all-time high of 76.5¢/lb in 1995.  By 2001, however, the farm price of 
cotton had dropped nearly 60% to 32¢/lb, the lowest level since the early 1970s  (Figure 3).  
Over the same period, the nominal A index followed a similar pattern, reaching a near record 
high of 93¢/lb in 1994 and then dropping to a low of 42¢/lb in 2001 before recovering somewhat 
(Figure 3).  The U.S. government loan rate over the same period dropped from 55.0¢/lb to 
50.0¢/lb and then rose slightly to 52¢/lb. 
                                                 




Adjusting the nominal prices for inflation, however, reveals that in relative terms, the prices of 
cotton and competing fibers all followed a clear downward since at least the mid-1970s (Figure 
4).  Figures 3 and 4 show clearly that cotton and competing fiber prices have been highly 
correlated over time with correlations ranging from 0.899 to 0.961.  The real prices of rayon and 
polyester were less collinear than was the case for the set of real cotton prices with a correlation 
of 0.841.  Also, the correlations of the real prices of polyester and rayon with real cotton prices 
were on the order of 0.8 and 0.7, respectively. 
 
Government Intervention in U.S. Cotton Markets 
 
Government intervention in U.S. cotton and textile markets has been the norm rather than the 
exception since at least the 1930s.  The primary objective of the intervention over the years has 
been to support cotton producer income through the use of a variety of policy tools, primarily  
cotton price and income support programs and demand enhancement programs. 
 
U.S. Cotton Price and Income Support Policy 
 
Beginning with the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, the government has attempted to 
support cotton farm income by restricting output, supporting domestic market prices, and making 
payments of various types to cotton producers. Supply reduction has been achieved through 
various programs designed to reduce acreage in production, such as acreage allotments, set-
asides, and acreage reduction programs, as well as long-term land retirement programs like the 
Soil Bank in the 1950s and the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) created in 1985. The 
combined effect of these programs has been to support farm prices over the years, including the 
price of cotton. 
 
The principal price support feature of U.S. farm policy has been the nonrecourse (NR) marketing 
assistance loan program operated by the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) since 1938. 
Through the CCC, cotton farmers can request loans on the bales of cotton they have harvested 
and ginned at the announced loan rate. Until passage of the 1985 farm bill, when market prices 
rose sufficiently above the loan rate during the term of the loan, cotton farmers could sell their 
crop and repay their loans plus any fees and charges. If market prices dropped below the loan 
rate, however, producers defaulted on their loans and transfered ownership of their cotton 
(pledged as collateral) to the CCC as full settlement of their loans, without penalty. The 
commodity loan program acted to support price at the established loan rate by removing supply 
from the market and into government inventories until the market price rose to the level of the 
loan rate. The NR loan rate for cotton rose from 38.9¢/lb in the mid-1970s to a high of 57.3¢/lb 
in 1985.  Since that time, however, the cotton NR loan rate has varied only slightly from a high 
of 55.0¢/lb in 1985 to a low of 50.0¢/lb in 1994.  The current cotton NR loan rate is 52.0¢/lb. 
 
Beginning with direct payments under the Food and Agriculture Act of 1965 and then deficiency 
payments under the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973, income support to U.S. 
producers of many commodities, including cotton, became a central feature of U.S. farm policy.  
Until the passage of the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996, 
producers received deficiency payments equal to the difference between a set target price and the  
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existing national average market price or the non-recourse loan rate, whichever was higher (the 
payment rate). The total payment to each farmer was calculated as the product of the payment 
rate, the farm's eligible payment acreage, and the farm's established program payment yield. 
Producers could only take part in the non-recourse loan program or receive deficiency payments 
if they set aside a portion of their acreage to reduce production. 
 
The Food Security Act (FSA) of 1985 added marketing loan provisions to the income support 
features of U.S. farm policy for cotton and a few other commodities. The marketing loan 
program allows cotton producers to sell their crop in the market and repay their loans at less than 
the loan rate and receive a marketing loan gain (or loan deficiency payment, as applicable) equal 
to the difference between the loan rate and the “adjusted world price” (AWP) (the marketing 
loan repayment rate) whenever the AWP was below the loan rate. The AWP is the prevailing 
world price for upland cotton, adjusted to account for U.S. quality and location. In most years 
during that period, however, cotton prices stayed above the loan rate (see Table 2).  
 
To mitigate potential negative impacts of the price support programs on exports and the domestic 
textile industry and to further support cotton farm income, the Food, Agriculture, Conservation, 
and Trade Act (FACTA) of 1990 implemented a three-step “competitiveness” program for 
cotton. Step 1 of the program allows the Secretary of Agriculture to lower the cotton loan 
repayment rate when the AWP falls below 115% of the upland cotton loan rate and the weekly 
average U.S.-Northern Europe price quotation exceeds the Northern Europe price quotation.   
Step 2 provided for payments to U.S. mills and exporters in user marketing certificates or cash 
when the A index exceeded the Northern European cotton price by more than 1.25¢/lb for four 
consecutive weeks. As indicated earlier, the Step 2 provision underwent several modifications 
through the years and was ultimately repealed effective August 1, 2006.  Step 3 permits special 
import quotas for upland cotton to enable domestic mills to import foreign cotton when the 
weekly average U.S.-Northern Europe price quotation (adjusted for any certificate value in 
effect, unless U.S. supplies are extremely tight) exceeds the Northern Europe price quotation by 
more than 1.25¢/lb for four consecutive weeks. 
 
Recent Changes in U.S. Cotton Policy 
 
With the passage of the FAIR Act in 1996, acreage reduction programs were eliminated and a 
schedule of agricultural marketing transition assistance (AMTA) payments was established. 
Cotton farmers were offered declining payments, known as production flexibility contract (PFC) 
payments, based on historical acreage and yields. Total planting flexibility enabled cotton 
producers who had participated in previous commodity programs to shift production to other 
crops such as corn or soybeans without sacrificing program benefits. Total planting flexibility 
also permitted farmers to shift production to cotton from other crops.  The FAIR Act also 
continued the three-step “competitiveness” program that was initiated under the 1990 farm bill.  
In 1998, Congress added ad hoc marketing loss assistance (MLA) payments to the PFCs. 
Continuation of the CRP allowed the Cotton Belt to continue active participation in acreage 
reduction to control soil erosion. 
   
The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 replaced PFC payments with direct 
payments (DPs) and added new counter-cyclical payments (CCPs) for cotton and other covered  
 
9
crops for 2002 through 2007 (Westcott, Young, and Price 2002).  Like PFC payments, DPs are 
decoupled (not tied to current production or price).  CCPs, on the other hand, are only partially 
decoupled payments.  Farmers have nearly complete flexibility in what to plant to their base so 
that CCPs are essentially decoupled from production decisions.  However, the actual payment 
received can be affected by the current market price so that the CCPs are not decoupled from 
prices. Owners of farms were given a one-time opportunity to select a method for determining 
base acreage for both DPs and CCPs based on historic production. The payment acreage was set 
at 85% of base acreage. Payment yields for DPs remained at the levels specified by the 1996 
Farm Act. For CCPs, farmers could update their payment yields at the time they initially 
enrolled. To receive payments, owners have to enroll annually. 
 
DPs were made available to eligible landowners and producers of upland cotton who enter into 
an annual agreement. The amount of the DP is equal to the product of the payment rate, payment 
acres, and payment yield. The payment rate for upland cotton is set at 6.67¢/lb for crop years 
2002 through 2007.  CCPs are available to contract holders when a program crop's target price is 
greater than the effective price. The target price for upland cotton for the crop years 2002 
through 2007 specified in the 2002 Farm Act is 72.4¢/lb.  Consequently, the effective price of 
upland cotton received by producers is the sum of the DP (6.67¢/lb) and the higher of the 
national average farm price for the marketing year or the national loan rate (52.0¢/lb). The 
minimum effective upland cotton price is 58.67¢/lb, calculated as the sum of the direct payment 
(6.67¢/lb) and the loan rate (52.0¢/lb). The maximum payment rate for upland cotton is 
13.73¢/lb, calculated as the target price (72.4¢/lb) minus the minimum effective price 
(58.67¢/lb). The payment amount equals the product of the payment rate, payment acres, and the 
counter-cyclical payment yield.  
 
The 2002 Farm Bill extends nonrecourse commodity loans with marketing loan provisions but 
eliminates the requirement that producers must enter into an agreement for DPs in order to be 
eligible for loan program benefits. All current upland cotton production is eligible. Farmers can 
receive government marketing loan assistance payments either through marketing loan gains 
(MLG) for those producers who receive CCC nonrecourse loans or loan deficiency payments 
(LDP).  Cotton producers with CCC loans can receive an MLG because the marketing loan 
provisions allow them to  repay their loans at a rate less than the loan rate. The difference 
between the loan rate and the repayment rate is the MLG. Alternatively, producers who do not 
place their cotton crop under loan can receive an LDP when the AWP is below the national loan 
rate of 52¢/lb. The difference between the AWP and the loan rate is the LDP.  
In addition to the price and income support provisions of the 2002 Farm Act, cotton producers 
can also benefit from crop and revenue insurance programs to guard against diverse weather, 
insect manifestations, and other natural perils. Payments from the USDA to cotton farmers have 
covered a portion of the contract premiums for the insurance policies. 
 
Clearly, U.S. farm policy has been an important driver in U.S. cotton markets. Government 
outlays to U.S. cotton farmers totaled roughly $29.6 billion between 1986/87 and 2004/05, 
averaging about $1.6 billion per year (Table 12).  Payments to cotton farmers hit  a low of $217 
million in 1995/96 just before the 1996 Farm Bill was passed and then hit an all-time high of 
$3.9 billion just before the 2002 Farm Bill was passed. At $2.2 billion, payments to cotton 
farmers in 2004/05 were nearly 50% above the annual average since 1986/87.  
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U.S. Cotton Policy and the WTO Cotton Decision 
 
In March 2005, a WTO appellate panel ruled against the U.S. in a dispute settlement case 
brought by Brazil against certain aspects of the U.S. cotton program (Schnepf 2006). In 
compliance with the “prohibited subsidy” portion of the WTO ruling, the Bush Administration  
proposed statutory changes to Congress in July of 2005, including elimination of the Step 2 
cotton program, removal of a 1% cap on fees charged under the GSM-102 export credit 
guarantee program, and termination of the GSM-103 export credit guarantee program. Congress 
complied with a portion of the Administration’s proposal by including a provision in the Deficit 
Reduction Act of 2005 (February 2006) that called for the elimination of Step 2 on August 1, 
2006. Schnepf (2006) indicates that with this action and the expectation that the rest of the WTO 
ruling will be fully implemented quickly, Brazil has temporarily suspended its pursuit of WTO-
sanctioned retaliatory trade measures against U.S. agricultural products. He argues that 
“additional permanent modifications to U.S. farm programs may still be needed to fully comply 
with the ‘actionable subsidies’ portion of the WTO ruling.”   
 
Textile and Apparel Trade Agreements 
 
The government also has intervened in U.S. textile markets by restricting imports of textiles and 
apparel in an effort to protect the U.S. cotton industry.  The intervention has historically taken 
the form of textile and apparel trade agreements to limit imports through tariffs and quotas. Prior 
to the 1970s, a trade agreement, referred to as the Long Term Agreement Regarding International 
Trade in Cotton Textiles (LTA), was in effect. This agreement specifically allowed the U.S. to 
limit the growth of cotton textile imports to 5% per year (Dickerson 1999).  No restrictions on 
man-made fiber trade were imposed during the years 1964 to 1971.  Following an influx of man-
made fiber textile imports in the early 1970s, however, the U.S. joined the Multi-Fiber 
Arrangement (MFA) in 1973. Under the MFA, import quotas were established by participating 
countries and implemented on a country- and product-specific basis when textile and clothing 
exports posed a threat of “market disruption” (MacDonald and Vollrath 2005). The MFA was 
renewed in 1977, 1981, and 1986 with minimal changes in provisions.  
 
The MFA and its predecessor agreements influenced world textile and clothing trade patterns for 
nearly 50 years (MacDonald and Vollrath 2005).  The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
(ATC) negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) negotiations and signed in 1994 specified that the MFA was to be phased out by the end 
of 2004.  The ATC established a schedule for eliminating quotas initially established under the 
MFA and for accelerating the annual growth rates in import quantities under the quota system. 
Under the ATC, textile and clothing tariffs also were lowered, highlighting the need to bring all 
trade policies applied to the sector into alignment with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. 
 
U.S. Cotton Demand Enhancement Policy 
 
In addition to price support policy, the government has also attempted to raise the level of cotton 
farm income through domestic demand enhancement programs, that is, shifting the demand 
curve for cotton to the right. The basic cotton demand enhancement policies implemented by the 
government over time fall into three categories:  (1) foreign demand expansion through policies  
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that promote exports; (2) subsidies for the development of new uses for cotton; and (3) domestic 
demand enhancement through checkoff-funded advertising and promotional programs. 
 
The particular policy interest in demand enhancement programs of any type stems from the fact  
that “farmers as a group are better off at a given increase in the price of a product, if the increase 
comes about through an increase in demand rather than a decrease in supply” (Gardner 1981).  In 
other words, if a program to expand demand for a commodity through advertising or promotion 
efforts, for example, effectively shifts the demand curve outward and boosts the price of the 
commodity, domestic producers, from a welfare viewpoint, are better off than if the price 
increase were to come about from an inward shift of the supply curve due to a particular 
production control program. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 5, an increase in the demand for a commodity from advertising, for 
example, from D0 to D1 also raises the price from P0 to P1, and increases producer surplus 
(producer welfare) from area i to area f+g+h+i resulting in a net increase in producer surplus of 
area f+g+h.  At the same time, consumer surplus changes from area a+c+f to area a+b+c+d+e.  
But note that area a+b = area a+c+f so that the new consumer surplus area is equal to 
(a+c+f)+c+d+e.  Subtracting the original consumer surplus area from the new area gives a   
positive increase in consumer surplus of area c+d+e.  Thus, a demand expansion program 
unequivocally improves producer welfare and consumer welfare.  The net benefit to society from 
a rightward shift in demand unequivocally is positive and equal to the sum of area c+d+e (the 
gain in consumer welfare) and area f+g+h (the gain in producer surplus). 
 
On the other hand, as illustrated in Figure 6, a reduction in supply from S0 to S1 under some 
government supply reduction program, which also increases price from P0 to P1, changes 
producer welfare from area c+f+g to area b+c giving a net increase in producer surplus of b-f-g.  
Unless the gain of area b is greater than the loss of area f+g, producers will lose from this 
government effort to enhance the price of the commodity to producers.  Worse yet, the loss in 
producer welfare comes at a cost to taxpayers if any government payments or subsidies were 
involved to achieve the supply reduction.  At the same time, a supply reduction program leads to 
an unequivocal loss in welfare to consumers since they lose area b+d+e and remain only with 
area a after the supply reduction occurs.  The net benefit to society from a leftward shift in 
supply unequivocally is negative and equal to the sum of areas d, e, f, and g. 
 
U.S. Cotton Advertising and Promotion Programs 
 
Like most other major U.S. agricultural commodity industries, the U.S. cotton industry operates 
a government established program to expand demand through collective action by cotton 
farmers.  The term “checkoff” refers to the collection of assessments and comes from the concept 
of checking off the appropriate box on a form, like a tax return, to authorize a contribution for a 
specific purpose, such as the public financing of election campaigns, or, such as in this case, the 
financing of demand expansion programs.  As with many other commodity checkoff programs,  
the cotton checkoff funds collected are used to expand demand by financing both generic 





Historical Foundation of the Cotton Checkoff Program  
 
The legal groundwork for checkoff programs was laid in the early 1900s when farmers were 
granted greater control over the production and marketing of their goods.  First, the Clayton Act 
of 1914 exempted non-stock agricultural associations from antitrust laws.  Then, the Capper-
Volstead Act of 1922 extended the Clayton Act’s antitrust exemptions to all producer 
cooperatives but still prevented cooperatives from engaging in predatory market conduct to 
exclude competition.  Although the Capper-Volstead Act was initially praised as providing some 
solution to the farm problem, the limitations of cooperatives in (legally) alleviating over-
production remained as long as cooperatives were prevented from exercising near monopoly 
control over production marketing.   
 
In the early 1930s, some farm groups and cooperatives instituted commodity marketing 
programs using voluntarily collected producer funds.  For homogeneous commodities, however, 
cooperatives, just like individual producers, have little incentive to engage in marketing activities 
if they lack any real market power.  Producers not associated with a particular cooperative, for 
example, can take advantage of any price increase resulting from the cooperative’s marketing 
activity without incurring any of the cost involved.  As a general rule, voluntary programs fail 
because producers who choose to remain outside the programs “free ride” on the efforts of those 
producers adhering to the voluntary marketing programs. Unless universal participation is 
mandated and the free-rider problem is eliminated, efforts by groups of producers to collectively 
affect market prices and income will be largely ineffective (Crespi 2001). 
 
In order to provide farmers greater control over the marketing of their goods, the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1933 gave the Secretary of Agriculture the power to enter into marketing 
agreements with producers and to issue licenses granting the licensee permission to handle 
agricultural commodities.  The Act also granted the Secretary the authority to impose production 
restraints to reduce commodity surpluses in order to increase purchasing power to that which 
farmers had enjoyed in the more prosperous years of 1909 to 1914 (“purchasing power parity”).  
The period from 1909 to 1914 often is labeled as the golden period of agriculture. 
 
Marketing orders, established under the 1937 Agricultural Marketing and Agreement Act, 
provide farmers of particular commodities with a method of regulating the marketing of their 
products under the auspices of the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture (for a federal order) or the State 
Secretary of Agriculture (for a state order).  Under the orders, producers in an industry are 
compelled to participate jointly in certain aspects of the marketing of a commodity.  A marketing 
order for generic advertising compels all producers under the order to jointly contribute funds for 
industry advertising.  The generic advertising component of marketing orders is one of the 
regulatory attempts to alleviate the “farm problem”.  The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act 
of 1937, like its precursors, the Agricultural Adjustment Acts of 1933 and 1935 (amended), are 
extensions of earlier voluntary attempts by producers to control the farm problem. 
 
In 1954, Congress amended the 1937 Act to authorize the Secretary to establish “marketing 
development projects,” including advertising and promotion for a broad range of commodities, 
that would further the goals of the original act.  With the exception of some minor provisions for 
milk promotion, generic advertising had been left out of the original 1937 Act because the  
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USDA had concerns that advertising just changed market share from one commodity to another.  
By the 1950s, however, the government was purchasing a great deal of excess supply to maintain 
parity prices.  Stimulating demand through advertising, it was hoped, would increase farm prices 
while relieving pressure for government purchases of excess stocks.  Thus, generic advertising 
just added a demand instrument to the government’s toolbox of supply controls (Crespi 2001). 
 
Like any effort by groups of farmers to collectively enhance market prices and incomes, generic 
commodity advertising is likely to be ineffective if free riding by other producers is allowed.  
Typically, when free riding is allowed, a sub-optimal level of funds for advertising is expended 
in the industry.  Consequently, even though every producer would benefit from advertising if all 
producers participated, no individual producer or group of producers wants to undertake the 
expense of benefiting all producers, particularly if the group is small relative to the total number 
of producers.  A marketing order for generic advertising solves this problem by compelling every 
producer in an industry to support the program.  The stipulations of marketing orders for generic 
advertising generally are that advertising must truly be of a generic nature so as not to benefit 
some producers over others, and that the assessed money may not be used to promote political or 
ideological viewpoints (Crespi 2001). 
 
The Cotton Research and Promotion Act 
 
Until the development of petroleum-derived synthetic fibers in the 1950s, cotton was unrivaled 
as the dominant fiber in clothing and home textiles in the United States. The introduction of 
polyester and nylon fibers led to a sustained decline in the demand for cotton for all uses 
beginning in 1960.  By 1966, the decline in cotton demand had progressed to the point that 
Congress intervened, passing the Cotton Research and Promotion Act (CRPA) of 1966 (PL89-
502) (Murray et al. 2001), in an effort to arrest the erosion of consumer demand for cotton.   
 
In passing the CRPA, Congress reasoned that the inroads into the textile fiber market made by 
synthetic fibers were due, for the most part, to research and promotion conducted by primarily 
large chemical firms. Because cotton producers did not have the resources to perform these 
activities or the legal means to join together to fund such work, Congress provided a 
coordinating mechanism to enable producers to collectively engage in research and promotion 
(Murray et al. 2001). 
 
The legislative intent of the CRPA and of the Cotton Research and Promotion Amendments Act 
(CRPAA) of 1990 was to authorize and enable the establishment of an orderly procedure for the 
development of “an effective and coordinated program of research and promotion.”  The 1966 
Act specifically authorized the creation of the Cotton Board to “establish and carry out research 
and development projects and studies with respect to the production, ginning, processing, 
distribution or utilization of cotton and its products.”  The design of both Acts was to strengthen 
the competitive position of cotton vis-à-vis primarily man-made fibers and to expand domestic 
and foreign markets and uses for U.S. cotton.  Clearly, the Acts are about more than increasing 
consumer demand through advertising and promotion.  Rather, advertising was intended to be 
one of several elements in a coordinated campaign to improve the use and quality of cotton 




From 1967 to 1991, all domestic producers were required to pay cotton assessments. However, 
the 1966 Act allowed producers who were not in favor of supporting the program to request a 
refund. Over the period 1967 to 1991, up to one-third of the assessments collected were 
refunded.  The CRPAA, enacted by Congress in November 1990 under Subtitle G of Title XIX 
of the Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990, contained two provisions 
amending funding procedures of the CRPA: (1) all cotton marketed in the United States, whether 
from domestic or foreign production, was to share in the cost of the research and promotion 
program and (2) the right of cotton producers to demand a refund of assessments was terminated.  
The CRPAA was approved by producers and importers voting in a referendum held July 17-26, 
1991. Consequently, since July 31, 1992, all imported cotton, and not just the cotton produced in 
the U.S., has been subject to the assessment of a fee as set out in the CRPAA. The assessment on 
imports is collected by the U.S. Customs Service and remitted to the Cotton Board through the 
Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) on a monthly basis. 
 
The CRPA, as amended by the CRPAA, requires an assessment of one dollar per bale plus a 
fractional percentage of value (specifically five-tenths of one percent), collected by first 
handlers, on domestically produced (raw) cotton, imported (raw) cotton, and the cotton content 
of imported textile and apparel products. Almost all U.S. cotton imports are textile and apparel 
cotton products rather than raw cotton. The AMS adopted the use of the calendar year average 
price received by U.S. farmers for upland cotton as a benchmark for the value of domestically 
produced cotton.  Use of the average price figure in the calculation of supplemental assessments 
on imported cotton and the cotton content of imported products yields a value that approximates 
assessments paid on domestically produced cotton.   
 
Cotton Checkoff Assessments 
 
Since 1976, the assessment on U.S. cotton producers has ranged from a low of 0.460¢/lb in 1999 
through 2002 to a high of 0.644¢/lb in 1980 (Table 13). The assessment is a fraction of the 
higher of the average price received by producers or the U.S. government loan rate for upland 
cotton and has generally declined since 1976. The importer assessment began in August of 1992 
and has since varied from a low of 0.383¢/lb in 2003 and 2004 to a high of 0.581¢/lb in 1997 
(Table 14).  The importer assessment is a fraction of the effective price used in the calculation of 
the assessment and has also tended to decline over time, at least since 1997.  
 
A comparison of the producer and importer assessments demonstrates that they are not equal.   
The importer assessment exceeded the producer assessment on a per pound basis in every year 
from 1992 through 2000 except for 1994 and 1995.  Since 2001, however, the annual producer 
assessment has been greater than the importer assessment by as much as 0.115¢/lb and as little as 
0.014¢/lb.  In 2004, the producer assessment exceeded the importer assessment by 0.077¢/lb. 
 
The Cotton Board collects all assessments and then contracts with producer-controlled 
organizations to carry out the research and promotion activities as authorized by the legislative 
Acts. Initially, the producer-controlled organization was the Cotton Producer Institute.   
Beginning in 1970, however, Cotton Incorporated (CI) was charged with the task of carrying out 
all research and promotion activities except export promotion under contract with the Cotton 




Because the checkoff program is federally authorized, the Secretary of Agriculture and the AMS 
have oversight responsibilities. Recommended program plans and budgets of the Cotton Board 
must be approved by the Secretary before they become operational. The responsibilities of AMS 
include: (1) developing regulations to implement the checkoff program, in consultation with the 
cotton industry and (2) ensuring compliance with the authorizing legislation. AMS regulations 
specify allowable activities, such as the type of promotion or research activities, the level and 
collection of assessments, the composition of the Cotton Board, and the types of allowable 
expenditures. AMS reviews the budgets and projects of the Cotton Board to prevent any 
prohibited activities such as lobbying.  Although not responsible for conducting evaluations of 
the program, the AMS reviews the independent evaluation of the effectiveness of the program 
required at least once every 5 years by the 1996 Farm Bill.  The Cotton Board reimburses AMS 
for its oversight costs. 
  
Between 1986 and 1991, about 65% of the cotton assessments collected (from $18.3 million up 
to $28.6 million in nominal terms over that period) was available for funding cotton checkoff 
activities and the remaining 35% was refunded on average each year.  By eliminating refunds, 
the 1990 amendments to the CRPA contributed to a substantial increase in annual cotton 
checkoff collections from $42 million in 1992 to $66 million in 2004 (Table 15).  
 
Since the implementation of the CRPAA in the early 1990s, contributions by importers have 
grown to $24.7 million.  Over that same period, producer contributions have varied considerably 
along with cash receipts from cotton sales from as low as $30.5 million in 1993 to as high as 
42.1 million in 1996 (Table 15). Total producer assessments were $41.3 in 2004. In the early 
1990s, importer assessments accounted for about 30% of total collections annually with 
producers paying the other 70%. Over time, however, the producer share has dropped to just over 
60% of total collections in 2004 while the importer share has increased to just under 40%. 
 
Cotton Checkoff Expenditures 
 
Cotton Incorporated (CI) uses the checkoff assessments collected to finance a wide variety of 
research and promotion activities which can be grouped into four categories: (1) marketing and 
promotion, (2) agricultural research, (3) textile or non-agricultural research, and (4) 
administration.  The CI total annual budget grew from $18.4 million in 1986 to over $60 million 
(unadjusted for inflation) in recent years (Table 15). In 2004, about 67% of the collected 
assessments were used to finance marketing and promotion activities and 16% to finance textile 
research activities.  Though a larger percentage of the budget goes to marketing/promotion than 
to textile research and development, that breakdown reflects the cost of national advertising more 
than program priorities.  The remainder was spent on agricultural research activities (13%) and 
administration (5%) (Table 15). 
 
Marketing and promotion activities include media advertising, public relations, fashion 
marketing, retail promotion, and global product marketing.  The most salient element in the 
consumer marketing effort revolves around the image represented by the “Cotton Seal”. This 
image is maintained and enhanced through media promotion, merchandising events, primary 
data collection, and strategic partnerships (for example, tie-ins with apparel retailers like J.C.  
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Penney and manufacturers like Proctor and Gamble). The CI global product marketing effort 
involves communications with textile mills and clothing retailers worldwide about the various  
products and services available. CI makes presentations at trade shows and distributes various 
publications to customers both in the United States and abroad.   
 
Checkoff funds allocated for textile research (non-agricultural research) finance technical 
support to mills, apparel manufacturers, and retailers to find ways of reducing their costs and 
increasing their operating efficiencies (such as improvements in fiber quality and processing, 
fabric production, fabric development, and ginning technology) as well as new product 
development research (such as wrinkle-free cotton, stretch fabrics, and flame-resistant cotton). 
Textile research activities focus on fiber quality and fiber management. CI provides 
measurement, data analysis services, and technical support related to fiber quality characteristics 
such as color, staple length, micronaire, and stickiness. Also, fiber performance in finished 
textiles, including shrinkage, fading, and smoothness is monitored. CI’s High Volume 
Instrument/Engineered Fiber Selection (HVI/EFS) system is the standard for measuring fiber 
quality. This system is used by merchants and mills to track the performance of each year’s crop 
and to select the optimal mix of cotton bales for specific needs. Textile research activities also 
include research and development in conjunction with U.S. as well as foreign textile mills in 
both processing and fashion fabrics to: (1) improve their ability to process cotton and cotton-
containing blends (the processing component) and (2) increase the desirability of cotton apparel 
to the final consumer (the fashion fabric component).  From 1986 through 2004, 15% to 20% of 
CI budget allocations have been directed to textile or non-agricultural research (Table 15). 
 
Agricultural research activities focus on reducing the costs or increasing the efficiency of 
growing and ginning cotton. Agricultural research expenditures rose from just over $800,000 in 
1986 (4% of expenditures) to $8.4 million in 2004 (12.7% of expenditures) (Table 15).  While  
administrative expenditures rose over the same period from $1.5 million to $3.2 million, the 
share of total expenditures accounted for by administrative costs dropped from 8% to about 5%. 
 
Despite the rather strong upward trend of nominal expenditures of cotton checkoff funds (Figure 
7), inflation has eroded the purchasing power of those funds.  In terms of 1982-84 inflation 
adjusted dollars, cotton checkoff expenditures by Cotton Incorporated declined to a low in the 
mid-1970s and then increased to a high in 1996 before declining somewhat over the next several 
years (Figure 8).  
 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE COTTON CHECKOFF PROGRAM 
 
Before attempting to empirically estimate the effects of the cotton checkoff program on U.S. and 
world fiber and textile markets and to calculate the cotton producer and importer average benefit-
cost ratios associated with the program, this section of the report first examines the program and 
its market effects graphically to determine what economic theory can tell us about how the 
checkoff program affects world fiber and textile markets.  Following the graphical analysis,  the 
methodology used in the analysis is presented, including a detailed review of the econometric 
simulation model and data used.  The results of the simulation analysis then are presented 




Graphical Analysis of the Cotton Checkoff Program 
 
After developing a simplified graphical representation or model of U.S. and world cotton and 
cotton textile markets, the model is used first to examine the economic incidence of the checkoff 
assessments paid by U.S. cotton producers and by U.S. cotton textile importers.  Then the   
graphical model is used to consider the likely effects of the cotton checkoff program on U.S. and 
world cotton and cotton fiber textile markets with a focus on the impacts of the retail 
marketing/promotion expenditures and the non-agricultural research expenditures associated 
with the checkoff program.  Next, the likely effects of cotton checkoff expenditures on U.S. and 
world man-made fiber and man-made fiber textile markets are analyzed.  Finally, based on the 
results of the graphical analysis, the likely returns to both producers and importers from the 
cotton checkoff expenditures are considered. 
 
Graphical Representation of World Cotton and Cotton Fiber Textile Markets 
 
A simplified graphical representation of world cotton and cotton textile markets is provided in 
Figure 9.  The top row of graphs represents raw cotton markets while the bottom row represents 
cotton fiber textile markets.  Cotton fiber textiles are the cotton products produced by mills for 
retail consumption, primarily cotton apparel but also cotton floor coverings and various cotton 
textile home furnishings.  Also, the first column of graphs represents U.S. markets while the last 
column represents all other countries. The middle column represents world markets. 
 
In raw cotton markets, the supply of cotton in each country is upward sloping indicating that an 
increase in cotton price leads to an increase in the quantity of cotton supplied to the market.  The 
supply of cotton in each country also is a function of other variables such as costs of production, 
the prices of competing crops, weather, and domestic agricultural policies. The demand for raw 
cotton in each country is the demand by mills for processing cotton into cotton fiber textiles and 
is downward sloping because an increase in cotton price reduces the quantity of raw cotton 
demanded by mills for processing.  Mill demand for cotton in each country also is affected by 
other variables such as the price of cotton fiber textiles and processing capacity in the 
corresponding country.  While the price of raw cotton represents the cost of the cotton input to 
cotton mills, the cotton fiber textile price represents the price of mill output. Consequently, while 
an increase in the raw cotton price reduces the quantity of cotton demanded by mills, represented 
by a movement along the mill demand curve up and to the left, an increase in the cotton fiber 
textile price is an incentive to mills to process more cotton and hence shifts the mill demand 
curve to the right. 
 
The U.S. is depicted in Figure 9 as an exporter of raw cotton because the U.S. supply of cotton is 
greater than U.S. mill demand for cotton at most prices.  In other words, at most prices, the U.S. 
can produce more cotton than is demanded by domestic mills.  The excess supply of cotton not 
demanded by domestic mills is available for export and is graphed as the upward sloping export 
supply curve in the middle graph on the top row of graphs in Figure 9.  The U.S. cotton export 
supply is the horizontal difference between the U.S. cotton supply and demand curves and is 
upward sloping because the higher the price, the greater the gap between the U.S. domestic 
supply and mill demand for cotton making more available for export at higher prices.  In 
contrast, the “rest-of-the-world” (ROW) is depicted as a net cotton importing region.  The ROW  
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supply and demand curves are the horizontal sums of the respective cotton supply and demand 
curves in all non-U.S. cotton producing and consuming countries.  Because what the ROW 
produces is less than what is demanded in those countries at most prices, the ROW is depicted as 
a net importing region.  The ROW import demand curve in the middle graph on the top row of 
graphs in Figure 9 is drawn as the difference between the ROW mill demand and supply of 
cotton and is downward sloping because the lower the price, the greater the gap between ROW 
cotton mill demand and supply.  The interaction of the U.S. export supply and ROW import 
demand in world markets determines the world price (
w
c P ) and quantity traded (
w
c Q ) of raw 
cotton.  In turn, the world price level determines the quantities of cotton demanded and supplied 
in all countries, including the United States. 
 
In cotton fiber textile (CFT) markets, the demand for CFTs is downward sloping because an 
increase in the price of CFTs reduces the quantity demanded. Other variables that affect CFT 
demand in each country include the prices of non-cotton textile products (primarily those made 
from man-made fibers like polyester and rayon) and consumer disposable personal income.  The 
vertical supply curves for CFT products reflect the fact that the mill demand for raw cotton in 
each country is actually the supply of cotton fiber textiles.  Given the cotton milling technology, 
therefore, the CFT yield per unit of cotton as determined by the installed capacity multiplied by 
the quantity of cotton processed at a given price for cotton (
us
c QD  at price 
w
c P in the United 
States, for example) gives the quantity of CFT products produced at that price of cotton (
us
cft QS ). 
 
Besides being linked through processing technology, the markets for raw cotton and CFTs also 
are linked through prices.  For the cotton miller, the price of cotton represents the price of the 
input while the CFT price represents the price of the output.   If the price of cotton (
w
c P in Figure 
9) increases, then the quantity of cotton demanded for processing and, consequently, the volume 
of CFT products produced, both decline.  On the other hand, if the CFT price (
w
cft P  in Figure 9) 
increases, the volume of cotton demanded at a given price for cotton increases which would be 
depicted as a rightward shift in the cotton mill demand curve. A CFT price increase results in not 
only a greater volume of cotton milled but also as greater volume of CFTs supplied to the market 
which would be shown as a rightward shift of the vertical CFT supply curve. 
The United States is depicted as a CFT importing country because at most prices the U.S. 
demand for CFT products is greater than the supply of those products available from U.S. mills.  
Consequently, the U.S. imports CFT products as depicted by the downward sloping U.S. CFT 
import demand curve in Figure 9 which is drawn as the difference between the domestic U.S. 
CFT supply and demand curves.  In contrast, the ROW exports CFT products to the United 
States so that the CFT supply is greater than the CFT demand in that region at most prices.  The 
ROW export supply curve for CFT products is, therefore, upward sloping and drawn as the 
horizontal difference between the ROW supply and demand for CFT products.  The interaction 
of the U.S. CFT import demand and the ROW CFT export supply determines both the world 
price (
w
cft P ) and quantity traded (
w
cft Q ) of CFTs in the world market. 
 
Note that this graphical model of U.S. and world cotton and cotton fiber textile markets does not 
include the effects of U.S. domestic cotton policy or textile import policies in order to focus on 
the basic underlying economic relationships in the U.S. and world cotton and cotton textile  
 
19
markets without the distortions implied by domestic and trade policy. These effects are 
incorporated into the graphical analysis later as part of the discussion of the effects of the cotton 
checkoff program expenditures.   
 
Incidence of the U.S. Cotton Producer and Cotton Textile Importer Assessments 
 
As indicated earlier in this report, the costs of cotton promotion and research activities until the 
early 1990s were financed through an assessment on each unit of domestic cotton sold.  With the 
passage of the CRPAA of 1990, an additional assessment was levied on imported cotton and 
cotton-containing products in addition to domestically produced cotton.  Thus, before addressing 
the question of the effects of the expenditure of the checkoff funds collected on cotton and cotton 
fiber markets, we first consider the incidence of the two assessments (producer assessment and 
importer assessment), or, in other words, the effects of the collection of the assessments on the 
markets.  The key question is “Who pays the assessments?”  The answer to that question is not 
straight forward and requires an understanding of the economics of tax incidence. 
 
A Brief Review of Tax Incidence 
 
The study of tax incidence in economics essentially is the study of who bears the burden of the 
tax, or in other words, who pays for the tax. The basic economic principles apply to the payment 
of any type of fee whether a sales tax, an import tariff, or a fee like the checkoff  assessment.  
The  seemingly obvious answer to the question of who pays for a tax or any other type of 
assessment is that the one from whom the tax or assessment is collected pays the tax or 
assessment.  In the case of the cotton checkoff program, it is commonly assumed that producers 
pay the assessment on raw cotton and that importers pay the assessment on imported cotton since 
the producer assessment appears to be deducted from the price they receive for the cotton they 
sell while the importer assessment is collected by the U.S. Customs Service from importers in 
much the same way as a tariff is collected. The actual answer to the question of tax incidence, 
however, is more complicated and involves the economic structure of the particular industry 
being studied.  A couple of simple examples serve to illustrate the point. 
 
In the case of an assessment on a domestically produced commodity, the assessment represents 
an increase in the costs to producers.  In Figure 10, the increase in producer cost represented by 
the assessment is shown as an upward shift in the domestic supply curve (to “supply with 
assessment” in Figure 10) since the supply curve is the marginal cost curve of the industry.  In 
other words, for every quantity of the commodity supplied by the producer, the price required to 
cover the cost of the assessment is higher.  The shift of the supply curve increases the market 
price at which producers sell their output along the demand curve (from “market price before 
assessment” to “market price after assessment” in Figure 10) and reduces the quantity available 
for consumption (from “market quantity before assessment” to “market quantity after 
assessment” in Figure 10).  Subtracting the assessment from the higher market price received by 
producers for each unit of the commodity sold gives the net price received by producers per unit 
sold.  Note that the assessment is the difference between the market price after assessment and 
the net price received by producers.  Note that as a result of the assessment the net price received 
by producers is not only lower than the price received before the assessment but also the 
reduction in the price is less than the assessment.  At the same time, the market price is higher as  
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a result of the assessment but the increase in the market price also is less than the assessment.  
Consequently, the assessment is paid in part by producers in terms of a lower net price received 
for their output and in part by buyers of the commodity in terms of a higher price paid for the 
commodity.  In other words, producers and buyers share the cost of the assessment. 
 
The share of the cost of the assessment paid for by producers and the share paid by buyers 
depends on the particular characteristics of the commodity market.  For example, Figure 11 
illustrates a market structure in which market demand is price-inelastic (relatively unresponsive 
to changes in market price) and supply is price-elastic (relatively responsive to changes in market 
price).  Given the same pre-assessment market supply and price, charging the same per unit 
assessment results in a higher market price as well as a higher net price received by producers.  
In this case, the largest proportion of the assessment is paid for by buyers in terms of a higher 
price with little of the cost falling on producers in terms of a lower net price received for their 
output. If the situation were reversed (that is, a more price-elastic demand and a more price-
inelastic supply), then a larger portion of the assessment would be paid by producers with buyers 
paying a smaller share.  Thus, who actually pays an assessment on a domestically-produced 
commodity, or how the cost of the assessment is shared by producers and buyers, has nothing to 
do with how or from whom the assessment is collected but rather on the price elasticities of 
supply and demand of the commodity. 
 
In the case of an assessment on an imported product, who actually pays the assessment also is 
independent of how or from whom the assessment is collected.  In this case, as in the case of a 
domestically produced commodity, who actually pays the cost of the assessment is determined 
by the own-price elasticities of supply and demand.  An assessment on imports is collected by 
the U.S. Customs Service as the product enters the country just as tariffs and other import duties 
are collected.  The U.S. Customs Service then remits the amount collected to the appropriate 
commodity organization.  Thus, the assessment operates much like a tariff in its effects on the 
market.  In Figure 12, the import demand curve represents the quantities of the product that the 
importing country is willing to import at various prices and the export supply curve represents 
the quantities that the exporting country is willing to export at various prices.  Before imposition 
of the import assessment, market equilibrium occurs at the “market price before assessment” 
with market demand at the “quantity demanded before assessment,” market supply at the 
“quantity supplied before assessment,” and imports at “imports before assessment.” 
 
When the assessment is imposed, the price received by the sellers of the product in the exporting 
country is less than the price paid by the buyers in the importing country by the amount of the 
assessment.  In other words, the net price that sellers in the exporting country receive is the price 
paid by the buyers in the importing country (“market price charged to consumers after 
assessment”) minus the assessment.  This situation is illustrated in Figure 12 with an import 
demand curve that is lower by the amount of the assessment at every level of imports (“import 
demand with assessment”). 
 
Given the lower import demand curve, the quantity imported is now lower (“imports after 
assessment’) as well as the price received by sellers in the exporting country from retailers or 
others who import the product for sale in the importing country (“net price received by foreign 
sellers”).  Adding the assessment to the price paid to (and received by) foreign sellers at the  
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lower level of imports gives the market price charged to consumers by retailers or others who 
import the product for domestic sale. 
 
The result of the assessment on the imported product, therefore, is a higher price charged to 
consumers and a lower net price received by foreign sellers.  The difference between those two 
prices is the amount of the assessment.  Thus, in this case, the assessment is paid by sellers in the 
exporting countries in terms of a lower price and by consumers in the importing country in terms 
of a higher price.  As in the case of an assessment on a domestically-produced commodity, the 
share of the cost of the assessment paid for by domestic consumers and by foreign sellers 
depends on the price elasticities (that is, the relative price responsiveness) of supply and demand.  
Note that, in this case, the share of the cost paid by the two groups depends on the supply and 
demand elasticities in both the importing and the exporting countries.  Consequently, the more 
price-elastic the supply and demand for the product in the exporting countries (and, therefore, the 
more elastic the export supply) and the less price-elastic the demand and supply of the product in 
the importing country (and, therefore, the more price-inelastic the import demand), the greater 
the share of the cost of the assessment that is paid by consumers in the importing country.  
Conversely, the more price inelastic is export supply and the more price elastic is import 
demand, the greater the share of the assessment that is paid by foreign sellers. 
 
Finally, note that intermediaries involved in the buying, selling, transporting, or other services do 
not pay any of the cost of the assessment.  For example, a domestic firm that buys the product 
from foreign sellers for sale in the domestic market pays the lower net price to the foreign sellers 
and charges the higher market price to consumers.  So even if the assessment is collected from an 
intermediary firm such as a retailer, that firm does not actually pay the cost since the firm 
recovers that cost by being able to pay a lower price to foreign sellers and to charge a higher 
price to consumers than would have been the case without the assessment. 
 
Incidence of the U.S. Cotton Producer Checkoff Assessment 
 
Using the graphical model of U.S. and world cotton and cotton fiber textile markets developed 
earlier and based on the previous discussion of the incidence of a tax, Figure 13 provides a 
graphical analysis of the incidence of the U.S. cotton producer checkoff assessment.  As 
explained earlier, the assessment acts as an increase in the cost of producing cotton and shifts the 
market supply of cotton up and, therefore, the U.S. export supply of cotton as well (the darker, 
higher U.S. export supply curve in Figure 13).  The consequences are a higher world market 
price for cotton and a lower net price received by U.S. cotton producers.  Again, whether the 
market price of raw cotton increases by more or less than the net price received by producers 
declines depends on the elasticities of supply and demand.  In other words, the share of the 
assessment paid for by U.S. cotton producers and the share paid by buyers (cotton mills) depends 
on the responsiveness of cotton supply and demand to prices in the U.S. and foreign countries.  
An empirical investigation is necessary to determine the actual share of the assessment paid by 
the two groups. 
 
The higher price of cotton reduces the quantity of cotton milled in the United States along with 
the volume of U.S. cotton exports since the decline in the U.S. cotton supply is greater than the 
decline in the U.S. quantity of cotton milled.  The higher market price for cotton also reduces the  
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quantity of cotton milled by foreign mills and increases the quantity of foreign cotton produced 
resulting in a lower volume of cotton imports by foreign countries.  The quantity of cotton milled 
in the United States and in foreign countries reduces the U.S. and foreign CFT supplies.  Even 
though the reduction in U.S. CFT production increases the U.S. demand for imported CFT (the 
rightward shift in the U.S. CFT import demand to the darker import demand curve in the bottom 
middle graph of Figure 13), the reduction in foreign CFT production restricts the availability of 
world CFT supplies (a leftward shift of the ROW CFT export supply to the darker export supply 
curve in the bottom middle graph of Figure 13), and pushes up the world CFT price (the higher, 
darker price line in the bottom row of graphs in Figure 13).  Whether the U.S. imports more or 
less CFT as a consequence depends on whether or not the increase in U.S. import demand 
outweighs the reduction in the ROW export supply.  If the ROW export supply declines by more 
than the U.S. import demand increases, the U.S. could import less CFT as a result of the U.S. 
cotton producer checkoff assessment.  On the other hand, the assessment could lead to greater 
U.S. CFT imports if the increase in the U.S. demand for such imports outweighs the reduction in 
the ROW export supply.  Either of the two cases is plausible but which actually occurs depends 
on myriad factors that affect the demand for and supply of cotton and cotton fiber textiles around 
the world.  An empirical analysis is required to determine the net effect of the cotton producer 
checkoff assessment on world CFT trade. 
 
Of course, the higher CFT price as a result of the assessment would tend to increase cotton mill 
demand in all countries leading to higher supplies of CFT in all countries, offsetting to some 
extent the positive effect of the producer assessment on the CFT price.  Under typical conditions, 
however, the net effect of the producer assessment on prices and quantities in both the cotton and 
CFT markets would be those represented in Figure 13. 
 
Incidence of the U.S. Cotton Textile Importer Checkoff Assessment 
 
The graphical analysis of the U.S. cotton textile importer checkoff assessment also follows 
closely from the earlier discussion of tax incidence.  In the middle bottom graph in Figure 14, the 
imposition of the importer assessment raises the CFT price charged to consumers and reduces the 
CFT price paid by importers (and received by foreign CFT suppliers) and, as a consequence, 
U.S. CFT imports decline.  Whether or not the CFT price charged to consumers increases by 
more than the CFT price paid by importers declines again depends on the price responsiveness of 
domestic and foreign CFT supplies and demands.   Under different plausible scenarios for the 
price elasticities of CFT supply and demand in the United States and in foreign countries, the 
share of the importer assessment paid for by U.S. consumers in the form of a higher price could 
be larger or smaller than the share of the importer assessment paid for by foreign CFT producers 
in the form of a lower CFT price.  An empirical investigation is necessary to determine the U.S. 
CFT consumer and the foreign CFT producer incidence (or share) of the assessment. 
 
The higher U.S. CFT price, however, signals an increase in U.S. mill demand (the rightward shift 
in U.S. mill demand to the darker curve in the top left graph in Figure 14) while the lower CFT 
price in foreign countries signals a decline in foreign cotton mill demand (the leftward shift in 
foreign mill demand to the darker curve in the top left graph of Figure 14).  Because the United 
States mills more cotton leaving less for export (the leftward shift of the U.S. cotton export 
supply curve in the top middle graph of Figure 14) while foreign countries mill less cotton  
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requiring less imports of U.S. cotton (the leftward shift of the ROW import demand curve in the 
top middle graph of Figure 14), the importer assessment not only leads to lower U.S. CFT  
imports but also to lower U.S. exports of raw cotton.  The implications concerning U.S. cotton 
prices, however, depend on the relative shift of the U.S cotton export supply curve and the ROW 
import demand curve.  If the reduction in ROW demand for U.S. cotton is greater than the U.S. 
reduction in the availability of cotton export supplies, the world price of cotton will be lower as a 
result of the importer assessment.  If, on the other hand, U.S. export supplies decline by more 
than the foreign demand for U.S. cotton, the importer assessment could lead to a higher market 
price of cotton.  Again, either case is quite plausible. Consequently, an empirical investigation is 
necessary to determine which case actually occurs. 
 
Of course, the increased U.S. cotton mill demand results in increased domestic supplies of CFT 
which tends to moderate the increase in the U.S. CFT price caused by the importer assessment to 
some extent.  At the same time, the lower foreign cotton mill demand results in lower foreign 
CFT supplies and tends to provide some price support in the ROW CFT market.  Under typical 
conditions, however, the net CFT price and quantity effects are those shown in Figure 14 (that is, 
a higher CFT price in the United States and a lower CFT price in the rest of the world). 
 
Effects of Cotton Checkoff Expenditures 
 
The preceding analysis of the incidence of the cotton checkoff assessments considers the market 
effects of imposing the producer and importer checkoff assessments.  Once the assessments are 
collected, they are then remitted to the Cotton Board and spent for various purposes, primarily 
for promoting the consumption of cotton textile products (retail marketing and promotion 
expenditures) and for research at the mill level mainly to develop new ways to use additional 
cotton in the production of cotton fiber textiles (non-agricultural research expenditures).  This 
section considers the market effects of the marketing/promotion expenditures and the non-
agricultural research expenditures made by the Cotton Board.  The graphical analysis in this 
section does not consider the effects of the assessments themselves (that is, the incidence of the 
assessments), only the effects of spending the assessments for marketing/promotion and non-
agricultural research. Nevertheless, in the empirical analysis of the cotton checkoff program, we 
account for both the assessments and the expenditures associated with the assessments. 
 
Effects of the Cotton Checkoff Retail Marketing/Promotion Expenditures 
 
As indicated earlier, the largest portion of cotton checkoff funds are spent on promoting the retail 
consumption of cotton fiber textiles (marketing/promotion expenditures).  If marketing and 
promotion expenditures effectively shift out the U.S. demand for cotton fiber textiles as intended, 
then Figure 15 illustrates the likely effects of such expenditures on world cotton and cotton fiber 
markets using the graphical model developed previously.   
 
An increase in the U.S. demand for cotton fiber textiles as a result of checkoff program 
expenditures (represented by the rightward shift of the CFT retail demand curve in the bottom 
left graph of Figure 15) results in a rightward shift of the U.S. CFT import demand (middle 
bottom graph in Figure 15) and a consequent increase in the CFT market price (the higher, 
darker horizontal line in the bottom row of graphs in Figure 15).  The increase in the CFT price,  
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however, signals an increase in cotton mill demand in all countries (top left graph and the top 
right graph of Figure 15) resulting in less U.S. cotton available for export at the same time that 
the foreign import demand for cotton increases.  As a result, the world price of cotton also 
increases, limiting the expansion of cotton mill demand in all countries. The effect on U.S. 
cotton exports, however, is unclear.  If the reduction in the U.S. cotton export supply is greater 
than the increase in the foreign import demand for cotton, U.S. cotton exports decline as a result 
of the marketing/promotion expenditures financed by the checkoff assessments. 
 
On the other hand, if U.S. cotton export supplies decline less than the increase in the import 
demand for cotton, then the marketing/promotion expenditures result in an expansion of U.S. 
cotton exports.  In either case, however, the marketing/promotion expenditures clearly increase 
the price of cotton as well as the price and imports of cotton fiber textiles.  Because the increase 
in U.S. cotton mill demand also increases the supply of domestically-produced cotton fiber 
textiles, not all of the additional consumption of cotton fiber textiles comes from imports.  The 
shares of the increased U.S. CFT consumption accounted for by increased imports and by 
increased domestic CFT supplies depend on the relative price elasticities of U.S. and foreign 
CFT and cotton supplies and demands.  If, for example, the U.S. mill demand for cotton is 
relatively sensitive to an increase in the CFT output price compared to foreign mill demand and 
foreign CFT demand is highly price inelastic, then a relatively larger share of the increased U.S. 
CFT demand from the marketing/promotion expenditures is likely to come from domestic 
supplies than from imports. If not, then the increase in demand for CFT prompted by the retail 
CFT marketing promotion expenditures could come primarily from imports. 
 
Effects of the Cotton Checkoff Non-Agricultural Research Expenditures 
 
As discussed in an earlier section of this report, some of the cotton checkoff funds are spent to 
develop new means of using additional cotton to produce additional cotton fiber textiles.  Such 
“non-agricultural” or textile research expenditures represent mill-level cotton demand promotion. 
If such expenditures are effective, then they result in a rightward shift in the mill demand for raw 
cotton.  Because these research activities are directed at foreign as well as U.S. textile mills, 
expenditures of this type tend to shift out the foreign as well as the U.S. mill demand for cotton  
(the rightward shifts in the U.S. and foreign mill demands to the darker mill demand curves in 
the top left and top right graphs of Figure 16). 
 
In the U.S., greater domestic use of  domestically produced cotton as a result of the non-
agricultural research expenditures results in less U.S. cotton available for export as depicted by 
the leftward shift of the U.S. cotton export supply in the top middle graph of Figure 16.  At the 
same time, greater foreign mill use of cotton induced by the research expenditures shifts out the 
foreign or rest-of-the-world (ROW) import demand for U.S. cotton as also shown in the top 
middle graph of Figure 16.  Together, the reduced availability of U.S. cotton for export and the 
increased ROW mill demand for cotton boosts the  price of cotton in both the U.S. and ROW 
markets.  The implications for U.S. exports of cotton, however, are unclear.  If the increase in 
U.S. mill demand for cotton induced by the non-agricultural cotton research expenditures is 
greater than the corresponding shift in the ROW cotton mill demand, then U.S. cotton exports 
would tend to decline.  If the reverse is the case, then U.S. cotton exports would tend to drop as a 




In the U.S., the increased processing of cotton results in an increase in the supply of 
domestically-produced cotton fiber textiles (the rightward shift of the CFT supply curve in the 
bottom left graph of Figure 16) and, therefore, a reduced U.S. demand for imported cotton fiber 
textiles (the leftward shift of the U.S. CFT import demand curve in the bottom middle graph of 
Figure 16).  At the same time, however, the ROW mill demand for cotton increases the ROW 
production of cotton fiber textiles (the rightward shift of the ROW CFT supply curve in the 
bottom right graph of Figure 16) as well as the ROW supply of cotton fiber textiles available for 
export (the rightward shift in the ROW export supply curve in the bottom middle graph of Figure 
16).  Together, the leftward shift of the U.S. demand for CFT imports and the greater ROW 
supply of CFT exports results in a lower CFT price in the CFT markets in both the U.S. and the 
ROW markets.  Again, however, the implications for U.S. imports of CFT are ambiguous.  U.S. 
CFT imports would tend to decline if the increase in the U.S. supply of cotton fiber textiles was 
larger than the corresponding increase in the ROW supply of cotton fiber textiles.  U.S. CFT 
imports would tend to rise if the opposite was the case.   
 
The Complications of U.S. Cotton Farm Policy 
 
The effects of the cotton checkoff program expenditures on the U.S. cotton market over the years 
have been complicated by U.S. farm policy.  In the decade preceding the 1996 Farm Bill, the 
central feature of U.S. farm policy for many commodities, including cotton, was the deficiency 
payment scheme. As discussed earlier, under U.S. farm policy during that period, U.S. cotton 
farmers received deficiency payments in each year equal to the difference between the 
established target price and the existing national average market price for cotton.  During that 
period, a NR loan program with a marketing loan feature was also  in place for cotton although 
the cotton market price was generally above the loan rate in most years as illustrated in Panel A 
of Figure 17. 
 
The policy worked to make the farm supply of cotton generally unresponsive to changes in the 
market price of cotton at levels below the target price for those producers that participated in 
farm programs as illustrated also in Figure 17 with the vertical supply curve for cotton below the 
target price.  With the market price between the target price and the NR loan rate, producers 
would sell their cotton output at the market price, repay their production loan from the 
government at the established loan rate, and receive a payment from the government in the 
amount of the difference between the target price and the market price multiplied by their output 
(the shaded area in Panel A of Figure 17).  The effective price received by the producer, 
therefore, was the market price plus the per unit deficiency payment.  Consequently, changes in 
the market price had little effect on the market supply and mainly affected the level of the 
deficiency payment (that is, the cost of the cotton program to taxpayers) and the shares of 
producer cotton revenues that came from market sales and from government payments. 
 
With the marketing loan feature, the NR loan rate for cotton did not operate as a floor to 
government payments to cotton farmers as was the case for most other program crops during that 
period.  When the cotton market price (as represented by  the AWP) dropped below the loan rate, 
which only happened in one year during that period (1986), cotton producers did not default on 
their loans and transfer ownership of their cotton to the CCC but rather sold their cotton and  
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repaid their loans at less than the loan rate.  As a consequence, the cotton market price was not 
supported at the loan rate in low price years by government takeovers of cotton pledged as 
collateral on defaulted loans but, rather, was free to drop in response to negative market forces.  
Producers would keep the loan from the government in the amount of the difference between the 
target price and the loan rate and also receive a marketing loan gain equal to the difference 
between the NR loan and the AWP.  Consequently, the effective price per unit to producers was 
still the target price even in low market price years. 
 
Because the pre-1996 cotton farm program effectively rotated the domestic supply curve of 
cotton below the target price to a vertical position (so that supply was unresponsive to changes in 
the market price), the farm program also rotated the U.S. cotton export supply curve to the right 
below the target price level since export supply is simply the horizontal difference between 
domestic supply and demand.  Given the ROW import demand for cotton, the cotton market 
price then is set at the level shown in Panel A of Figure 17.  Thus, with the market price between 
the target price and the NR loan rate as was the case in most years during that period, the total   
payment to cotton farmers subsequently was the difference between the target price and the 
market price multiplied by the quantity of cotton produced (the shaded area in Panel A in Figure 
17 as indicated earlier). 
 
From an examination of Figures 15 and 16, note that checkoff expenditures for both retail 
marketing/promotion activities and non-agricultural research activities result in a rightward shift 
of the U.S. mill demand for cotton, a leftward shift of the U.S. export supply of cotton, and a 
consequent increase in the cotton market price.  This scenario is reproduced in panel B of Figure 
17. In this case, any increase in the cotton market price as a result of cotton checkoff 
expenditures during that pre-1996 Farm Bill period simply reduced the amount of government 
deficiency payments to cotton producers (the smaller shaded area in Panel B of Figure 17).  
While a larger share of producer revenues consequently came from the market and less from the 
government, the effective price and total revenues received by cotton producers were relatively 
unaffected by cotton checkoff expenditures.  In other words, under the pre-1996 farm policy, the 
cotton checkoff program primarily worked to limit government payments to farmers rather than 
to increase cotton producer revenues.  Because not all cotton producers participated in farm 
programs, the cotton checkoff program likely had a small positive effect on the aggregate 
revenues of U.S. cotton producers during that period. 
 
As discussed earlier, the 1996 Farm Bill (the FAIR Act) eliminated target prices and the 
deficiency payment program in favor of decoupled direct payments to farmers so that the cotton 
checkoff program worked essentially as depicted earlier in Figures 15 and 16.  The 1996 Farm 
Bill continued the marketing loan program for cotton but market prices continued to stay above 
the loan rate until the 1999/2000 crop year  (see Table 13). 
 
An increase in world commodity supplies and a drop in world commodity prices along with 
weakened global demand in the late 1990s set the stage for a return to target prices and a form of 
deficiency payments referred to as counter cyclical payments (CCPs) in the 2002 Farm Bill.  In 
addition, the loan deficiency provisions were continued providing an additional payment to 
farmers in years when the market price drops below the loan rate which has occurred frequently 
in recent years (see Table 13).  The effects of the essential features of the 2002 Farm Bill on  
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cotton markets are depicted in Panel A of Figure 18.  With a market price below the loan rate, 
cotton producers receive a per unit CCP equal to the target price minus the loan rate minus the 
direct payment rate as well as an LDP/MLG payment calculated as the difference between the 
loan rate and the AWP. 
 
Under the 2002 Farm Bill, therefore, given a market price below the loan rate, which has been 
the case frequently in recent years, a rightward shift of the U.S. cotton mill demand as a result of 
cotton checkoff program expenditures would increase the market price as depicted in Panel B of 
Figure 18 and reduce government payments to farmers by eliminating some or all of the 
LDP/MLG and CCP payments.  Consequently, the checkoff program currently works to reduce 
the costs of the cotton program to taxpayers as was the case before the implementation of the 
1996 Farm Bill.  The primary effect of the cotton checkoff program on producers is again to 
reduce the share of producer revenues paid for by the government and to increase the share 
coming from private market sales.   
 
Spillover Effects of Cotton Checkoff Expenditures 
 
The cotton checkoff program can have unintended effects on other related fiber and fiber textile 
markets – the so-called spillover effects of checkoff promotion.  To the extent that checkoff 
program expenditures have an effect on cotton and cotton fiber markets, those expenditures 
might be expected also to have effects on related fiber and fiber textile markets.  These effects 
can be illustrated for man-made fiber (MMF) and man-made fiber textile (MMFT) markets in a 
graphical analysis similar to the one used for the analysis of cotton and cotton fiber markets. In 
Figure 19, the United States is depicted as a net importer of raw man-made fibers rather than a 
net exporter as in the case for raw cotton.  The same is the case for man-made fiber textiles 
consistent with the market situation for cotton fiber textiles.  In other words, in the U.S. markets 
for both man-made fibers and man-made fiber textiles, the U.S. demand is greater than the U.S. 
supply at most prices. Thus, at most prices, the U.S. tends to import both man-made fibers and 
man-made fiber textiles. 
 
Given the graphical representation of the MMF and MMFT markets as discussed above and 
depicted in Figure 19, then the use of checkoff funds to promote the retail demand for cotton 
fiber textiles might be expected to result in some shift of total textile consumption away from 
man-made fiber textiles toward cotton fiber textiles to some extent (shown as a leftward shift of 
the MMFT retail demand curve in the lower left graph in Figure 19).  The result in the MMFT 
market would be a reduction in U.S. MMFT import demand (the leftward shift in the U.S. import 
demand curve in the bottom middle graph of Figure 19), a consequent drop in the MMFT market 
price (the lower, darker horizontal line in the bottom row of graphs in Figure 19), and lower U.S. 
MMFT imports.  The drop in the MMFT price, in turn, reduces the MMF mill demand in both 
the United States and foreign markets (the leftward shifts of the mill demand curves in both the 
top left and top right graphs in Figure 19).   
 
With a lower U.S. MMF mill demand, the U.S. MMF import demand curve shifts to the left (top 
middle graph of Figure 19).  At the same time, given a lower MMF mill demand in foreign 
countries, the quantity of MMF available for export increases (top middle graph in Figure 19).  
Thus, with a lower U.S. MMF import demand and a greater availability of MMF from the ROW,  
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the market price of MMF unambiguously declines.  The implication for world MMF trade, 
however, is not so clear.  Whether MMF trade increases or decreases depends on the relative 
shifts of the MMF mill demands in both regions.  If the drop in the MMFT price reduces the 
MMF mill demand in the U.S. by more than in the ROW, then MMF trade declines.  If not, then 
MMF trade increases.  Which case actually holds is an empirical question that can only be 
determined through a statistical examination of the data. 
 
The effect of the cotton checkoff program on MMF and MMFT markets is somewhat different if 
the funds are used to promote the mill level demand for cotton through expenditures on non-
agricultural research.  At the mill level, cotton is more likely to be a complement to man-made 
fibers than a substitute since the production of cotton textile products often involves the use of 
fiber blends.  Thus, an increase in the use of cotton to produce new textile products through 
cotton checkoff-financed non-agricultural research often results in an increase in the demand for 
raw man made fibers as well.   This non-agricultural-research-induced  increase in the mill 
demand for man made fibers is depicted as a rightward shift in the MMF mill demand curve in 
the top left graph in Figure 20 and a corresponding rightward shift in the U.S. MMF import 
demand curve in the top middle graph.  The greater U.S. MMF import demand leads to an 
increase in the MMF market price (the higher, darker horizontal line in the top row of graphs in 
Figure 20), a reduction in the quantity of MMF demanded by the rest of the world, and an 
increase in the quantity of MMF supplied to the market by the ROW.   
 
The increase in the U.S. MMF mill demand results in an increase in the domestic quantity 
demanded of MMF (top left graph of Figure 20) and a corresponding increase in the supply of 
MMFT (the rightward shift in the MMFT supply curve in the bottom left graph of Figure 20) and 
along with a leftward shift in the U.S. MMFT import demand curve (bottom middle graph of 
Figure 20).  At the same time, the decline in the quantity demanded of MMF by mills in foreign 
countries reduces the production of MMFT in those countries (a leftward shift in the MMFT 
supply curve in the bottom right graph of Figure 20) as well as the supply of MMFT available for 
export (a leftward shift in the ROW export supply curve in the bottom middle graph of Figure 
20).  The result is an unambiguous decline in U.S. imports of man made fiber textiles as a result 
of the non-agricultural research expenditures funded by the cotton checkoff program.  The result 
for the price of man-made fiber textiles is ambiguous and depends on the relative shifts in the 
ROW MMFT export supply and the U.S. MMFT import demand.   
 
Empirical Analysis of the Cotton Checkoff Program  
 
The preceding graphical analysis provides a basic understanding of what economic theory can 
tell us about the potential effects of the cotton checkoff program on cotton and cotton textile 
markets as well as on competing man-made fiber and man-made fiber textile markets.  Although 
the graphical analysis is a powerful tool for analyzing the expected direction of the effects of the 
program, the analysis provides little insight into the likely magnitude of effects.   Consequently, 
in this section we present an empirical analysis of the cotton checkoff program both as a test of 
the hypotheses relating to the direction of the impacts of the cotton checkoff program as 
represented by the preceding graphical analysis as well as a measurement of the magnitude of the 
effects of the program.  After presenting the model and data used in the empirical analysis, we 
present the results of econometrically estimating the parameters of the model, focusing on  
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several key equations in the model.  The results of validating the model for use in analyzing the 
effects of the cotton checkoff program then are discussed.  Subsequently, we present the results 
of using the validated model to conduct an historical simulation analysis of the cotton checkoff 
program in which we examine several scenarios of changes in the level of checkoff funding to 
measure the market effects.  The results of the simulation analysis are used in the subsequent 
benefit-cost analysis in which we calculate the returns to both producers and importers.  Finally, 
the simulation results also are used as the basis for an analysis of the incidence of the checkoff 
assessment (that is, an analysis of who actually pays the cost of the assessments). 
 
The MCERI Model 
 
The empirical analysis of the cotton checkoff program is conducted with the use of a multi-
equation, econometric, simulation model of U.S. and foreign fiber markets. The model originally 
was developed by the Cotton Economics Research Institute (CERI) at Texas Tech University but 
was modified for this project to account for the programmatic activities of the Cotton Board and, 
hence, is referred to in this report as the modified CERI model or the MCERI model.  The CERI 
model has been used for a wide range of analyses and has received extensive peer review 
associated with academic journal articles, including most recently Pan et al. (2006a); Pan et al. 
(2006b); Pan et al. (2005); Chaudhary et al. (2006); Li, Mohanty, and Pan (2005); and Ramirez 
et al. (2004).  An extensive technical description and documentation of the extensive CERI 
model is available in Pan and Mohanty (2005).  
 
A frequently used market analysis tool is the equilibrium displacement model (EDM) which 
originated with Muth (1964).  The EDM has been used extensively in evaluating the effects of 
promotion on markets and producer and consumer surplus (see, for example Alston, Chalfant, 
and Piggot (1995); Piggot, Piggot, and Wright (1995); Kinnucan (1996); Kinnucan and Christian 
(1997)).  The EDM framework is appealing for three reasons: (1) it is flexible in modeling 
diverse economic phenomena; (2) it is easy to implement; and (3) the results are robust to 
econometric misspecifications.  However, EDMs still are grossly inadequate when subjected to 
the scientific standards of confirmation and falsification because they presently are not testable 
as to their empirical validity.  Consequently, their empirical claims are highly questionable.   
Without confirmation and falsification, theoretical speculations remain just that – speculation 
(Davis (2001); and Davis and Espinoza (1998, 2000)). 
 
In an EDM, the values of reduced-form parameters are determined by substituting values for the 
structural parameters.  The values of the structural parameters, usually elasticities, are obtained 
in one of three ways: (1) arbitrarily assumed; (2) borrowed from other studies; or (3) estimated 
empirically.  The obvious shortcoming in this type of analysis is the assumption that the 
structural elasticities are assumed to be known with certainty (Davis and Espinoza (1998, 2000); 
Griffiths and Zhao (2000)). 
 
Though the general procedure is couched within the same framework as a structural econometric 
model, an EDM is fundamentally different from an econometric model.  In an econometric 
model, the unrestricted estimation process forces the parameter estimates and the data set under 
consideration to be compatible.  Hopefully, the parameter estimates then also are compatible 
with theory.  Alternatively in an EDM, the researcher forces the parameter estimates and the  
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theory to be compatible.  As a result, the parameters in an EDM may not be compatible with any 
single data set.  Hence, the results are difficult to validate based on actual observations. 
 
The only previous studies of the cotton checkoff program were done by Capps et al. (1997) and 
Murray et al. (2001).  Both studies relied on the development of econometric models (technically 
quasi-reduced form specifications) to quantify the effects of the cotton checkoff program not 
only on the demand for cotton but also on the welfare of cotton producers and cotton importers.  
The 1997 Capps et al. investigation also used a time-series (vector autoregression) approach to 
serve as a check of the robustness of the econometric model results. Their study focused on the 
performance of the Cotton Research and Promotion Program primarily during the period of 1991 
through 1995 while the 2001 study by Murray et al. focused on the period of 1996 through 2000. 
 
The analysis presented in this report is the third in the series of economic evaluations of the 
cotton checkoff program.  The analysis focuses on the period of 1986/87-2004/05 and is an 
updated and revised version of a comprehensive analysis of the effects of the cotton checkoff 
program recently completed by the authors in connection with the recent legal defense of the 
program. That analysis and this updated version make extensive and fundamentally important 
advances in the methodology for analyzing the cotton checkoff program leading to the most 
accurate, reliable, and defensible measurement of the impacts and returns from the cotton 
checkoff program to date.   A few of the more salient advances in this analysis include the 
following: 
•  The model used in this study is a more formal and structurally comprehensive model than 
used by either Capps et al. (1997) or Murray et al. (2001).  The model includes many key 
economic and market relationships and linkages not accounted for in the models used in 
those two studies while avoiding the pitfalls of the EDM and similar analytical methods. 
•  The model used in this study also explicitly includes both the raw cotton and man-made fiber 
markets as well as cotton and man-made fiber textile markets and their extensive market 
linkages and interrelationships. Cotton checkoff expenditures on marketing and promotion 
are linked in the model directly to retail level demand for cotton and man-made fiber textiles 
while expenditures for non-agricultural research expenditures are linked directly to mill level 
demands for cotton and man-made fiber.  
•  Because the model includes both cotton and man-made fiber and textile markets, the analysis 
explicitly measures the “spillover” effects of the cotton checkoff program, that is, the impacts 
of the program on not only the cotton industry but also the man-made fiber industry.  
•  The model also explicitly accounts for the incidence of the checkoff assessments allowing a 
detailed measurement of the share of the costs of the assessments borne by U.S. producers, 
importers, foreign producers, foreign mills, and consumers.  
•  The model used includes detailed representations of the complicated government cotton 
policy over the years so that the savings to taxpayers in terms of reduced government outlays 
to cotton farmers over time that are directly attributable to the cotton checkoff program can 
be measured.  
•  This study provides the first ever measurement of the impacts of agricultural research funded 
by the cotton checkoff program on cotton harvested acreages and yields in four production 
regions across the United States.  
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•  This study provides both discounted and undiscounted average benefit-cost ratios (BCR) for 
both domestic producers as well as for importers over the period of 1986/87 through 
2004/05.  Because the original Cotton Research and Promotion Act of 1966 was amended to 
make contributions to the checkoff program mandatory and to require contributions by 
importers, the BCR analysis is also decomposed into two time periods: (1) the “voluntary 
contribution period” of 1986/87 through 1991/92 and (2) the “mandatory contribution 
period” of 1992/93 through 2004/05.  
 
In essence, the MCERI model used in this analysis functions through the simultaneous 
interaction of various supply, demand, trade, and price components across various commodities 
and regions of the world  (Labys (1972)). The main components of the model include: (1) the 
U.S. and foreign cotton production; (2) U.S. and foreign man-made fiber production; (3) U.S. 
and foreign cotton and man-made fiber mill demands; (4) U.S. and foreign demands for cotton 
textiles and man-made fiber textiles; (5) world trade and price linkages for cotton, cotton textiles, 
man-made fiber, and man-made fiber textiles; and (6) international trade policy and U.S. 
government farm policy elements.  
 
The U.S. cotton supply sector in the model is divided into four production regions: (1) Delta; (2) 
Southeast; (3) Southwest; and (4) West (Figure 21). The Southwest is further subdivided into 
irrigated and dry land areas of production. Cotton producers located in the irrigated areas of the 
Southwest may make considerably different acreage response decisions than cotton producers 
located in dry land regions of the Southwest.  Cotton competes for acreage with other 
commodities, primarily soybeans in the Delta and Southeast regions, sorghum and wheat in the 
Southwest, and corn and wheat in the West. 
 
The model also includes representations of 24 foreign cotton regions as well, including: (1) 
China (divided into three production sub-regions: the Xinjiang valley, the Yellow River valley, 
and the Yangtze River valley); (2) India (divided into three production sub-regions: Northern—
Haryana, Punjab, and Rajasthan; Western--Maharastra, Gujarat, and Madhya Pradesh; and     
Southern—Karnataka, Tami Nadu, and Andhra Pradesh); (3) Pakistan; (4) South Korea; (5) 
Taiwan, (6) Japan; (7) Other Asia; (8) Egypt; (9) Other Africa; (10) Mexico; (11) Canada; (12) 
Brazil; (13) Argentina; (14) Other Latin America; (15) Australia; (16) Turkey; (17) Other Middle 
East; (18) Uzbekistan; (19) Russia; (20) Other Former Soviet Union; (21) the European Union 
(EU-15); (22) Other Western Europe; (23) Eastern and Central Europe; and (24) a rest-of-the-
world (ROW) region. 
 
Cotton production in the U.S. and foreign cotton producing regions is derived in the MCERI 
model from behavioral (structural) stochastic equations related to acreage and yield.  Figure 21 
represents these relationships for the U.S. region. Generally, acreage is specified as a function of 
the expected net returns for cotton and competing crops. For the U.S., expected net returns for 
cotton and competing crops include both market returns and all government program payments 
such as direct payments, marketing assistance, loan deficiency payments, and counter cyclical 
payments. Producer cotton assessments associated with the checkoff program are treated as a 
cost and subtracted from the expected net returns. Yield is a function of expected cotton prices 
and technological development. National cotton production in each case is the sum of production 
in the corresponding regions.  
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Unlike previous studies of the cotton checkoff program reported in the literature, the MCERI 
model used in this analysis takes into account the markets and prices of not only cotton (top half 
of Figure 22) but also wool and man-made fibers (synthetics, primarily polyester, and cellulosics, 
primarily rayon) (bottom half of Figure 22) and their interactions.  Man-made fiber production 
for both synthetics and cellulosics is derived through the estimation of capacity and utilization 
behavioral equations for each country (Figure 23).  Emphasis in the model is placed on cotton 
and man-made fibers (primarily synthetics).  As indicated earlier in this report, these fibers 
collectively account for more than 95% of total world fiber utilization.  Synthetic fiber accounts 
for roughly 88% of the man-made fiber production in the world. Importantly, then, the MCERI 
model is capable of capturing spillover effects, that is, the impacts on the man-made fiber 
industry induced by the promotion and marketing activities as well as the non-agricultural 
research activities of the Cotton Board.  
   
For each region as appropriate, the MCERI model also includes behavioral equations 
representing raw cotton and raw man-made fiber demand (mill demands and ending stocks) as 
indicated in Figure 22.  Mill use, both for cotton and man-made fiber, is a function of the textile 
price in the downstream retail market, prices of raw cotton and man-made fiber from the 
upstream market (mills), and the non-agricultural research expenditures of the Cotton Board in 
each region as appropriate to the extent that the data are available.  This structural representation 
of world fiber markets takes into account inter-fiber competition or complementary relationships 
between natural fibers and man made fibers in textile mill use as well as the important linkages 
between the raw fiber production segments of the marketing chain and the processing segments 
(mills) of the marketing chain in each region. 
 
The U.S. model also includes representations of the cotton fiber textile market and the man-made  
fiber textile market (Figure 24).  The U.S. demand for cotton and man-made fiber textiles is 
calculated as the sum of the net imports of cotton and man-made fiber textiles plus mill use of 
cotton and man-made fiber and is specified in the model to be a function of the textile price in 
the retail market, disposable personal income, and the marketing and promotion activities of the 
Cotton Board.  These components of the model solve for retail level cotton textile and man-made 
fiber textile prices which enter the respective U.S. mill demand equations as the output price. 
 
Finally, the MCERI model includes a series of international price and trade linkages for cotton, 
man-made fiber, cotton fiber textiles, and man-made fiber textiles to close the model (Figure 25).  
The price and trade linkages account for appropriate tariffs, quotas, and qualitative trade-related 
elements (such as the implementation of the new GATT agreement under the World Trade 
Organization). In essence, the model solves for world synthetic prices as well as the world price 
of cotton (the A index) which are linked to the respective domestic prices of cotton and man-




Two general types of data were required for the analysis undertaken in this study: (1) data 
pertaining to supply, demand, trade, prices, etc and (2) marketing and promotion expenditures 
and non-agricultural research expenditures by the Cotton Board. The data sources are compiled 
from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank, the Food and Agricultural Policy Institute (FAPRI),  
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the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), the FAO World Fiber Consumption Survey, Fiber 
Organon (published by the American Fiber Manufacturers Association), the Cotton Board, 
Cotton Incorporated, the National Cotton Council, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and 
direct contact with various research organizations and institutes in various countries. In general, 
the structural parameters of this multi-equation model are estimated using 29 annual data 
observations covering 1976 through 2004, the common time period and frequency across all 
endogenous and predetermined variables. 
 
Model Parameter Estimation 
 
This section reports the empirical results of the econometric estimation of the parameters of the 
MCERI model with an emphasis on four key U.S. demand equations which are the focus of  the 
marketing and promotion activities as well as the non-agricultural research activities of the 
Cotton Board.  The parameters of the MCERI model were estimated using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) with annual data for 1976 to 2004. Two (2SLS) or three-stage least squares 
(3SLS) procedures sometimes are used in the estimation of simultaneous systems. In this case, 
however, the large size of the model and the availability of limited annual observations resulted 
in a greater number of predetermined variables than the number of observations. Also, given that 
the efficiency gained in parameter estimation with the use of 2SLS and 3SLS is actually 
consistent with a large number of data points, OLS was the estimator of choice in this analysis. 
Additionally, data for some years of the 1976 to 2004 time period were not available for some 
behavioral equations, further necessitating the use of OLS to estimate the parameters of the 
behavioral equations in the model.   
 
The four key demand equations (discussed in more detail below) account for more than 96% of 
the variability in the corresponding endogenous variables indicating that these representations 
provide excellent fits of the data. Also, the signs and magnitudes of the estimated parameters in 
each demand equation are consistent with a priori expectations as indicated for key variables in 
the model by their partial elasticities (Table 16). 
For all cotton producing regions, cotton acreage is highly inelastic with respect to price in the 
short-run as expected, with elasticities ranging from 0.05 in the U.S. Delta region to 0.57 in 
Mexico (Table 16). The long-run price elasticity of cotton acreage in each region is higher than 
their short-run counterparts as expected, varying from 0.17 in Uzbekistan to 1.49 in Mexico.  
 
Also, the demand for cotton at the mill level is estimated to be price inelastic as expected. The 
own-price elasticities for cotton at the mill level range from -0.08 in the U.S. to -0.73 in China.  
The U.S. mill demand price elasticity is about half the elasticity estimate of –0.17 previously 
reported by Capps et al. (1997) and much smaller than the -0.40 mill demand price elasticity 
reported by Murray et al (2001) and the -0.30 elasticity reported by Lowenstein (1952), 
Wohlgenant (1986), Waugh (1964), and Ding and Kinnucan (1996).  Shui, Behgin, and 
Wohlgenant (1993) reported a much higher cotton mill demand price elasticity of –0.60.
4   
 
                                                 
4  According to one peer reviewer (Dr. Carl G. Anderson), the inconsistency of estimated cotton mill demand 




In all regions except the United States, the estimated cross-price elasticities for polyester in the 
respective cotton mill demand equations are positive and smaller in magnitude than the 
corresponding own-price elasticities for cotton. The implication is that polyester and cotton re 
substitutes in foreign cotton mill use.  The cross-price elasticity for polyester in the U.S. cotton 
mill demand equation, however, is negative and larger in magnitude than the own-price elasticity 
for cotton implying that cotton and polyester are complements at the cotton mill level of the U.S. 
cotton industry.  Although different from the results for foreign countries in the MCERI model, 
the finding that cotton and polyester are complements in cotton mill use in the United States is 
consistent with the conclusions of a number of other studies, including Capps et al. (1997), Ding 
and Kinnucan (1996), and Murray et al. (2001).  The latter study found the elasticity of cotton 
mill demand with respect to polyester price to be –0.13, lower than the estimate of -0.26 found in 
this study.  Ding and Kinnucan (1996) reported a quite high short-run polyester price elasticity of 
cotton mill demand of –0.27 and an even higher long-run cross-price elasticity of –0.85.  Capps 
et al. (1997) estimated the polyester cross-price elasticity to be -0.55. 
 
For U.S. man-made fiber mill demand, the estimated own-price elasticity is -0.20 and the 
estimated cotton cross-price elasticity is -0.08 (Table 16).  Because this study is the first to report 
parameter estimates for U.S. man-made fiber mill demand, there are no results from other studies 
with which to compare those reported here.  However, these results are consistent with those 
found for U.S. cotton mill demand providing further evidence that cotton and man-made fibers 
are complements in mill use in this country.  Thus, when prices for either cotton or man-made 
fibers rise (fall), less (more) of both cotton and man-made fiber are demanded by U.S. mills.   
 
At the retail level of fiber markets, the demands for textiles across all countries in the model, 
including the United States, are found to be inelastic with respect to both the prices of textiles 
and income (Table 16). In the U.S., the estimated own-price elasticities of cotton fiber textile 
demand and man-made fiber textile demand are -0.41 and -0.24, respectively.  In foreign 
countries, data limitations restricted the estimation of parameters to the demand for all textiles. 
The estimated own-price elasticities for all textiles in those countries range from -0.03 for 
Taiwan to -0.53 for Pakistan.  The estimated income elasticities range in magnitude from 0.03 in 
South Korea to 0.81 and 0.87 in Mexico and the U.S, respectively.  The U.S. demand for man-
made fiber textiles is estimated to be slightly more income inelastic (0.56) than cotton fiber 
textiles (0.87).  Given that the estimated income elasticities of textiles are positive and less than 
unity in magnitude across all countries, the implication is that consumers in most countries 
consider textile goods to be necessities rather than luxury goods.  
 
The price elasticities of the foreign supplies of cotton fiber textiles and of man-made fiber 
textiles are important in determining the extent of the price and quantity responses in the model 
to any checkoff-induced increases in the retail and mill-level demands for cotton.  Recall from an 
earlier discussion that the share of U.S. cotton fiber textile consumption accounted for by imports 
since the mid-1980s has increased from about a third to about two-thirds while the domestically 
produced share has declined from about two-thirds to about one-third over that same period (see 
Table 9). The import share of U.S. man-made fiber textile consumption also increased 
dramatically over that same period from about 10% to about one-third while the domestically-
produced share has declined from 90% to about two-thirds.  Most of the cotton fiber the U.S. 
imports from other countries is in the form of apparel or intermediate products. Some of those  
 
35
cotton product imports may be manufactured with the raw cotton the U.S. exports to foreign 
countries. The U.S. also exports some cotton textile products but most are relatively unprocessed 
and often return to the U.S. in a more finished form.  Thus, how effective the cotton checkoff 
program is at raising cotton and cotton textile prices and generating increased profits at the farm 
level depends critically on how textile imports respond to any price changes induced by the 
program.  In the model, the import supply elasticity for cotton fiber textiles is estimated to be 
0.62 in the short-run and 0.93 in the long-run (Table 16). Thus, a 10% increase in the price of 
cotton fiber textiles translates into a 6.2% increase in the import supply of cotton fiber textiles in 
the short-run and a 9.3% increase in the long-run. Murray et al. (2001) estimated an 
unreasonably large long-run import supply elasticity for cotton fiber textiles of between 4.2 and 
7.1. The lower estimated import supply elasticity in this study reflects the effects of nearly 50 
years of U.S. restrictions on imports of cotton fiber textiles under the Multi-Fiber Agreement on 
the price responsiveness of those imports as discussed in an earlier section.  Those restrictions 
were only recently phased out.   
 
For the U.S. import supply of man-made fiber textiles, the price elasticity is estimated to be 0.58 
in the short-run and 13.4 in the long-run. No previously published estimates of U.S man-made 
fiber textile import supply are available. The elasticity estimates indicate that a 10% increase in 
the man-made fiber textile price translates into a 5.8% increase in the man-made fiber textile 
import supply in the short-run and a 134% increase in the long-run. Because man-made fibers 
have faced fewer U.S. import restrictions than has been the case for cotton textiles, the import 
supply of man-made fiber textiles is estimated to be far more sensitive to changes in its price, at 
least in the short-run, than is the case for the import supply of cotton fiber textiles. 
 
The U.S. Cotton and Man-Made Fiber Demand Equations in the MCERI Model 
 
The direct effects of the cotton checkoff program in the model are reflected in the four equations 
in the MCERI model relating to the retail demands for cotton fiber textiles and for man-made 
fiber textiles and to the mill demands for cotton and for man-made fibers.  The estimated 
coefficients, t-statistics, p-values and other regression statistics associated with these four 
demand equations are provided in Tables 17 and 18. Given the sample size in this analysis, the 
significance level chosen for this analysis was 0.10. Consequently, estimated coefficients of the 
structural parameters were deemed to be statistically different from zero if their corresponding p-
values were less than 0.10 for two-tailed tests and less than 0.20 for one-tailed tests. The 
accompanying definitions of the variable names used in Table 17 are provided in Table 18. 
 
U.S. Cotton Fiber Textile Demand and Man-Made Fiber Textile Demand Equations 
 
The first set of U.S. demand equations in the model represent consumer demand at the retail end 
of the cotton and man-made fiber marketing chains which include the apparel market, the home 
furnishings market, and others (see USDAf).  As discussed in an earlier section of this report, 
about two-thirds of the cotton checkoff funds are used for marketing and promotion activities in 
an attempt to shift out the retail demand for cotton fiber textiles (see Table 15).  These two 
equations provide a statistical analysis of the effectiveness of those expenditures in achieving the 
goal of shifting the cotton fiber textile demand shifting and of the spillover effects of those 
expenditures on the demand for man-made fiber textile goods.  
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Equations (1) and (2) in Table 17 provide the OLS parameter estimates for the U.S. cotton fiber 
textile demand equation and the U.S. man-made fiber textile demand equation, respectively.  The 
associated goodness-of-fit statistics (R
2) are 0.992 and 0.979, respectively.  In other words, these 
two equations explain nearly all of the variability in the consumption of cotton fiber textiles and 
man-made fiber textiles over the period of analysis (1976-2004).  Neither the Durbin-Watson 
(DW) statistics nor the Ljung-Box Q-statistics indicate the presence of serial correlation of 
residuals in either of these structural equations. 
   
The econometric analysis indicates that the statistically significant drivers of cotton fiber textile 
consumption include the real (inflation-adjusted) cotton textile fiber price, real disposable 
personal income, real cotton checkoff marketing and promotion expenditures, and qualitative 
variables related to agricultural and trade policy. The own-price elasticity of demand for cotton 
fiber textiles is estimated to be -0.41 while the income elasticity of demand for cotton fiber 
textiles is estimated to be 0.87 (see Table 16). 
 
The carryover effects associated with all advertising and promotion programs (Clarke (1976); 
Lee and Brown (1992); Forker and Ward (1998)) are accounted for in this analysis through the 
use of a polynomial distributed lag (PDL) procedure, a lag formulation commonly used in the 
analysis of advertising effectiveness. A previous analysis of the cotton checkoff program by 
Murray et al. (2001) used the PDL procedure.  The attractive features of the PDL include: (1) a 
flexible representation of the lag structure allowing for the possibility of humped-shaped or 
monotonically declining lag weight distributions and (2) a parsimonious representation of the lag 
structure (Simon and Arndt (1980)).  Another previous analysis of the effectiveness of the cotton 
checkoff program by Capps et al. (1997), however, used a polynomial inverse lag (PIL) structure 
(Mitchell and Speaker (1986)) rather than the PDL to capture the carryover effects.  In contrast 
to the PDL model, the PIL does not require specifying the lag length, and, thus, is conceptually 
an infinite lag.  In principle, then, the use of the PIL lag formulation imposes the assumption on 
the model that advertising/promotion expenditures in one period have infinitely long impacts 
over time on consumption.  Consequently, the PDL formulation was adopted for this study in 
order to allow for testing for lag length, that is, the pattern and time period over which 
advertising expenditures influence demand.  The search for the polynomial degree and lag length 
for each advertising variable involves a series of nested OLS regressions.   Second, third, and 
fourth degree polynomials with lags up to 10 years were considered in each case.  Based on the 
Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) statistics for 
selecting lag length, the optimal lag length for the marketing promotion expenditures in both 
equations was two years while the degree of the polynomial was two with the PDL beginning 
with the current level of expenditures. This finding is consistent with Capps et al (1997) as well 
as Ding and Kinnucan (1996).  Also, based on the AIC and SIC statistics, both head and tail 
endpoint restrictions were employed in the analysis. 
 
The estimated short-run advertising elasticity for cotton fiber textiles is 0.05 and the cumulative 
(long-run) advertising elasticity is estimated to be 0.17 (see Table 16).  These results are 
consistent with the marketing and promotion elasticities of demand reported by most other 
studies of generic advertising programs which have tended to range between 0.01 and 0.25 in 
both the short-run and the long-run (Williams and Nichols (1998)).  The results imply that cotton 
checkoff expenditures have effectively shifted out the demand for cotton fiber textiles over time.   
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Capps et al. (1997) estimated the elasticity of cotton checkoff program expenditures to be 0.06 in 
the short-run and 0.10 in the long-run.  Murray et al (2001), however, estimated a much smaller 
cotton promotion elasticity of 0.02.   Because any lagged effects of  marketing and promotion 
expenditures were assumed away in the Murray et al. study, the short-run and cumulative 
impacts of marketing and promotion expenditures were the same in that study.  Neither the 
assumption on lagged effects nor the estimated promotion elasticity in Murray et al. is in 
agreement with the existing literature for cotton promotion.  Ding and Kinnucan (1996) 
estimated the long-run advertising elasticity for cotton to be 0.07.  Solomon and Kinnucan 
(1993) estimated the advertising elasticity for cotton for the export market to be 0.12.  Dewbre, 
Richardson, and Beare (1987) estimated an advertising elasticity of 0.09 for Australian wool 
promotion in the United States. 
 
Berndt (1990) argued that models based on quarterly and annual data tend to overestimate the 
cumulative effects of advertising and promotion. However, our estimates of the impact of 
marketing and promotion activities perhaps are a reflection of the increase in the level of funds 
that occurred as a result of the amended Act of 1992. Recall from Table 15 that the level of 
cotton checkoff funding rose from roughly $29 million in 1991 to about $66 million in 2004. 
Two-thirds of that funding was allocated to marketing and promotion activities over this period. 
Consequently, this scale effect in the level of funding for marketing and promotion of cotton may 
account for the magnitude of the cumulative estimate of the advertising elasticity.  
 
Another possibility for the relatively large estimate of the long-run advertising elasticity may be 
due to the relatively higher level of cotton promotion intensity over time (that is, the level of 
cotton promotion expenditures compared to cotton farm cash receipts) than normally has been 
the case for other checkoff commodities. As shown in Table 19, between 1977 and 1992, the 
ratio of cotton checkoff expenditures to total cotton farm cash receipts (the intensity of the cotton 
checkoff program) increased from 0.3% to 1%, a more than 3-fold increase.  By 2001, however, 
the ratio doubled to about 2%. For most checkoff program commodities, annual program 
expenditures as a percent of producer cash receipts have averaged less than 1% over time.  For 
the soybean checkoff program, for example, program expenditures for research and promotion 
ranged from only 0.08% to 0.20% of soybean farm cash receipts over the history of the program 
(Williams, Shumway, and Love (2002)).  Also, the advertising intensity for the Florida 
Department of Citrus annual orange juice advertising program dropped from over 3% in the late 
1960s to less than 1% in more recent years (Capps, Bessler, and Williams (2004)). With a cotton 
checkoff advertising intensity that is substantially higher than that of other checkoff programs, 
the overall impact of the cotton checkoff program may be expected to be greater in both a 
practical and a statistical sense in its effects on production, demand, prices, and exports than 
might be the case for other checkoff program commodities.       
    
In addition to the generic cotton promotion expenditures from checkoff dollars collected by the 
Cotton Board, private industries also spent funds to promote their own particular brands of 
cotton fiber textiles and man-made fiber textiles.  These brand advertising expenditures might be 
expected to have an impact on the demand for cotton fiber textiles and man-made fiber textiles as 
well. Data for such expenditures by private companies are proprietary and, thus, were 
unavailable for this analysis.  Statistical theory suggests that omitted variables may result in 
biased structural parameter estimates, although the direction of the bias is not clear. However, in  
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the estimated cotton and man-made fiber textile demand equations of the MCERI model, no 
serial correlation pattern was evident in the residuals, based on the Durbin-Watson statistics and 
the Ljung-Box statistics indicating the absence of any systematic omitted variable bias associated 
with the structural parameter estimates of the demand functions for both types of fiber textiles.  
Neither of the previous two studies of the cotton checkoff program (Murray et al. (2001) and 
Capss et al. (1997)) included the effects of brand promotion expenditures related to man-made 
fiber textiles due to the unavailability of data. For branded cotton fiber textile promotion, 
however, Murray et al. obtained data from Levi Strauss to serve as a proxy for branded 
promotional expenditures for cotton fiber textiles.  Importantly, the inclusion of these data in the 
Murray et al (2001) analysis revealed no statistically significant impact of the branded 
advertising variable on the structural parameter estimate associated with generic cotton checkoff 
marketing and promotion expenditures.  Capps, Bessler, and Williams (2004) also found that 
brand advertising expenditures were statistically insignificant in influencing the level of orange 
juice demand.  Insignificant branded advertising and promotion effects, at least from a statistical 
point of view, are not surprising.  Generic advertising and promotion expenditures are designed 
to increase the demand for a particular commodity while corresponding branded expenditures 
associated with a given manufacturer are designed primarily to increase the market share for that 
manufacturer. In other words, generic marketing and promotion expenditures are designed to 
grow market demand for the product while branded marketing and promotion expenditures are 
designed to grow the market share associated with that particular brand but not necessarily the 
overall market demand for the product.    
 
Similar to the estimation results for cotton fiber textile demand, the statistically significant 
determinants of man-made fiber textile consumption are the real man-made fiber textile price, 
real disposable income, and qualitative variables related to agricultural and trade policy (Table 
17). The own-price and income elasticities of the U.S. demand for man-made fiber textiles are 
estimated to be -0.24 and 0.56, respectively (see Table 16).  The impact of cotton checkoff 
program marketing and promotion expenditures on man-made fiber textile consumption is found 
to be positive, a result that is inconsistent with expectations and the theoretical argument made 
earlier in connection with Figure 19.  However, the estimated positive relationship is not 
statistically different from zero. In other words, the direct effect of the marketing and promotion 
activities of the Cotton Board on the domestic demand for man-made fiber textiles is negligible 
and statistically not distinguishable from zero.  Based on the statistically insignificant estimated 
coefficient for the impact of cotton checkoff promotion activities on man-made fiber demand, the 
short-run and long-run cross-advertising elasticities of man-made fiber textile consumption with 
respect to marketing expenditures for cotton are calculated to be 0.01 and 0.02 (see Table 16).  
The important implication of this result is that there is no statistically discernible direct spillover 
effect of cotton checkoff program expenditures on the U.S. demand for man-made fiber textiles. 
 
U.S. Cotton Mill Use and U.S. Man-Made Fiber Mill Use Equations 
 
The second set of key demand equations represents the demand by U.S. mills for raw cotton and 
for raw man-made fibers.  Each year, roughly 15%-20% of cotton checkoff funds are spent on  
non-agricultural research activities in attempt to stimulate the mill use of raw cotton (see Table 
15). The statistical analysis associated with these two equations provides an empirical 
assessment of the effectiveness of cotton checkoff funded activities in attempting to directly  
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stimulate U.S. mill demand for raw cotton and of the spillover effects on the demand by U.S. 
mills for raw man-made fibers.  Note that separate demand functions at the retail and at the mill 
levels of the marketing channel are estimated which is unique to the literature dealing with the 
evaluation of the cotton checkoff promotion and research activities. 
 
Equations (3) and (4) in Table 17 are the estimated equations for U.S. cotton mill use and U.S. 
man-made fiber use, respectively.  The goodness-of-fit statistics associated with the cotton mill 
demand and man-made fiber mill demand equations are 0.990 and 0.962, respectively. In other 
words, these two equations account for most of the variation in the consumption of cotton and 
man-made fiber at the mill level over the period of analysis (1976-2004).  Neither the Durbin-
Watson (DW) statistics nor the Ljung-Box Q-statistics indicate the presence of serial correlation 
of residuals in either of these structural equations. Also, all the estimated coefficients are 
statistically significant and agree in sign with economic theory. 
   
The statistical results for equation (3) indicate that the statistically significant drivers of cotton 
consumption at the mill level include real (inflation-adjusted) cotton textile fiber prices, real 
prices of cotton paid by domestic mills, real prices of polyester paid by domestic mills, cotton 
mill use in the previous year, real non-agricultural research expenditures financed by cotton 
checkoff dollars, and qualitative variables related to agricultural and trade policy. 
 
As discussed in the earlier graphical analysis of the cotton checkoff program, the cotton fiber 
textile price represents the per unit value of the output from cotton mills.  Thus, the mill demand 
for raw cotton should increase with an increase in the output price.  The positive and statistically 
significant sign for the cotton textile price in equation (3) provides statistical evidence that the 
U.S. mill demand for cotton is responsive to changes in the price of cotton fiber textiles. The 
estimated coefficient of the cotton fiber textile price implies that a 10% increase in the price of 
cotton fiber textiles translates into a 4.1% increase in mill use of cotton (see Table 16).  
Based on the estimated coefficient of the raw cotton price in equation (3) of Table 17, the 
estimated own-price elasticity of cotton mill demand is -0.08, implying that U.S. mill demand for 
raw cotton is less responsive to changes in the market price of raw cotton (the input price) than to 
the cotton fiber textile price (output price) (see Table 16).  The own-price elasticity of cotton mill 
demand estimated in this study is smaller than the elasticity of -0.17 estimated by Capps et al. 
(1997) and  also smaller than those estimated in several other studies as discussed earlier. 
 
Given the dominance of polyester over other synthetic fabrics in man-made fiber markets, the 
real price of polyester is used in the mill demand specifications for cotton and man-made fibers 
to represent the per unit cost of man-made fiber (the man-made fiber input price) at the mill 
level. Given the high degree of correlation among synthetic fiber prices, using just the polyester 
price to represent man-made fibers helps avoid potential collinearity problems in the mill 
demand equations.  In the U.S. cotton mill use equation (equation (3) in Table 17), the estimated 
polyester cross-price elasticity is -0.26 which is larger in absolute value than the own-price 
elasticity (see Table 16).  The implication is that, in the United States, cotton and polyester are 
complements at the mill level. Although we found the opposite to be the case for foreign cotton 
mill demand, the finding that cotton and man-made fibers are complements in U.S. mill use is 
consistent with the findings of previous studies.  Our estimated polyester cross-price elasticity is 
also within the range of the estimates reported by previous studies.  For example, Murray et al  
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(2001) estimated the polyester cross-price elasticity of cotton mill demand to be -0.13 while 
Ding and Kinnucan (1996) reported a short-run polyester cross-price elasticity of -0.27 and a 
long-run cross-price elasticity of -0.85.  Capps et al. (1997) reported a polyester cross-price 
elasticity estimate for the cotton mill demand of -0.55. 
 
The U.S. textile industry at the mill level typically is characterized by lags between orders and 
deliveries.  Stennis, Pinar, and Allen (1983) indicate that forward ordering is prevalent in this 
industry.  Distributors and retailers often contract for cotton fiber twelve months or more prior to 
delivery.  Consequently, to account for these dynamics, various lag lengths on prices were tested 
in the empirical specification for mill demand.  Forward contracting, at least historically, has 
been an integral part of the cotton and textile industry such that the price observed today 
influences consumption in the future.  Textile manufacturers, for example, make future decisions 
based on today’s prices.  Using the AIC and the SIC, the optimal lag length on prices was found 
to be zero in all cases so that all prices in the mill demand equations are contemporaneous.  This 
finding differs from the findings of Wohlgenant (1986); Shui, Beghin, and Wohlgenant (1993); 
and Ding and Kinnucan (1996) who considered a lag length of 12 months. Because our analysis 
employs more current data, the justification for our finding is the improvements in the efficiency 
of ordering and deliveries that have occurred over the last 20 years.  
 
As with the retail demand for cotton fiber textiles, the PDL formulation is used to account for the 
carryover effects of non-agricultural research expenditures on cotton mill demand in equation (3) 
(Table 17).  The results indicate that after a one-year delay, the estimated short-run elasticity of 
non-agricultural research expenditures with respect to cotton mill use is 0.03 and that the 
cumulative (long-run) estimated elasticity is 0.09 (see Table 16). Thus, the results suggest that 
more time is required before non-agricultural research activities impact cotton mill demand than 
is the case for the effect of marketing and promotion activity expenditures effects on the retail 
demand for cotton fiber textiles. Following a one year lag between expenditure and effect, the 
cumulative effect of a 10% change in non-agricultural research expenditures for cotton, sustained 
over two years, gives rise to a 0.9% change in domestic mill use of cotton. These results are 
similar to those of Capps et al. (1997) who estimated the short-run elasticity associated with non-
agricultural research expenditures to be 0.08 and the long-run elasticity to be 0.13 after a nine-
month delay. Murray et al. (2001) also found a statistically positive and significant relationship 
between non-agricultural research expenditures and cotton mill use.  They estimated the 
cumulative elasticity to be in the range of 0.31 to 0.35 which is not only well above the estimated 
elasticity in this study but also exceedingly high relative to those reported previously in the 
literature for cotton and for other commodities. 
 
In the U.S. man-made fiber mill demand equation (equation (4) in Table 17), based on the 
estimated coefficients for the real polyester price and the market price of cotton, the own-price 
elasticity and the raw cotton cross-price elasticity of the U.S. mill demand for man-made fibers 
are estimated to be -0.20 and -0.08, respectively (see Table 16).  Even though no comparison to 
the results of other studies is possible as discussed earlier, the results provide further evidence of 
the complementary nature of cotton and man-made fibers at the mill level and identify a potential 




The results for equation (4) in Table 17, also suggest that non-agricultural research activities 
associated with the cotton checkoff program are positively related to the mill demand for man-
made fibers following a one year delay between expenditures and effect as in the case of cotton 
mill demand.  The results indicate that after a one-year delay, the estimated short-run elasticity of 
non-agricultural research expenditures with respect to man-made fiber mill use is 0.01 and that 
the cumulative (long-run) estimated elasticity is 0.02 (see Table 16).  Thus, following a one-year 
lag between expenditure and effect, the cumulative effect of a 10% change in non-agricultural 
research expenditures for cotton gives rise to a 0.1% change in U.S. man-made fiber mill 
demand.  Sustained over a period of two years, the cumulative effect of a 10% change in non-
agricultural research expenditures for cotton is a 0.2% change in U.S. man-made fiber mill 
demand. This direct spillover effect not only is extremely small in magnitude but also is not 
statistically different from zero. The implication is that the cotton checkoff program expenditures 
have little, if any, direct  impact on mill demand for man-made fibers which is the same 
conclusion reached earlier for the retail demand for man-made fibers.  
 
Summary Comments on the MCERI Model and the Demand Equation Estimation Results 
 
The particular structure of the MCERI model and the parameters estimated for the model 
equations represent the key assumptions of the methodology for determining the net benefits 
associated with the cotton checkoff program for cotton producers and cotton importers.  Even 
though both domestic producers and importers pay assessments to fund the checkoff program, 
the net benefits associated with the programmatic activities of the Cotton Board may be quite 
different for each group. Using the MCERI model, producer and importer net benefits are 
separated and government savings as a result of the cotton checkoff program are captured. The 
key structural parameters that allow a calculation of the benefit-cost ratios as well as government 
savings are precisely those associated with the cotton checkoff marketing and promotion 
expenditures and non-agricultural research expenditures, and the price elasticities of demand at 
the retail and mill levels of the marketing channel.    
 
In particular, several statistical results are key to understanding the conclusions of the analysis of 
the effectiveness of the cotton checkoff program using the MCERI model. First, note that the 
demand for cotton fiber textiles at the retail level and the demand for cotton at the mill level are 
positively and significantly affected by the cotton checkoff expenditures. Perhaps more 
important is that the long-run elasticity associated with marketing and promotion expenditures 
(0.17) exceeds the long-run elasticity associated with non-agricultural research expenditures 
(0.09).  Thus, all other factors held constant, equal percentage changes in marketing/promotion 
expenditures and in non-agricultural research expenditures lead to a greater percentage change in 
cotton fiber textile consumption than in mill demand for raw cotton. Second, the cotton checkoff 
program has no statistically significant impact on either the demand for man-made fiber textiles 
or the mill demand for man-made fibers. Finally, the only statistically significant spillover effect 
of the cotton checkoff program on the markets for man-made fibers is through mill level prices 








Validation of the MCERI model consists of a check on the dynamic, within-sample (ex-post) 
simulation statistics. The simulation exercise is based on the period from 1986 to 2004.  The 
dynamic simulation statistics, including the root mean squared error as well as the mean squared 
error, Theil inequality coefficients, and Theil error decomposition proportions (bias, variance, 
covariance, regression, and disturbance proportions) all indicate a highly satisfactory fit of the 
historical, dynamic simulation solution values to observed data.  Most of the Theil inequality 
coefficients are close to zero, indicating excellent model performance. As well, the bias and 
variance proportions are close to zero, indicative of the ability of the structural equations of the 
MCERI model to not only replicate the observed values of endogenous variables over time on 
average but also to replicate their variability.  Because the model tracks the historical changes in 
the key market variables (such as quantities and prices) well as indicated by the simulation 
statistics, the model can be used with confidence to consider the historical functioning of the 
cotton and man-made fiber and fiber textile markets under various scenarios as done and 
reported in the following simulation analysis of the effects of the cotton checkoff program.  
 
Simulation Analysis of the Impacts and Returns from the Cotton Checkoff Program 
 
The estimated cotton checkoff elasticities presented and discussed in the previous section of the 
report provide measurements of the relationship between cotton checkoff expenditures and the 
U.S. demands for cotton, cotton fiber textiles, man-made fiber, and man-made fiber textiles.  
While instructive, the expenditure elasticities (advertising and promotion expenditures and non-
agricultural expenditures) fall far short of providing a complete understanding of either the 
market effects of the expenditures or the return they generate to those who pay the assessments 
for at least two reasons. First, the expenditure elasticities are static impact measures and 
overestimate the effect of an increase in expenditures on quantity demanded. Thus, the 
expenditure elasticities indicate how demand changes given a change in checkoff expenditures, 
holding constant all other factors. That is, the assumption underlying the calculation of the cotton 
checkoff expenditure elasticities is that a change in expenditures that affects demand does not 
affect prices, imports, supply, or any other market quantities. Undoubtedly, however, if demand 
shifts as a result of checkoff expenditures, then price will change unless supply is perfectly 
elastic which, in turn, will change the levels of imports, supply, and many other market variables, 
including the quantity demanded of the good itself. 
 
A look back at Figure 5 will help illustrate the problem with using an elasticity as the measure of 
the demand impact of checkoff expenditures. In Figure 5, assume that a 10% increase in 
checkoff expenditures shifts demand from D0 to D1.  If price (P0) does not change, then the 
demand for the commodity increases from Q0 to Q2.  If this increase in Q was on the order of 
0.5%, then the expenditure elasticity (as presented in the previous section) would be 0.05 
calculated as the percent change in Q (0.5%) divided by the percent change in expenditures 
(10%).  But if price increases from P0 to P1 as would normally happen when the demand shifts 
from D0 to D1 unless supply is perfectly elastic (which is not the case in U.S. cotton markets), 
then the actual increase in demand following the price increase is only Q0 to Q1 a much smaller 
increase in demand than the expenditure elasticity leads us to believe would happen because of  
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the assumption that price does not change.  And, if price changes when the demand changes, 
then imports, and supply, and many other market variables are likely to change as well.   
 
A second reason that expenditure elasticities are insufficient measures of checkoff program 
impact is that they provide measures only of the effect of the program expenditures on demand.  
The primary objective of the cotton checkoff program, however, has not necessarily been to 
increase the demand for cotton but rather to enhance the profitability of growing cotton for 
domestic producers.  The estimated expenditure elasticities presented and discussed earlier 
suggest that the cotton checkoff program has had a positive and statistically significant impact on 
the demand for cotton and cotton fiber textiles.  The relevant question for those who pay for the 
program, however, is whether the increase in demand and any consequent increase in their 
revenues has been sufficient to cover their assessment costs. 
 
To provide a more accurate measure of the impact of cotton checkoff expenditures on demand as 
well as a measure of the returns to those who pay the checkoff assessments, the MCERI model 
was used in this study to conduct a simulation analysis of the cotton checkoff program.  The 
basic simulation analysis with the MCERI included two basic simulation scenarios: (1) the “With 
Expenditures” scenario in which cotton checkoff expenditures (non-agricultural research 
expenditures and marketing and promotion expenditures) were set to their actual historical levels 
and (2) the “Without Expenditures” scenario in which those checkoff expenditures were set to 
zero over the history of the program.  The first step in the analysis was to use the MCERI model 
to generate a baseline historical simulation of the various endogenous variables in the model (e.g. 
U.S. cotton and man-made fiber production; world production of cotton; mill use of cotton and 
man-made fiber; net imports of cotton fiber textiles and man-made fiber textiles; prices of cotton 
and man-made fiber, etc.) over the 1986/87 to 2004/05 period that closely replicates their actual, 
historical values.  Because all cotton checkoff expenditures were set to their actual historical 
values, the baseline simulation represents the “With Expenditures Scenario.”  The baseline 
simulation accounts for all major exogenous forces affecting world cotton and man-made fiber 
markets, such as advances in cotton productivity from technological developments and cultural 
practices (no till programs), the boll weevil eradication programs, and improved cotton varieties 
(bollworm resistant BT cotton and Roundup Ready varieties). 
 
Then all cotton checkoff expenditures were set to zero and the model was simulated once again 
over the 1986/87 to 2004/05 period to generate the “Without Scenario” results for the 
endogenous variables in the model.  These results provide a measure of what the levels of 
production, prices, consumption, mill use, trade, etc. would have been in the absence of the 
cotton checkoff program. Differences in the solution values of the endogenous variables in the 
“Without Scenario” from their baseline solution values in the “With Scenario” consequently are 
direct measures of the effects of the programmatic activities of the Cotton Board over time. 
 
Graphically, the overall effects of the cotton checkoff program, thus, are equivalent to the 
combination of: (1) Figures 15 and 16 which demonstrate the separate cotton and cotton fiber 
textile market effects of the non-agricultural research and the market/promotion expenditures by 
the Cotton Board, (2) Figures 17 and 18 which illustrate the complications imposed by U.S. 
cotton policy over time, and (3) Figures 19 and 20 which illustrate the spillover effects on man-
made fiber and textile markets from the non-agricultural research and the market/promotion  
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expenditures by the Cotton Board.  Obviously, the final effects of the cotton checkoff program 
on cotton and fiber textile markets and prices and on the returns to cotton producers and 
importers will depend on the nature and strength of the relationships and interactions among the 
many market variables as captured by the MCERI model. 
 
Because no exogenous or predetermined variable other than cotton checkoff expenditures in the 
MCERI model (e.g. real disposable income, trade and agricultural policy variables, etc) is 
allowed to change as the two simulation scenarios are conducted, the process just described 
effectively isolates the impacts of the both the marketing/promotion expenditures and non-
agricultural research expenditures associated with the cotton checkoff program on the respective 
endogenous variables. Because  the cotton cross-expenditure elasticities with respect to both 
man-made fiber mill demand (non-agricultural research expenditures) and man-made fiber textile 
demand (marketing/promotion expenditures) were not statistically significant (that is, statistically 
not different from zero), those elasticities were set to zero in the simulation analysis. 
 
In analyzing the effects of the cotton checkoff program over the entire period of 1986/87 to 
2004/05, the effects of the program were divided into two distinct periods: (1)1986/87 to 
1991/92 - the period after implementation of the Cotton Research and Promotion Act of 1966 
(PL89-502) but before the implementation of the Cotton Research and Promotion Amendments 
Act of 1990 and (2) 1992/93 to 2004/05 - the period following the implementation of the Cotton 
Research and Promotion Amendments Act of 1990.  The first of the two periods is referred to as 
as the “voluntary” period because even though all domestic producers were required to pay the 
cotton checkoff assessment during that period, they could request a refund of their payments.   
The period of 1992/93 to 2004/05 is labeled the “mandatory” period because all cotton marketed 
in the U.S., whether from domestic or foreign production, during that period was required to 
share in the cost of the cotton checkoff program and the right to demand a refund of the 
assessments was terminated.  Given the increase in the magnitude of the budget available to the 
Cotton Board due to the Cotton Research and Promotion Amendments Act of 1990, the 
hypothesis is that greater market impacts of the checkoff program occurred in the mandatory 
period relative to the voluntary period. 
 
The simulation analysis is designed to address many of the key questions regarding the 
effectiveness of the cotton checkoff program posed at the beginning of this report: (1) What have 
been the effects on the U.S. and world cotton and cotton fiber textile markets and the associated 
spillover effects on man-made fiber markets? (2) Have domestic cotton producers and cotton 
importers benefited from the checkoff program?  (3) What have been the implications of the 
cotton checkoff program for U.S. cotton farm policy costs?  (4) What is the overall return on 
investment associated with the cotton research and promotion program both to importers and to 
domestic producers?  (5) What is the incidence of the cotton checkoff assessments or, in other 




Effects of the Cotton Checkoff Program on U.S. and World Fiber Markets
5 
 
The simulation results demonstrate clearly that the cotton checkoff program increased U.S. raw 
cotton production, mill use, and prices over the entire period of 1986/87 2004/05 (Table 20).  On 
the supply side of the U.S. cotton market, the cotton checkoff program boosted annual cotton 
production by 4% on average over the entire period. Between 1986/87 and 1991/92 (the 
“voluntary period”), U.S. annual average cotton production was higher by 41 million lb as a 
result of the cotton checkoff program and by 459 million lb over the following 13 years (the 
“mandatory period”).  Note that the increase in U.S. cotton production as a result of the checkoff 
program was not uniformly distributed across the Cotton Belt. The largest average annual 
impacts on cotton production over the entire period from 1986/87 to 2004/05 were in the 
Southeast and West regions where production increased by 121 million lb (7%) and 110 million 
lb (8%), respectively.  The average annual impacts of the cotton checkoff program on production 
over the same period in the Delta, the irrigated Southwest, and the dryland Southwest regions 
were more modest at 46 million lb (2%), 35 million lb (3%), and 16 million lb (2%), 
respectively. 
 
The average annual mill use of cotton in the United States was 286 million lb higher in the 
voluntary period and 809 million lb higher in the mandatory period as a result of the cotton 
checkoff program than would otherwise have been the case (Table 20). Overall, the average 
annual domestic cotton mill use rose by about 16% over the entire period.  Because the cotton 
research and promotion program induced a larger increase in U.S. cotton mill demand than in 
U.S. cotton production, cotton was diverted from exports to domestic markets.  On average each 
year, the checkoff program diverted 218 million lb of cotton from exports to domestic mills 
during the voluntary period and 353 million lb during the mandatory period. Over the entire 
period of 1986/87 to 2004/05, average annual U.S. cotton exports were 7% lower as a result of 
the checkoff program.  Market farm prices received by cotton producers averaged about 8¢/lb 
(13%) higher in each year from 1986/87 to 2004/05 as a result of the checkoff program.  The 
average increase in the farm price was two and a half times higher (10¢/lb versus 4¢/lb) in the 
mandatory period than in the voluntary period. The average changes in the prices paid by 
domestic mills for cotton were similar to those of farm prices. 
 
In foreign cotton producing and milling countries, the cotton checkoff program boosted cotton 
mill demand by an annual average of 1% over the entire period leading to an average world price 
(A-index) increase of 2% and an annual average foreign production response of 2% (Table 20).  
The average annual increase in foreign production over the entire period (936 million lb) was 
more than sufficient to meet the increase in foreign mill demand (512 million lb) and still allow 
an increase in exports to importing countries (241 million lb) to fill the void left by the decline in 
U.S exports. 
 
The simulation results also indicate that, due to the promotion activities of the Cotton Board, 
U.S. consumption of cotton fiber textiles was higher by 428 million lb on average during the 
voluntary period and 1,030 million lb higher on average during the mandatory period. Over the 
entire period of 1986/87 to 2004/05, the average U.S. consumption of cotton fiber textiles was 
                                                 
5 To better comprehend the simulation effects discussed here, the reader is encouraged first to review the graphical 
analysis presented earlier in this report associated with Figures 9 through 20.  
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about 10% higher as a result of the checkoff program than otherwise would have been the case. 
Over this same period, the annual average cotton textile fiber (CFT) price declined by about 2%, 
indicating that the increase in the retail CFT demand induced by the marketing/promotion 
expenditures portion of the cotton checkoff program was more than offset by the combined 
increase in U.S. and foreign supply of CFT induced by the non-agricultural research 
expenditures of the program.  Because the induced increase in U.S. CFT demand was greater 
than the induced increase in U.S. CFT supplies, the cotton checkoff program also boosted U.S. 
CFT imports on average each year over the entire period by almost 5%. Because price tended to 
decline by a smaller percentage (2%) than the increase in consumption (10%), the annual 
average increase in revenue accruing to cotton textile retailers was higher by about 9% because 
of the checkoff program.   
 
Recall that the previous section of this report concluded that the direct effect of the cotton 
checkoff program on man-made fiber mill demand has been positive but quite small and not 
statistically significant.  In other words, there has been no direct effect of the cotton checkoff 
program on the demand for man-made fiber at the mill level. Nevertheless, there is an indirect 
effect of the cotton checkoff program on man-made fiber markets through price linkages 
between the two markets.  Given that cotton and man-made fibers are complements in the 
production of textiles at the mill level, the nearly 14% increase in the price of cotton as a result 
of the cotton checkoff program generated a small decline of about 3% in the domestic mill use of 
man-made fibers on average over the entire period of analysis.  Over the voluntary period, man-
made fiber mill use declined by an annual average of 118.5 million lb and by 342 million lb 
during the mandatory period as a result of the checkoff program.  The lower mill demand for 
man-made fibers resulted in a decline in the price of man-made fibers as well, as indicated by the 
small (1%) decline in the price of polyester over the entire period.  The lower price of man-made 
fibers over the period of analysis generated a small decline in the annual average production of 
synthetics (polyester) and cellulosics (rayon) of 4 million lb (0.1%) over the entire period. 
 
Also, recall that the estimated effects of the cotton checkoff program on the demand for man-
made fiber textile products have been small and statistically insignificant.  Thus, no direct of the 
cotton checkoff program on the demand for man-made fiber textile products was found similar to 
the case of man-made fiber mill demand. Again, however, there is an indirect effect because the 
reduction in the cotton textile fiber price as a result of the cotton checkoff program shifted the 
demand for man-made fibers slightly to the left.  Because the resulting decline in the mill use of 
man-made fibers over the entire period (278 million lb) as a result of the cotton checkoff 
program, and consequently in the U.S. production of man-made fiber textiles, is larger than the 
decline in U.S. consumption of man-made fiber textile products (69 million lb), the relatively 
small level of U.S. man-made fiber textile imports increased by an average of 209 million lb 
(22%) over the same period.  Also, because the percentage drop in the consumption of man-
made fiber textiles was less than the percentage rise in the price of man-made fiber textiles as a 
result of the cotton checkoff program, retail revenue in the man-made fiber industry increased  
about 5% over the entire simulation period.  
 
In summary, the key impacts of the cotton checkoff program on world cotton and cotton fiber 
textile markets on average over the 1986/87 to 2004/05 period according to the simulation 
analysis were the following (Table 20):  
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•  A 4% increase in U.S. cotton production with much of the increase taking place in western 
and southeastern states; 
•  A 2% increase in foreign cotton production; 
•  Increases in U.S. and foreign cotton mill use of about 16% and 1%, respectively. 
•  A 7% decline in U.S. cotton exports offset to a large degree by an increase in foreign cotton 
exports of nearly 2%. 
•  An increase in the annual average prices of cotton, including the U.S. farm price (13%), the 
U.S. mill price (14%), and the world price of cotton measured by the A-index (2%); 
•  A 10% increase in the consumption of cotton fiber textiles along with higher imports of 
cotton fiber textiles from foreign mills of about 5% resulting in a larger share of  the U.S. 
consumption of cotton fiber textiles being supplied by foreign rather than domestic mills; and 
•  A decline in the price of cotton fiber textiles by about 2%. 
 
In U.S. man-made fiber and man-made fiber textile markets, the key impacts of the cotton 
checkoff program on average over the entire simulation period (the spillover effects) included 
the following (Table 20): 
•  A small negative impact on the U.S. production of synthetics and cellulosics (0.1%); 
•  A reduction in U.S. man-made fiber mill use of about 3%; 
•  A decline in the polyester price of roughly 1.2%; 
•  A 22% increase in net imports of man-made fiber textiles; 
•  A 1% decline in the U.S. consumption of man-made fiber textiles; and 
•  A 5% increase in the price of man-made fiber textiles. 
 
Benefit-Cost Analysis of the Cotton Checkoff Program 
 
While the simulation analysis clearly demonstrates that the cotton checkoff program had 
measurable impacts not only on the cotton industry but also on the man-made fiber industry, an 
important question for those who contribute to the cotton checkoff program through the 
assessments that they pay is whether the market effects have been sufficiently large to justify the 
cost of the program. The standard method of analysis used to address this question is to calculate 
the benefit-cost ratio (BCR) of the program (i.e., the average return per dollar spent on the 
checkoff program) for each contributing group.  Various definitions for benefit-cost ratio (BCR) 
have been used in the literature to calculate the returns to those who pay for commodity checkoff 
program expenditures.  Consequently, before using the results of the simulation analysis to 
calculate the BCR to cotton producers and importers whose checkoff assessments pay for the 
cotton promotion activities of the Cotton Board, some background on the definition and methods 
of calculating the BCR for a commodity checkoff program is provided. 
 
Definition and Calculation of a Benefit-Cost Ratio 
 
Most commonly in evaluations of the effectiveness of commodity checkoff programs, the 
primary focus of the analysis is the impact of the checkoff program expenditures on the retail 
demand for the commodity.  Consequently, the “benefit” in the BCR calculation in such studies 
is the increase in retail sales revenue brought about by any increase in the demand and price for 
the commodity.  The BCR is then calculated by dividing the value of additional retail sales by 
the expenditures made to achieve the demand and price increase.  Such a “retail level” BCR,  
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however, does not recognize the separate contributions, and therefore, the separate returns 
potentially earned by the various contributors along the supply chain.  More relevant BCR 
measures are those that calculate the benefit to the individual groups that actually pay for the 
promotion programs per checkoff dollar spent on those programs. For the cotton checkoff 
program, cotton producers and importers (retailers) of cotton fiber textile products pay for   
cotton checkoff program activities through their individual assessments. 
 
For producers, the BCR of a checkoff program can be measured in various ways.  One measure 
of the BCR to producers is the Producer Revenue BCR (RBCR) calculated as the sum of the 
estimated returns to producers in additional producer revenues or profits over time as a result of 
the checkoff expenditures divided by those expenditures over the same period.  Calculated in this 
way, an estimated RBCR greater than 1 is taken as an indication that the checkoff expenditures 
have been beneficial because producer revenues have increased by more than one dollar for 
every dollar spent on the promotional activities of the commodity board.  On the other hand, an 
RBCR of less than 1 is taken to mean that advertising does not pay since each dollar invested 
generates less than a dollar in additional producer revenues. 
 
A more meaningful Producer BCR formulation is the Producer Profit Benefit-Cost Ratio 
(PBCR).  As usually calculated, the PBCR is the total producer revenue added as a consequence 
of the checkoff program expenditures over time divided by the level of checkoff expenditures 
made to generate those additional revenues after deducting the additional production costs 
required to produce the additional output generated.  The calculation of the PBCR for cotton is 
illustrated graphically in Figure 26. Recall from the previous section that the cotton checkoff 
program works to increase the mill demand for U.S. cotton.  Given an increase in cotton mill 
demand from checkoff program expenditures as shown in Figure 26, the cotton market price 
received by producers also increases in those years in which domestic farm policy allows the 
market to determine the price received by producers for their cotton.  The  price increases from 
the price level that would exist without the checkoff program (
wo
c P  in Figure 26) to the level that 
occurs with the checkoff program expenditures (
w
c P  in Figure 26). At the same time, sales of 
cotton increase from 
wo
c Q  without the program expenditures to 
w
c Q  with the expenditures.   
 
The additional revenue to producers from the checkoff program expenditures is the sum of the 








c Q .  The additional production of 
cotton induced by the checkoff program expenditures requires additional production costs which 
must be subtracted from the revenues to arrive at what economists term the additional producer 
surplus accruing to producers as a result of the checkoff program.  These additional costs are 




c Q in Figure 26 so that the remaining producer surplus is 




c P ba.  The concept of the producer surplus is roughly equivalent to 
producer profit so that the additional producer surplus generated by the cotton checkoff program 
in each year (Rt) can approximated by the following equation: 
 




















where Pc is the price for cotton received by producers; C is production cost per unit of output; Qc 
corresponds to the production of cotton; and w and wo indicate “with” and “without” cotton 
checkoff program expenditures, respectively.  Then, the Producer Profit BCR is calculated as: 
 
















where E is the cotton checkoff program expenditures. 
 
If the expenditures in each year (Et) are first netted out of the additional profit generated (Rt) in 
those years (i.e., Rt - Et), then the Producer Net Profit BCR (NBCR) is calculated as: 
 
(3)      NBCR = PBCR – 1. 
 
A number of researchers, including Sellen, Goodard, and Duff (1997), Davis et al (2001), 
Williams, Shumway, and Love (2002), Williams, Capps, and Bessler (2004) and others, account 
for the time value of money in calculating the Producer Profit BCR by first discounting the 
producer profits over time to present value before dividing by the total checkoff expenditures. If i 

















DBCR     . 
 
In this study, for calculating the producer DBCR, the Treasury bill rate was taken as the cost of 
capital simply because it represents a realistic alternative investment rate for producers.  
 
Calculating the importer (retailer) BCR, the benefit to importers per dollar of checkoff 
expenditure, is somewhat more complicated because the cotton checkoff expenditures on retail 
marketing/promotion activities and on non-agricultural research activities affect the market for 
cotton textile fibers in different ways.  Recall from Figure 15 (bottom left graph) that checkoff 
expenditures on retail marketing/promotion increase both the price and quantity sold of cotton 
fiber textiles so that the revenues to the importers who sell those textiles also clearly increase.  








cft Q  where P is 
price, Q is quantity sold, the subscript cft indicates cotton fiber textiles and the superscripts w 
and wo again indicate “with” and “without” the cotton checkoff marketing/promotion 
expenditures.  Since the costs to importers associated with additional sales of cotton fiber textiles 
are unknown, the additional profit accruing to importers in each year (Mt) can be approximated 
by assuming some realistic profit ratio earned by importers on sales of cotton fiber textiles (πcft) 













cft cft t − = .  
 
In calculating the benefit-cost ratio to importers from checkoff expenditures on non-agricultural 
research activities, the difficulty is that the expected change in the revenues earned by importers 
is ambiguous.  Recall from Figure 16 that non-agricultural research expenditures would be 
expected to reduce the market price of cotton fiber textiles (CFT) but increase the quantity 
demanded of CFT so that any increase in revenues to importers from an increase in consumption 
would tend to be offset to some extent by the lower CFT price.  If the percentage decline in the 
CFT price is greater than the percentage increase in CFT consumption, then revenues to 
importers would decline.  If the reverse is true, then importer revenues would tend to increase.   
 
In either case, the change in profits (positive or negative) to importers as a result of the non-
agricultural research expenditures in each year (Nt) is calculated using the same formula for 
calculating the change in profits to importers from checkoff expenditures on retail marketing 
promotion (equation (5)).  The importer benefit-cost ratio (IBCR) would then be calculated as 
the sum of the additional profit earned by importers as a result of the marketing/promotion 
expenditures (Mt+Nt) over time divided by Et, the sum of the marketing promotion expenditures 















IBCR  .     
 
As with the PBCR, the IBCR can be discounted to present value to account for the time value of 
money.  In this study, the discounted IBCR was calculated assuming a cost of capital to retailers 
of 5% in each year.  While a different rate could have been chosen, a discount rate of 5% was 
considered a conservative choice such that the discounted IBCR was not likely to be much lower. 
 
Note that if Nt is sufficiently negative in calculating the IBCR in equation (6), the total increase 
in revenues to importers in any given year (Mt + Nt) or in aggregate over time also could be 
negative. The implication, therefore, is that cotton checkoff expenditures for retail 
marketing/promotion and for non-agricultural research together could plausibly lead to a decline 
in importer profits and yield a negative BCR to importers.  Only an empirical investigation of the 
data can provide some insight into the importer profit impacts of the cotton checkoff program. 
In the two previous analyses of the cotton checkoff program, the benefits associated with the 
program were estimated to outweigh the costs for both producers and importers.  In Capps et al 
(1997), the total net returns to domestic producers plus importers divided by total program costs 
were estimated to be in the interval from 5.38 to 5.95.  In Murray et al. (2001), the ratio of total 
net returns to total program costs was found to be in the interval of 22.4 to 38.9. 
 
In this study, we calculate the Producer Net Profit BCR (NBCR) and the Importer BCR (IBCR) 
(discounted and undiscounted) as outlined above.  Technically, we report dynamic BCRs in 
which all endogenous variables are allowed to change in the MCERI model in response to 
changes in the cotton marketing/promotion and non-agricultural research expenditures made by 
CI. Only a few studies of the returns to commodity checkoff programs have reported such  
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dynamic benefit-cost ratios (e.g. Williams (1985); Sellen, Goddard, and Duff (1997); Schmit and 
Kaiser (1998); Williams, Shumway, and Love (2002); and Williams, Capps, and Bessler (2004)).  
 
Benefits to Cotton Producers from the Cotton Checkoff Program 
 
The calculation of the producer and importer BCRs is based on the simulation results discussed 
earlier which provide a measure of the changes in cotton and cotton fiber textile prices and 
quantities over time as a direct result of the cotton checkoff program.  The producer BCRs for 
the two consecutive time periods discussed earlier are calculated and compared: (1) the 
“voluntary period” of checkoff assessments from 1986/87 to 1991/92 and (2) the “mandatory 
period” of checkoff assessments from 1992/93 to 2004/05 (Table 21).  As discussed in 
connection with Figures 17 and 18, the farm program in place affects the returns to producers 
from the checkoff program each year.  Recall from that discussion that in years of deficiency 
payments and similar government farm programs, the checkoff program could well have resulted 
primarily in farm program savings rather than revenue increases to producers.  For that reason, in 
reporting the producer benefits, the cumulative added net revenues to cotton producers due to the 
checkoff program for both participants and non-participants in the existing farm programs during 
both time periods (voluntary and mandatory) are reported along with the cumulative change in 
government cotton farm program expenditure savings due to the cotton checkoff program.  
 
Over the voluntary period of the program, the simulation results indicate that the cumulative 
added net revenues to producers as a result of the checkoff expenditures were $220 million for 
all cotton producers, roughly $37 million per year or about 0.9% of the total cotton farm receipts 
received, excluding government payments (Table 21).  Note that benefits in terms of added net 
revenues were positive to non-participants in farm programs and negative for farm program 
participants during the voluntary period.  Because farm program participants during that period 
received deficiency payments as discussed earlier, the increase in market price had no effect on 
the revenue per pound of cotton they received.  The primary effect on cotton producers that 
participated in farm programs during that period was a change in the source of about 5% of their 
total revenues from the government to the market (Table 21). However, the higher cotton farm 
price induced by the cotton checkoff program during that period encouraged fewer producers to 
participate in farm programs so that total revenues earned by cotton producers that participated in 
farm programs was actually lower as a result of the cotton checkoff program.  On the other hand, 
however, the sales of non-participants in farm programs were benefited by the higher cotton farm 
price of cotton induced by the checkoff program during that period. 
 
During the mandatory period, in contrast, both participants and non-participants in farm 
programs benefited from the boost in both the price and mill demand for cotton generated by the 
cotton checkoff program.  In the middle of the mandatory period, the 1996 FAIR Act eliminated 
deficiency payments forcing production decisions to become more responsive to changes in 
market conditions.  Consequently, the price increase achieved by the cotton checkoff program 
during the mandatory period had larger revenue implications for cotton producers than was the 
case for the price increases achieved during the voluntary period of the program. According to 
the simulation results, the cotton checkoff program generated a total of $6.4 billion more in 
cotton sales during the 13-year mandatory period than would have occurred without the 
promotion program.  The additional cotton cash receipts earned by cotton producers accounted  
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for about 10% of total revenues earned by cotton farmers during that period (excluding 
government payments).  Over the entire simulation period, the added net revenues to cotton 
producers per year were nearly $350 million, representing 7.5% of the cotton cash receipts 
earned by cotton producers (excluding government payments). 
 
Using the estimated added net revenues to producers as a result of the cotton checkoff program 
as the “benefit” of the program to producers as discussed earlier, the calculated undiscounted 
producer net profit BCR (NBCR) during the voluntary and mandatory periods of the cotton 
checkoff program were 0.6 and 9.2, respectively.  The corresponding discounted BCRs (DBCR) 
were 0.5 and 7.5.  Not surprisingly, as a consequence of the cotton checkoff program, during the 
voluntary program period most of the returns accrued to the government as cotton program cost 
savings.  Thus, the cotton checkoff program functioned as an effective means of reducing the 
dependence of cotton producers on government farm programs during that period. 
 
During the mandatory period of the program, the additional cotton sales response to the price 
increase achieved by the cotton checkoff program that was made possible by the greater market 
orientation of government farm programs also allowed the checkoff program to more than pay 
for itself in terms of returns to producers per dollar spent by the Cotton Board on promotion 
activities.  Over the entire simulation period, the undiscounted producer NBCR was 7.6 and the 
discounted producer NBCR was 5.7.  In comparison, Capps et al. (1997) reported undiscounted 
BCRs for cotton producers in the range of -0.69 to -0.73 under the voluntary program and in the 
range of 3.23 to 3.49 under the mandatory program.  Murray et al. (2001) only reported 
undiscounted cotton producer BCRs for the mandatory period in the range of 3.20 to 6.00. 
 
In summary, cotton producers clearly have benefited from the cotton checkoff program, 
particularly in recent years under the mandatory checkoff program.  Producer BCRs were much 
higher in the mandatory period than in the voluntary period.  
 
Government Farm Program Savings from the Cotton Checkoff Program 
 
During the years when the dominant farm program for cotton producers was some form of 
deficiency payment, price increases resulting from the cotton checkoff program automatically 
worked to reduce the total amount of those payments to cotton producers.  Consequently, 
because the checkoff program increased the farm price of cotton as discussed earlier, the 
checkoff program also generated some farm program cost savings to the government in many 
years.  Also, depending on the level of the market price at the time and the extent of the price 
increase resulting from the checkoff program activities, the checkoff program could have 
reduced non-recourse loan defaults and government takeovers of cotton in some years.  The 
simulation results clearly demonstrate that the increase in the market price of cotton received by 
producers induced by the cotton checkoff program worked to increase the percentage of cotton 
producer revenues coming from their market sales of cotton and reduced the share of their 
revenues coming from government payments in many years.   
 
During the voluntary period which roughly corresponded to the period when deficiency 
payments were a major component of government farm policy, the cumulative reduction in 
government farm program costs due to the cotton checkoff program amounted to about $1.3  
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billion (Table 21). Thus, during the voluntary period, had it not been for the cotton checkoff 
program, government cotton program costs would have been higher by about $221 million per 
year, an annual savings of about 22%. In the mandatory period, the cumulative reduction in 
government expenditures due to the cotton checkoff program amounted to about $6.5 billion or 
about $502 million per year, an annual savings of approximately 28%.  Over the entire period 
from 1986/87 to 2004/05, the cumulative savings in government cotton program outlays totaled 
about $7.9 billion, an annual savings of about $413 million or approximately 27%.    
 
Combining the benefits accruing to domestic producers together with the reduction in 
government outlays associated with the cotton checkoff program allows a calculation of the total 
net BCR for the cotton checkoff program at the farm level. For the voluntary period, the 
undiscounted total net BCR was 10.0 and 9.1 on a discounted basis.  During the mandatory 
period, the undiscounted and discounted total net BCRs were 19.5 and 16.0, respectively. Over 
the entire simulation period of 1986/87 to 2004/05, the total undiscounted benefit of the cotton 
checkoff program was an average of $17.8 per dollar spent on cotton marketing/promotion and 
non-agricultural research activities and 13.4 on a discounted basis at the farm level. 
  
Benefits to Importers from the Cotton Checkoff Program 
 
Importers began paying the cotton checkoff assessment in July of 1992 with the implementation 
of the Cotton Research and Promotion Amendments Act of 1990. The revenue effects of the 
cotton check-off program for importers have come from two sources: (1) changes in sales of 
cotton fiber textiles and (2) changes in sales of man-made fiber textiles.  Recall from the earlier 
discussion of the simulated effects of the cotton checkoff program on market prices and 
quantities (see Table 20) that the cumulative net change in the revenue accruing to importers in 
both cases has been positive. 
 
In the case of cotton fiber textiles, the cotton checkoff program was shown to have reduced the 
price of cotton fiber textiles while increasing their consumption by a greater percentage amount.  
The consequence was an estimated 9% annual average increase in revenue accruing to importers 
from sales of cotton fiber textiles as a result of the cotton promotion program since importers 
began paying the cotton checkoff assessment (Table 22).   
 
In the case of man-made fibers, the cotton program had a negative effect on consumption but 
boosted the price of man-made fibers by a greater percentage than the decline in their 
consumption resulting in a 5.5% annual average increase in revenue accruing to importers from 
sales of man-made fiber textiles as a result of the cotton promotion program (Table 22).  Note 
that the calculated importer BCR captures the man-made fiber market spillover effects associated 
with the programmatic activities of the Cotton Board. 
 
Although there are virtually no retail sales data for cotton and man-made fiber apparel and home 
furnishings, estimates of the retail sales of cotton textiles and man-made fiber textiles can be 
constructed by multiplying an average price series based on consumer panel data by end use data 
for apparel and home furnishings.  Apparent consumption data can be constructed using Fiber 
Organon’s end use survey (U.S. manufactured basis) along with USDA data on fiber trade for  
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finished apparel and home fabrics. According to experts at Cotton Incorporated , these estimates 
are reasonable approximations of the sales data. 
 
The average selling price for cotton apparel was $15.20/lb over the period 1992/93 to 2004/05 
based on consumer panel data collected by Cotton Incorporated.  Based on that same data, the 
average selling prices of cotton home furnishings, non-cotton apparel, and non-cotton home 
furnishings over that same period were about $8.20/lb, $13.50/b, and $11.50/lb, respectively. 
Using end use data from Fiber Organon and USDA, weighted average price series over that 
period for cotton fiber textiles and for non-cotton fiber textiles were estimated to be $12.82/lb 
and $13.04/lb, respectively. These weighted average prices were useful in the calculation of the 
cumulative retail sales revenues attributable to the cotton checkoff program.  
 
The total increase in revenue to importers from sales of both cotton fiber textiles and man-made 
fiber textiles amounted to about $258 billion or an average of $19.8 billion per year since 
importers began paying the cotton checkoff assessment (Table 22).  According to the financial 
data of 18 major apparel and home furnishings retailers, the average industry pre-tax profits to 
sales ratio ranged from 4.2% to 6.5% from 1994 to 2003 (Table 23). The median pre-tax profit to 
sales ratio was roughly 5% over this period. Applying the 5% profit ratio to the cumulative 
additional sales of cotton and man-made fiber textiles generated by the cotton checkoff program 
yields an increase in profits of the U.S. retail textile sales industry of about $12.9 billion. 
Consequently, the undiscounted benefit to the retail textile industry in terms of additional profits 
as a result of the cotton checkoff program over the 1992/93 to 2004/05 period was $19.5 per 
dollar spent or by the Cotton Board on cotton and cotton fiber textile promotion activities (table 
22). The discounted importer BCR over the same period was 14.4. 
 
The  importer BCR estimate in this study is larger than those reported in the literature. Capps et 
al. (1997) and Murray et al. (2001) reported undiscounted importer BCRs of between 3.63 and 
5.59 and between 1.90 and 3.40, respectively.  Recall, however, that those two previous studies 
failed to capture spillover effects from the man-made fiber industry associated with the program 
and, therefore, underestimated the retail benefits of the cotton checkoff program.  If only the 
specific effects of the cotton checkoff program on cotton and cotton fiber textiles are considered, 
then the added profit to importers from the program would be much less at $7.0 billion and 
would yield a lower  importer BCR of about 10.  Differences in time periods and model structure 
also account for differences in the calculation of importer BCRs.  Neither the Capps et al. (1997) 
nor the Murray et al. (2001) studies estimated separate demand equations for cotton at the mill 




Because the calculation of the farm and retail level benefits of the cotton checkoff program may 
be sensitive to the magnitude of the estimated long-run marketing/promotion elasticity of 
demand for cotton fiber textiles and to the estimated long-run non-agricultural research elasticity 
of demand for cotton at the mill level, a sensitivity analysis was performed consisting of two 
scenarios.  In this analysis, the primary concern is to determine reasonable lower bounds for the 
calculated BCRs presented in Tables 21 and 22.  In the first scenario, the estimated coefficients 
corresponding to the two long-run elasticities were set at one standard deviation below their  
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estimated values giving long-run elasticity values for cotton textile marketing/promotion and 
non-agricultural research expenditures of 0.12 and 0.03, respectively.  In the second scenario, the 
estimated elasticities corresponding to both expenditure variables were set at half their original 
levels (0.08 and 0.04, respectively). Because the corresponding elasticities for man-made fiber 
were not statistically significant (that is, statistically not different from zero), these elasticities 
were again set to zero in the calculation of the benefit-cost ratios in the sensitivity analyses.  
  
The results of the sensitivity analyses for both scenarios for the producer BCR calculation are 
exhibited in Table 24 and for the importer BCR calculations in Table 25. In resetting the first 
scenario (setting the long-run marketing/promotion and non-agricultural research elasticities to 
one standard deviation below their estimated values), the discounted producer BCR fell from 5.7 
(see Table 21) to 4.5 (Table 24). Similarly, in the second scenario (setting the two elasticities to 
one-half their estimated levels), the discounted producer BCR over the entire simulation period 
declined to 3.1, lower than in the first scenario. 
 
In summary, even if the BCR estimates for the cotton checkoff program presented here are 
considered to be on the high side, reducing the estimated responsiveness of cotton and cotton 
fiber demand to cotton checkoff promotion activities to some lower bound level still results in a 
return to cotton producers from their investment in the cotton checkoff program of no less than 
about $3 for every dollar spent on promotion.  The strong implication, therefore, is that both 
cotton producers and taxpayers (through reductions in government outlays) were better off 
financially over the last two decades as a result of the cotton checkoff program than they would 
have been without the program.  
 
The sensitivity of the importer BCR results to the magnitudes of the long-run 
marketing/promotion elasticity of cotton fiber textile demand and the long-run non-agricultural 
research elasticity of the mill demand for cotton was also examined following the same 
procedure as for the producer BCR sensitivity analysis. As before, the two elasticities were  first 
set at levels corresponding to the original structural parameter estimates minus one standard 
deviation and the simulations were re-run and the importer BCR re-calculated. In the other 
scenario, the same two elasticities are set at precisely half of their original levels.  As before, the  
elasticities for man-made fiber were set to zero in each of the scenarios because the 
corresponding estimated coefficients for man-made fiber were not statistically significant (that is, 
statistically not different from zero).  
 
In the first scenario, the discounted importer BCR declined only slightly from 14.4 to 14.3 over 
the entire simulation period (compare Tables 23 and 26).  In the second scenario, the discounted 
importer BCR dropped even further to 6.0 (Table 25). 
 
In summary, even accounting for the potential sensitivity of the results to changes in the checkoff 
program expenditures elasticities of the demands for cotton and cotton fiber textiles, the 
conclusions remain unchanged.  Importers of cotton fiber textiles, like domestic U.S. cotton 
producers, were financially better off over the last 13 years as a result of the cotton promotion 
activities of the Cotton Board that were funded in part by the cotton checkoff assessments of 
importers than they would have been in the absence of the cotton checkoff program.  The BCRs 
for importers are more than double those for producers.  The benefits to importers are higher, in  
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part, because importers gain not only from the additional revenue from sales of cotton fiber 
textiles as a result of the cotton checkoff program but also from the additional revenue from sales 
of man-made fiber textiles, the so-called spillover effects of the program.  
 
Incidence of the Producer and Importer Assessments 
 
In considering the effects of the cotton checkoff program, the incidence of the assessment must 
be taken into account as discussed in connection with Figures 10 through 14 earlier in this report. 
Recall that for producers, the assessment represents an increase in their costs.  An assessment on 
imports, on the other hand, is collected by the U.S. Customs Service as the product enters the 
country just as tariffs and other import duties are collected and affects the market in the much the 
same way that a tariff does. The annual average assessments paid by producers ranged from 
0.460¢/lb to 0.604¢/lb between 1976/77 and 2004/05 (see Table 13).  Given that the average 
market price received by cotton farmers varied from 30.8¢/lb to 75.6¢/lb over the same period, 
the added cost from the assessment was less than 1% of the farm price in most years.  The annual 
average assessments paid by importers from 1992/93 to 2004/05 ranged from 0.383¢/lb to 
0.581¢/lb (see Table 14). With an average price of cotton fiber textiles of $12.82/lb over that  
period, the importer assessment was about 0.03% to 0.05% of the price received by importers.  
 
As the discussion of the incidence of the checkoff assessment earlier in this report emphasized, 
while cotton producers and importers are those from whom cotton checkoff assessments are 
collected, some portion of that cost is passed on to consumers and other groups.  Consequently 
neither producers nor importers pay the full cost of the assessments.  In case of the producer 
assessment, some portion of the cost of the assessment is passed on to domestic and foreign 
cotton buyers.  In the case of importers, virtually all of the cost is either passed forward to 
consumers of cotton textile fiber products or backwards to foreign producers of cotton textile 
fiber products. The main question of concern, therefore, is how much of the producer assessment 
is actually paid by U.S. cotton producers in terms of a lower net price received. 
 
In the case of the importer assessment, the simulation results presented earlier in this report  
demonstrated clearly that while importers (cotton fiber textile retailers) collect the assessment 
and forward it on to the Cotton Board, the assessment functions much like an import tariff which 
pushes up the price to consumers and a reduces the net price received by foreign sellers.  The 
difference between those two prices is the amount of the assessment.  Thus, in this case, the 
assessment is paid by sellers in the foreign producing and exporting countries in terms of a lower 
price and by U.S. consumers in terms of a higher price.  The importers primarily act as the 
assessment collection agent.  The cost of the assessment to cotton importers essentially is 
reimbursed to them in two ways: (1) through an increase in the price charged to consumers and 
(2) through a decrease in the price paid to importers.  The only real cost to importers would be 
the cost of acting as the assessment collection agent. In the final analysis, the importer 
assessment is paid by U.S. consumers and foreign producers.  Consequently, referring to 
“importer checkoff assessments,” the “returns to importers,” and the “importer BCR” is 
misleading.  More proper terminologies might be the “checkoff assessment collected from 
importers,” the “returns to the expenditure of the checkoff assessments collected from 
importers,” and the “import checkoff assessment BCR.” The question of the incidence of the  
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assessment collected from importers, therefore, is concerned primarily with the share of the cost 
paid by U.S. consumers and the share paid by foreign producers/sellers. 
 
The results of simulating the market impacts of the cotton checkoff program presented earlier 
provide the information needed for calculating the share of each assessment paid for various 
groups. For the producer assessment, the results indicate that on average over the entire period of 
analysis, producers paid about 58% of assessment while about 42% was paid by domestic and 
foreign cotton buyers (mills) (Table 26).  Thus, while U.S. producers have paid the largest share 
of the assessment over the years, an average of about 40% of the cost has been passed on to 
cotton buyers.  There is some evidence, however, that the incidence may be shifting toward 
buyers.  During the voluntary period of the program, producers paid an average of 67% of the 
assessment and only 54% during the mandatory period. 
 
For the import assessment, the results indicate that, on average over the period of analysis, cotton 
fiber textile consumers paid 49% of the assessment while foreign cotton textile sellers paid about 
51%.  Thus, about half of the assessment has been passed on to consumers in terms of a higher 
retail price they have paid for cotton fiber textiles over the years while foreign sellers have borne 
the other half of the cost in terms of a lower selling price of their cotton fiber textile goods. 
 
 
Economic Effects of the Cotton Checkoff Agricultural Research Program 
 
 
The foregoing analysis centered attention primarily on ascertaining the impacts of cotton 
checkoff-funded marketing and promotion expenditures and non-agricultural (textile) research 
expenditures on various segments of the cotton industry, both domestic and foreign. Marketing 
and promotion expenditures are intended to shift out the retail demand for cotton fiber textile 
products while non-agricultural research expenditures are intended to shift out the textile mill 
demand for raw cotton. In contrast, checkoff expenditures in support of agricultural research are 
intended to shift out the supply of U.S. cotton by increasing production efficiency and/or 
reducing production costs. No previous study of the cotton checkoff program has ever considered 
the effects of investing funds in agricultural research. 
 
This section of the report provides an analysis of the economic relationship between checkoff 
expenditures on cotton research and the U.S. cotton supply.  As shown earlier in Table 15, 
agricultural research currently accounts for about 13% of cotton checkoff expenditures. The 
share of checkoff funds allocated to agricultural research has grown steadily over time from 
about 4% in the mid-1980s.  Almost all of the growth in the agricultural research share of cotton 
checkoff dollars has been at the expense of expenditures on non-agricultural textile research 
which has experienced a declining share since the mid-1980s from about 20% to about 16% in 
recent years (Table 15). 
 
Typically, agricultural research expenditures that reduce production costs would be expected to 
lead to an expansion in the acreage dedicated to cotton production. On the other hand, 
agricultural research expenditures that increase production efficiency would increase production  
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yields, that is, the output per acre in production.  Since production is the product of acreage and 
yield, successful agricultural research of either type would tend to increase output. 
 
The effects of investments in research on the market supply of a commodity like cotton, 
however, are often not immediate, measurable, or direct.  Research investments may fund either 
basic, long-term types of research or more applied, short-term types of research.  Because the lag 
between research activities, particularly basic research, and the commercialization of new 
technologies available for adoption by cotton producers may be quite lengthy, the full market 
impacts and any benefits of checkoff-funded research to cotton  producers may not be felt for a 
long time following the research investment. 
 
Also, research investments may not always result in measurable market impacts.  For example, 
basic or applied research that provides knowledge about what does not work in increasing yields 
or reducing costs has value but is not measurable in terms of market impacts.  At the same time, 
applied research often is related to or depends on previous investments in basic research.   
Consequently, investments in basic research may have only indirect market effects to the extent 
that the results of that research lead to more applied research to develop new technologies and 
processes for adoption by producers. For these and other reasons, accurate quantification of the 
effectiveness of cotton checkoff agricultural research expenditures over the years on cotton 
production is difficult at best.  An added complication is the difficulty in obtaining the necessary 
data over a sufficiently long enough period of time to be able to statistically identify the 
relationship between research and production. 
 
Checkoff dollars represent a small portion of the total investment in cotton production research 
in this country.  Most of the research investment is made by private firms like Monsanto and 
others and publicly funded research organizations like the agricultural experiment stations at 
landgrant universities and the Agricultural Research Service of the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture.  In general, most basic, long-term types of research are funded by public and private 
firm investments.  Checkoff dollars are normally invested in more applied, short-term types of 
research.  As a consequence, the relationship between cotton checkoff investments in research 
and cotton production may be more straightforward and amenable to statistical measurement 
than might be the case for cotton research funded by other groups. 
 
Major contributions to both the theory and measurement of the returns to producers from 
investments in agricultural research have been made by a variety of researchers (see, for 
example, Schultz (1953); Griliches (1958); Evenson (1967); Peterson (1967); Fox (1985); Pardey 
and Craig (1989); Chavas and Cox (1992); and Williams, Shumway, and Love (2002)). A 
number of commodities have been analyzed, including corn, poultry, rice, rapeseed, wheat, wool, 
and soybeans.  Unfortunately, little research is available on the returns and supply effects of  
either public or private investments in cotton research.  
 
Data and Methodology 
 
The first step in the analysis of the cotton supply effects of cotton checkoff investments in 
agricultural research was to gather annual data pertaining to harvested acreage and yields for 
various cotton production regions: (1) the West (Arizona, California, and New Mexico); (2) the  
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Irrigated Southwest (Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas); (3) the Dryland Southwest (Kansas, 
Oklahoma, and Texas); (4) the Southeast (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, and Virginia); and (5) the Delta (Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, and 
Tennessee).  Over the period of 1977 to 2004, average harvested acreage was the highest in the 
Delta at 3.31 million acres followed closely by the Dryland Southwest at 3.30 million acres and 
the lowest in the West at 1.48 million acres followed by the Southeast at 1.76 million acres, and 
the Irrigated Southwest at 1.97 million acres.  Over that same period, the West achieved the 
highest average yields at 1,139lb/acre followed at a distance by the Delta at 683lb/acre, the 
Southeast at 599lb/acre, the Irrigated Southwest at 572lb/acre, and finally the Dryland Southwest 
at 333lb/acre.  
 
Although annual data on harvested acreage and yield are available back to 1962/63 for the 
various production regions, data on agricultural research expenditures from Cotton Incorporated 
(CI) are only available back to 1977/78. Thus, the maximum time period available for this 
analysis covers only the 18 crop years between 1977/78 and 2004/05.  Nominal agricultural 
research expenditures have grown from about $0.8 million in 1986/87 to $3.6 million in 1992/93 
to $8.4 million in 2004/05. Since 1992/93, nominal agricultural research expenditures have 
averaged about $6.2 million and accounted for about 11% of cotton checkoff expenditures. 
 
The economic relationship between cotton checkoff-funded agricultural research expenditures 
and cotton harvested acreage and yield was measured using regression analysis. Separate single-
equation models are specified corresponding to the harvested acreage and the yields of cotton in 
each of the five production regions.  As with the retail demand for cotton fiber textile and the 
mill demand for cotton, a polynomial distributed lag (PDL) formulation was used to account for 
the potential carryover effects of agricultural research expenditures on harvested acreage and on 
yields across the five production regions. In each region, the logarithm of harvested acreage in 
the current period is specified to be a function of several variables: (1) the real price of cotton 
paid by mills in the previous year, (2) a one-year lag of the logarithm of harvested acreage, and 
(3) the PDL formulation of the logarithm of real agricultural research expenditures. For yield in 
each region, the logarithm of yield in the current period was specified to be a function of the 
PDL formulation of the logarithm of real agricultural research expenditures. A second degree 
polynomial distributed lag with endpoint constraints was used for the acreage and yield 
equations in each of the 5 production regions. Lag lengths of up to 12 years were considered with 
the optimal lag lengths chosen based on statistical criteria, namely the use of the Schwarz 





Following the procedure described above, agricultural research expenditures were found to 
positively and significantly affect yields with no discernable effect on harvested acreage.  The 
cumulative or long-run elasticities on yields as well as the length of time to reach the cumulative 
effect by production region are exhibited in Table 27.  The long-run percentage changes in yields 
due to a 1% change in real agricultural research expenditures were found to vary among regions 
from 0.04 in the Dryland Southwest to 0.18 in the Irrigated Southwest. The cumulative impact of 
agricultural research expenditures on yields was quite similar in magnitude to the cumulative  
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impact of marketing/promotion expenditures on the demand for retail cotton fiber textile 
products as well as the cumulative impact of non-agricultural research expenditures on the 
demand for cotton at the mill level. Importantly, however, the length of time to reach this 
cumulative effect varied from six to ten years across the respective production regions. The 
conclusion from this analysis is that that agricultural research expenditures funded with cotton 
checkoff dollars effectively enhanced cotton yields and, thus, cotton production over the years. 
The amount of time required to reach this cumulative impact, however, is between six and ten 




This study is a retrospective economic analysis of the Cotton Checkoff Research and Promotion 
Program to determine the market results and returns achieved through the investment of the 
checkoff funds collected by the Cotton Board.  Specifically, this study focuses on the answers to 
the following questions: 
 
●  What are the effects of the cotton checkoff program on the demand for raw cotton (mill level) 
and the demand for cotton fiber textile products (retail level)? 
●  What are the spillover effects of the cotton checkoff program on man-made fiber markets? 
●  What are the effects of the agricultural research programs funded by the cotton checkoff 
program? 
●  What is the incidence (that is, who pays the cost) of the cotton checkoff assessments on 
domestically produced cotton and on cotton fiber textile product imports? 
●  What is the overall return on investment associated with the cotton checkoff program to U.S. 
cotton producers and importers of cotton fiber textile products? 
●  What are the implications of cotton checkoff program activities for government cotton 
program costs? 
 
This report is the third in the series of economic evaluations of the cotton checkoff program and  
focuses on the period of 1986/87-2004/05.  The analysis presented in this report is an updated 
and revised version of a comprehensive analysis of the effects of the cotton checkoff program 
recently completed by the authors in connection with the recent legal defense of the program.  
The analysis is conducted with the use of a multi-equation, econometric simulation model of 
U.S. and foreign fiber markets originally developed by the Cotton Economics Research Institute 
(CERI) at Texas Tech University.  The model was modified by the authors to account for the 
programmatic activities of the Cotton Board and, hence, is referred to as the modified CERI 
model or the MCERI model. 
 
Extensive and fundamentally important advances in the methodology for analyzing the cotton 
checkoff program were made in this analysis leading to the most accurate, reliable, and 
defensible measurement of the impacts and returns from the cotton checkoff program to date.   A 
few of the more salient advances made include the following: 
 
●  The MCERI model used in this study is a more formal and structurally comprehensive model 
than used in previous studies.    
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●  The model also explicitly includes both the raw cotton and man-made fiber markets as well 
as cotton and man-made fiber textile markets and their extensive market linkages and 
interrelationships. 
●  The analysis explicitly measures the “spillover” effects of the cotton checkoff program, that 
is, the impacts of the program on not only the cotton industry but also the man-made fiber 
industry.  
●  The MCERI model also explicitly accounts for the incidence of the checkoff assessments 
allowing a detailed measurement of the share of the costs of the assessments borne by U.S. 
producers, importers, foreign producers, foreign mills, and consumers.  
●  The MCERI model includes detailed representations of the complicated government cotton 
policy over the years so that the savings to taxpayers in terms of reduced government outlays 
to cotton farmers over time that are directly attributable to the cotton checkoff program can 
be measured.  
●  This study provides the first ever measurement of the impacts of agricultural research funded 
by the cotton checkoff program on cotton harvested acreages and yields in five production 
regions across the United States. 
●  This study provides both discounted and undiscounted average benefit-cost ratios (BCR) for 
both domestic producers as well as for importers over the period of 1986/87 through 
2004/05. 
●  Because the cotton checkoff program became mandatory in 1992, the BCR analysis is   
decomposed into two time periods: (1) the “voluntary contribution period” of 1986/87 
through 1991/92 and (2) the “mandatory contribution period” of 1992/93 through 2004/05.  
 
The MCERI model functions through the simultaneous interaction of supply, demand, trade, and 
price components across various commodities and regions of the world. The main components of 
the model include: (1) the U.S. and foreign cotton production; (2) U.S. and foreign man-made 
fiber production; (3) U.S. and foreign cotton and man-made fiber mill demands; (4) U.S. and 
foreign demands for cotton textiles and man-made fiber textiles; (5) world trade and price 
linkages for cotton, cotton textiles, man-made fiber, and man-made fiber textiles; and (6) 
international trade policy and U.S. government farm policy elements.  
 
Based on the simulation analysis conducted with the MCERI model, the key average annual 
impacts of the  cotton checkoff program on world cotton and cotton fiber textile markets over the 
1986/87 to 2004/05 period were the following: (1) a 4% increase in U.S. cotton production, 
mostly in western and southeastern states; (2) a 2% increase in foreign cotton production; (3) a 
16% and a 1% increase in U.S. and foreign cotton mill use, respectively; (4) a 7% decline in U.S. 
cotton exports offset somewhat by a 2% increase in foreign cotton exports; (5) a 13% increase in 
the average annual U.S. cotton farm price, a 14% increase in the U.S. cotton mill price, and a 2% 
increase in the world price of cotton (A-index); (6) 10 % increase in U.S. consumption of cotton 
fiber textiles along with a 5% increase in imports of cotton fiber textiles from foreign mills; (7) a 
larger share of the U.S. consumption of cotton fiber textiles being supplied by foreign rather than 
domestic mills; and (8) a 2% decline in the price of cotton fiber textiles. 
 
In U.S. man-made fiber and man-made fiber textile markets, the key average annual impacts of 
the cotton checkoff program over the entire simulation period (the spillover effects) included: (1) 
a small negative impact on U.S. production of synthetics and cellulosics; (2) a reduction in U.S.  
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man-made fiber mill use by 3%; (3) a 1.2% decline in the polyester price; (4) higher net imports 
of man-made fiber textiles by 22%; (5) lower U.S. consumption of man-made fiber textiles by 
1%; and (6) a higher price of man-made fiber textiles by nearly 5%. 
 
Over the voluntary period of the checkoff program (1986/87-1991/92), the simulation results 
indicate that the cumulative added net revenues to producers as a result of the cotton checkoff 
program were $220 million for all cotton producers, roughly $37 million per year and about 
0.9% of the farm receipts received by cotton producers, excluding government payments, during 
that time period. Benefits in terms of added net revenues were positive to non-participants in 
farm programs and negative for farm program participants during this period.  Because farm 
program participants during that period received deficiency payments, their cotton farm revenues 
were not affected by any price increase achieved by the checkoff program. Non-participants in 
farm programs, however, were benefited by the higher farm price of cotton induced by the 
checkoff program during that period. 
 
During the mandatory period (1992/93-2004/05), in contrast, both participants and non-
participants in farm programs benefited from the price and demand increase generated by the 
cotton checkoff program. Cumulative added net revenues for participants in the farm program 
during the mandatory period were close to $6.1 billion compared to $322 million for non-
participants primarily due to the much larger number of participants than non-participants in 
cotton farm programs.  Added net revenues to cotton producers per year was almost $493 million 
during the mandatory period representing about 10.4% of the farm receipts received by cotton 
producers during that period, excluding government payments.  Over the entire simulation 
period, the added net revenues to cotton producers per year were nearly $350 million, 
representing 7.5% of the farm receipts received by cotton producers, excluding government 
payments. 
 
The calculated undiscounted producer net benefit cost ratios (NBCR) during the voluntary and 
during the mandatory periods of the cotton checkoff program were 0.6 and 9.2, respectively.  
The discounted producer NBCRs during those two periods are estimated at 0.5 and 7.5, 
respectively. Over the entire simulation period, the undiscounted and discounted producer 
NBCRs were 7.6 and 5.7, respectively. Clearly, cotton producers have benefited from the cotton 
checkoff program, particularly in the mandatory stage of the program. 
 
During the voluntary period which roughly corresponded to the period when deficiency 
payments were a major component of government farm policy, the cumulative reduction in 
government farm program costs due to the cotton checkoff program amounted to slightly less 
than $1.3 billion. Thus, during the voluntary period, had it not been for the cotton checkoff 
program, government cotton program costs would have been higher by about $221 million per 
year, an annual savings of about 22%. In the mandatory period, the cumulative reduction in 
government expenditures due to the cotton checkoff program amounted to slightly more than 
$6.5 billion or about $502 million per year, an annual savings of approximately 28%.  Over the 
entire period from 1986/87 to 2004/05, the cumulative savings in government cotton program 




Combining the benefits accruing to domestic producers together with the reduction in 
government outlays associated with the cotton checkoff program generates an undiscounted total 
BCR of 17.8 at the farm level over the entire period (13.4 on a discounted basis).  Over the 
voluntary period of the program, the undiscounted and discounted total BCRs at the farm level 
were 10.0 and 9.1, respectively.  For the mandatory period, the undiscounted and discounted  
BCRs at the farm-level were 19.5 and 16.0. respectively.  Even after accounting for the 
sensitivity of the results to changes in key parameters in the model, the conclusion that both 
cotton producers and taxpayers (in the way of reductions in government outlays) are better off 
with the cotton checkoff program is still strongly supported by the empirical results. 
  
The cumulative retail sales revenues for cotton fiber textiles attributed to the checkoff program 
over the period of 1992 to 2004 were nearly $140 billion, about $11 billion per year. The 
cumulative retail sales revenues for man-made fiber textiles attributed to the checkoff program 
over the same period were $118 billion, about $9 billion per year.  The sum of the cumulative 
total revenue from retail sales of both cotton and man-made fiber textiles over the simulation 
period, then, was $258 billion, or nearly $20 billion per year. According to financial data of 18 
major apparel and home furnishings retailers, the average pre-tax profits to sales ratio ranged 
from 4.2% to 6.5% from 1994 to 2003. The median pre-tax profits to sales ratio was roughly 5% 
over this period. Consequently, the additional profit to the retail textile industry per dollar spent 
by the Cotton Board was $19.5 (undiscounted) or $14.4 on a discounted basis. Again, even after 
accounting for the sensitivity of the results to key model parameters, the analysis clearly 
demonstrates that importers, like domestic producers, are better off economically with the cotton 
checkoff program. The BCRs for importers are found to be higher than those for producers 
indicating that importers have benefited more from the cotton checkoff program than have 
domestic producers. The higher return to importers is due largely to the spillover effects of 
cotton checkoff programs at retail to man-made fiber textile markets.  That is, importers gained 
from the cotton checkoff program not only from additional sales of cotton fiber textiles but also 
from additional related sales of man-made fiber textiles. 
 
To put these importer BCR calculations into perspective with the extant literature, Capps et al. 
(1997) and Murray et al. (2001) found the undiscounted importer BCR to be in the interval of 
3.63 to 5.59 and 1.90 to 3.40, respectively. The lower BCRs for importers in these earlier studies 
are largely explained by the fact that they did not account for the spillover benefits to the retail 
textile industry in additional man-made fiber textile sales that are captured in this study. 
 
In considering the effects of the cotton checkoff program, the incidence of the assessment, that 
is, the share of the cost of the assessment paid by the various contributors, was also taken into 
account.  For producers, their assessment is tantamount to an added cost. For importers, their 
assessment is akin to a tariff. The annual average assessments paid by producers in each year 
was usually less than 1% of the farm price. The annual average assessments paid by importers 
was equivalent to about 0.03% to 0.05% of the price received by importers. A comparison of the 
producer and importer assessments demonstrates that they have not been equal over time. The 
importer assessment exceeded the producer assessment in every year from 1992/93 to 2000/2001 
except for 1994/95 and 1995/96.  Since 2001/02, however, the annual producer assessment has 
been greater than the importer assessment. On average, the analysis shows that 58% of the 
producer assessment was paid by U.S. cotton producers and about 42% by domestic buyers  
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(mills) and foreign cotton buyers (mills).  With respect to the importer assessment, an average of 
49% was paid by U.S. cotton fiber textile consumers and roughly 51% by foreign cotton fiber 
textile sellers.  
 
While this study focuses primarily on cotton checkoff expenditures intended to shift out the mill 
demand for cotton and the retail demand for cotton fiber textiles, the study also analyzes the 
cotton production effects of the 13% of cotton checkoff dollars that are spent on agricultural 
research. The results indicate that over the period of 1977/78 through 2004/05, cotton checkoff 
funded agricultural research activities positively and significantly affected yields with no 
statistically discernible effect on harvested acreage.   Over the long-run, percentage changes in 
yields due to a 1% change in inflation-adjusted agricultural research expenditures were 
calculated to have varied among U.S. cotton-producing regions from 0.04 in the Dryland 
Southwest to 0.18 in the Irrigated Southwest.  The length of time required for such expenditures 
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  a  Mill prices are raw-fiber equivalent. 
  Source:  USDAb. 
 
 
    Figure 4: Real Prices of Cotton, Rayon, and Polyester, 1975-2004
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 a  Mill prices are raw-fiber equivalent.  Prices are deflated by the CPI (U.S. city average) (1982-84=100) 




Figure 5: Welfare Effects from a Rightward Shift in the Market Demand Function from a  
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Figure 6:  Welfare Effects from a Leftward Shift in the Market Supply Function from a  
Production Control Program 
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        Source:  Cotton Incorporated. 
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Figure 11:  Effect of Market Structure on the Incidence of an Assessment on a 
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Figure 14:  Incidence of U.S. Cotton Textile Importer Checkoff Assessment 
Raw Cotton
Market
United States Rest of the World World Market
   Mill 
Demand  Supply
















 PAID  BY 
IMPORTERS




























United States Rest of the World World Market
   Mill 
Demand  Supply










































United States Rest of the World World Market
   Mill 
Demand  Supply




























































































































































United States Rest of the World World Market







































































United States Rest of the World World Market










































   Regional Net Returns for 
     Cotton and Competing    Cotton 





















































  Labor 
Ginning 
















  Acreage 
Response 
  Acreage 
Response 
  Acreage 
Response 











 Figure 22:  Schematic Representation of the Regional Cotton and Man-Made Fiber Components of the MCERI Model 
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Figure 24:  Schematic Representation of the U.S. Cotton and Man-Made Fiber Textile 










Source: Pan and Mohanty (2005)  
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1994 1016.4  7,072.2  14.4  24.5  131.1  18.7 
1995 1,024.5  7,397.7  13.9  24.3  132.3  18.4 
1996 1,066.8  7,816.9  13.7  24.3  133.9  18.2 
1997 1,076.6  8,304.3  13.0  23.9  136.3  17.5 
1998 1,092.5  8,747.0  12.5  24.0  137.7  17.4 
1999 1,127.1  9,268.4  12.2  24.1  139.4  17.3 
2000 1,170.7  9,817.0   11.9  24.2  142.6  17.0 
2001  1,193.7  10,100.8      11.8  24.0  143.7  16.7 
2002 1,241.7  10,983.9  11.3  23.2  144.9  16.0 
           
 
a  Data published by USDA only through 2002. 
Source:  USDAa.  
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  1,000 acres  1,000 acres  lbs/acre  million lbs  ---------------- ¢/lb ----------------  million $ 
1965 14,152  13,613  527  7,174  29.4  29.0  $2,109 
1966  10,349 9,553 480 4,585 21.8  21.0  $1,000 
1967  9,450  7,997 447 3,575 26.7  20.25  $954 
1968 10,913  10,159  516  5,242  23.1 20.25  $1,211 
1969 11,883  11,051  434  4,796  22.0 20.25  $1,055 
1970 11,945  11,155  438  4,886  22.0 20.25  $1,075 
1971 12,355  11,471  438  5,024  28.2  19.5  $1,417 
1972 14,001  12,984  507  6,583  27.3  19.5  $1,797 
1973 12,480  11,970  520  6,224  44.6  19.5  $2,776 
1974 13,679  12,547  442  5,546  42.9  25.3  $2,379 
1975  9,478  8,796 453 3,985 51.3  34.3  $2,044 
1976 11,636  10,914  465  5,075  64.1  37.2 $3,253 
1977 13,680  13,275  520  6,903  52.3  42.6 $3,610 
1978 13,375  12,400  420  5,208  58.4  48.0 $3,041 
1979 13,978  12,831  547  7,019  62.5  50.2 $4,387 
1980 14,534  13,215  404  5,339  74.7  48.0 $3,988 
1981 14,330  13,841  542  7,502  54.3  52.5 $4,073 
1982  11,345 9,734 590 5,743 59.6  57.1  $3,423 
1983  7,926  7,348 508 3,733 66.6  55.0  $2,486 
1984 11,145  10,379  600  6,227  58.9  55.0 $3,668 
1985 10,685  10,229  630  6,444  56.3  57.3 $3,628 
1986  10,045 8,468 552 4,674 52.4  55.0  $2,449 
1987 10,397  10,030  706  7,081  64.3  52.3 $4,553 
1988 12,515  11,948  619  7,396  56.6  51.8 $4,186 
1989  10,587 9,538 614 5,856 66.2  50.0  $3,877 
1990 12,348  11,732  634  7,438  68.2  50.3 $5,073 
1991 14,052  12,960  652  8,450  58.1  50.8 $4,909 
1992 13,240  11,123  700  7,786  54.9  52.4 $4,275 
1993 13,438  12,783  606  7,746  58.4  52.4 $4,524 
1994 13,720  13,322  708  9,432  72.0  50.0 $6,791 
1995 16,931  16,007  537  8,596  76.5  51.9 $6,576 
1996 14,653  12,888  705  9,086  70.5  51.9 $6,406 
1997 13,898  13,406  673  9,022  66.2  51.9 $5,973 
1998 13,393  10,684  625  6,678  61.7  51.9 $4,120 
1999 14,874  13,425  607  8,149  46.8  51.9 $3,814 
2000 15,517  13,053  632  8,249  51.6  51.9 $4,257 
2001 15,769  13,828  705  9,749  32.0  51.9 $3,120 
2002 13,958  12,417  665  8,257  45.7  52.0 $3,774 
2003 13,480  12,003  730  8,762  63.2  52.0 $5,538 
2004 13,659  13,057  855 11,164 43.1 52.0 $4,812
Mean 12,745  11,703  574 6,760 51.4 43.4  $3,560
Median 13,384  11,987  571  6,790  55.6  51.3  $3,721 
Std  Dev  1,939  1,853 106 1,801 16.2  13.6  $1,572 
Min  7,926  7,348 404 3,575 21.8  19.5  $954 
Max  16,931 16,007 855 11,164 76.5  57.3  $6,791 
Source:  USDAb. 
1 Excludes government payments. 
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 Table 3: Harvested Acres, Yields, and Production of Cotton in Selected Countries, 1970 -2004 
Former Soviet Union  Brazil  Turkey  China  India  Pakistan 
Year 
Beginning 





lb bales   
million 
hectares kg/ha 
1000 480  
  lb bales 
million 
hectares kg/ha 
1000 480  
  lb bales 
million 
hectares kg/ha 
1000 480  









1970 2.746  854  10,770    2.469  241  2,733   0.526  759  1,835  4.997  458  10,500   7.605  127  4,423  1.748  311  2,500 
1971 2.770  847  10,780    2.590  263  3,123   0.688  760  2,400  4.923  429  9,700  7.800  162  5,787  1.957  362  3,249 
1972 2.735  877  11,020    2.307  282  2,990   0.761  714  2,495  4.896  400  9,000  7.679  147  5,167  2.010  336  3,100 
1973 2.742  876  11,030    2.287  234  2,459   0.678  756  2,355  4.942  515  11,700   7.574  143  4,958  1.845  343  2,909 
1974 2.879  924  12,220    2.216  241  2,448   0.838  716  2,755  5.013  491  11,300   7.562  159  5,505  2.031  300  2,802 
 
1975 2.924  865  11,610    1.815  220  1,837   0.670  717  2,205  4.955  479  10,900   7.350  154  5,192  1.851  267  2,269 
1976 2.950  886  12,010    1.990  297  2,710   0.581  819  2,185  4.929  420  9,500  6.885  147  4,646  1.865  224  1,921 
1977 2.992  907  12,470    2.015  243  2,246   0.778  739  2,640  4.845  422  9,400  7.866  156  5,645  1.843  300  2,539 
1978 3.038  853  11,907    1.965  277  2,499   0.653  728  2,182  4.867  445  9,950  8.119  166  6,192  1.902  244  2,132 
1979 
3.090 904  12,833    1.975 290 2,627    0.612 778 2,186    4.512 487  10,100    8.127 168 6,262    2.023 368 3,417 
 
1980 3.147  858  12,401    2.015  295  2,728   0.673  743  2,296  4.920  549  12,400   7.823  169  6,071  2.108  339  3,280 
1981 3.168  758  11,032    2.070  328  3,123   0.654  746  2,241  5.185  571  13,600   8.057  177  6,559  2.215  338  3,434 
1982 3.188  725  10,619    2.113  277  2,691   0.595  822  2,246  5.828  616  16,500   7.871  187  6,755  2.263  364  3,782 
1983 3.192  680  9,976    1.960  344  3,096   0.614  850  2,398  6.077  763  21,300   7.721  173  6,122  2.221  223  2,271 
1984 3.347  776  11,928    2.420  400  4,446   0.743  781  2,664  6.923  903  28,700   7.382  247  8,360  2.236  451  4,630 
 
1985 3.316  839  12,777    2.290  346  3,642   0.660  785  2,379  5.140  805  19,000   7.533  261  9,021  2.366  514  5,587 
1986 3.475  765  12,217    2.130  297  2,907   0.589  880  2,380  4.306  824  16,300   6.948  227  7,254  2.505  527  6,062 
1987 3.527  709  11,491    2.156  401  3,968   0.586  916  2,465  4.844  876  19,500   6.471  240  7,140  2.568  572  6,744 
1988 3.432  805  12,686    2.367  300  3,258   0.737  882  2,985  5.535  751  19,100   7.343  244  8,214  2.508  569  6,551 
1989 3.338  796  12,203    1.900  350  3,058   0.725  851  2,835  5.203  728  17,400   7.331  313  10,541  2.599  560  6,687 
 
1990 3.171  818  11,910    1.977  363  3,293    0.641 1,021 3,007  5.588  807 20,700   7.440  267  9,135  2.662  615  7,522 
1991 3.010  800  11,065    1.969  339  3,064   0.599  937  2,578  6.539  869  26,100   7.661  264  9,291  2.836  768  10,000 
1992 2.888  690  9,146    1.485  283  1,929   0.637  901  2,635  6.835  659  20,700   7.543  311  10,775  2.836  543  7,073 
1993 2.903  703  9,378    1.085  445  2,219    0.568 1,060 2,766  5.000  749 17,200   7.440  287  9,800  2.805  488  6,282 
1994 2.707  706  8,778    1.220  440  2,467    0.582 1,080 2,886  5.530  784 19,900   7.861  309  11,148  2.650  514  6,250 
Continued on next page 
           
 




 Table 3 (continued) 
Former Soviet Union    Brazil    Turkey    China    India    Pakistan  Year 
Beginning 
August 1  Area  Yield Prdctn   Area  Yield Prdctn   Area  Yield Prdctn   Area  Yield Prdctn   Area  Yield Prdctn  Area Yield Prdctn 
 
million 
hectares  kg/ha 
1000 480 
lb bales   
million 
hectares  kg/ha 
1000 480 
lb bales   
million 
hectares  kg/ha 
1000 480 
lb bales   
million 
hectares  kg/ha 
1000 480 
lb bales   
million 
hectares  kg/ha 
1000 480 
lb bales   
million 
hectares  kg/ha 
1000 480 
lb bales 
1995 2.573  699  8,260    1.130  363  1,884    0.757 1,125 3,911  5.422  879 21,900   9.063  318  13,250  3.048  586  8,200 
1996 2.535  566  6,588    0.695  440  1,405    0.743 1,055 3,600  4.722  890 19,300   9.122  332  13,918  3.148  506  7,323 
1997 2.502  619  7,108    0.765  538  1,890    0.722 1,101 3,651  4.491 1,023  21,100   8.904  302  12,337  2.960  528  7,175 
1998 2.550  564  6,600    0.685  760  2,391    0.757 1,110 3,860  4.459 1,011  20,700   9.287  302  12,883  2.923  469  6,300 
1999 2.507  634  7,300    0.752  931  3,216    0.719 1,100 3,634  3.726 1,028  17,600   8.791  302  12,180  2.915  642  8,600 
 
 
2000 2.436  571  6,385    0.853  1,101  4,312   0.654 1,198 3,600  4.058 1,089 20,300   8.576  278  10,931  2.928  610  8,200 
2001 2.515  641  7,410    0.748  1,024  3,519   0.693 1,249 3,975  4.820 1,102 24,400   8.730  307  12,300  3.116  580  8,300 
2002 2.441  613  6,875    0.735  1,152  3,890   0.700 1,300 4,179  4.184 1,176 22,600   7.667  301  10,600  2.796  607  7,800 
2003 2.476  592  6,735    1.100  1,191  6,015   0.710 1,257 4,100  5.110  950  22,300   7.785  386  13,800  3.092  546  7,750 
2004 2.638  664  8,040    1.172  1,096  5,900   0.700 1,291 4,150  5.690 1,110 29,000   9.000  460  19,000  3.190  771  11,300 
 
                                 
Mean  2.910  754  10,159   1.698  468  3,028  0.673  929  2,876  5.115  745 17,419   7.883  243 8,890    2.473 465 5,541 
Median  2.903  765  11,020   1.969  344  2,907  0.673  880  2,640  4.955  763 19,000   7.721  247 8,360    2.508 506 6,250 
Std  Dev  0.328  111  2,189  0.620  303  1,009  0.071  190  691   0.710  236  5,724  0.674  80 3,427    0.459  148  2,543 
Min 2.436  564  6,385    0.685  220  1,405   0.526  714  1,835  3.726  400  9,000  6.471  127  4,423  1.748  223  1,921 
Max 3.527  924  12,833    2.590  1191  6,015    0.838 1,300 4,179  6..923 1,176  29,000   9.287  460  19,000  3.190  771  11,300 





Table 4: Cotton Exports of Major Foreign Exporters, 1965-2004 















  --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1,000 480 lb bales --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- %  % 
1965 0 372  492  155  500  959  570  937  1,575  4,039  13,931  3,035  16,966  82.1  17.9 
1966  0  446  558  198  500  1,093 682 1,014  1,428 4,474 13,475  4,832  18,307  73.6 26.4 
1967 0 527  887  191  300  1,083  794  836  1,171  4,770  13,259  4,361  17,620  75.2  24.8 
1968  0  633  606  160  300 993  848 1,765  1,087 4,437 14,205  2,825  17,030  83.4 16.6 
1969 0 670  393  169  400  1,186  1,081  1,933  1,463  4,792  14,857  2,878  17,735  83.8  16.2 
 
1970 0 535  473  139  500  1,124  1,049  1,011  1,397  11,759  19,685  3,897  23,582  83.5  16.5 
1971 0 637  1,151  166  700  1,539  990  1,409  1,366  11,540  21,450  3,385  24,835  86.4  13.6 
1972 0 647  822  198  2,000  1,489  1,090  1,333  1,387  11,315  22,505  5,311  27,816  80.9  19.1 
1973 0 590  196  182  1,800  1,000  729  661  1.199  12,030  20,097  6,123  26,220  76.6  23.4 
1974 0 611  1,060  89  700  583  568  269  878  13,575  20,369  3,926  24,295  83.8  16.2 
 
1975 0 771  418  294  250  2,163  1,097  356  775  15,020  22,656  3,311  25,967  87.2  12.8 
1976 0 794  65 35  200  580  607  54  606  15,356  19,819  4,784  24,603  80.6  19.4 
1977 0 684  471 11  100  1,218  689  192  686  15,032  20,957  5,484  26,441  79.3  20.7 
1978 0 808  246  195  15  962  814  141  690  14,274  21,073  6,180  27,253  77.3  22.7 
1979  0  803  1,177 399 12  617  805 0 876  13,756  21,433  9,229  30,662  69.9  30.1 
 
1980 0 849  1,489  527  6  1,028  426  42  749  12,451  20,339  5,926  26,265  77.4  22.6 
1981 0 766  1,096  339  0  956  269  138  898  11,281  19,197  6,567  25,764  74.5  25.5 
1982  0  933  1,272 500 75  654  640  1,021  920  11,591  20,308  5,207  25,515  79.6  20.4 
1983 0 932  377  299  760  499  1,004  80  780  11,384  18,547  6,786  25,333  73.2  26.8 
1984 0  1,070  1,260  151  944  684  590  354  560  11,740  20,985  6,215  27,200  77.2  22.8 
 
1985 0  1,541  3,146  336  2,799  322  499  358  837  12,094  26,118  1,960  28,078  93.0  7.0 
1986 0  1,533  2,870  1,018  3,169  510  820  303  586  12,419  26,666  6,684  33,350  80.0  20.0 
1987 6,284 1,749  2,358  19 2,322  197 725 597 436 4,996  23,521  6,582  30,103  78.1  21.9 
1988 7,006 1,982  3,780  149  1,636  666 775 464 294 4,809  27,333  6,148  33,481  81.6  18.4 
1989 6,810 2,115  1,371 1,077  865  205 750 661 211 4,698  23,663  7,694  31,357  75.5  24.5 







Table 4 (continued) 
Year Uzbekistan  Africa















  --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1000 480 lb bales ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  % % 
   1990  5,393  2,055  1,357  708  928  753  400  716  90  4,385  21,787  7,793  29,560  73.6  26.4 
1991 5,200  2,247  2,059 303 620  289  400 133 90 3,925  21,602  6,646  28,248  76.5  23.5 
1992 5,500  2,048  1,175 990 684  269  200 110 85 4,509  20,274  5,201  25,475  79.6  20.4 
1993 5,800  2,026  318  369 749  500  200  5  525 4,850  19,798  6,862  26,660  74.3  25.7 
1994 5,006 2,682 148  104 183 9  350 152 307 5,532  18,755  9,402  28,157  66.6  33.4 
1995 4,524  2,798  1,433 567 20  266  425  101 87 5,059  19,686  7,675  27,361  71.9  28.1 
1996 4,550  3,308  119 1,187  10  207  362  0  211 4,180  19,998  6,865  26,863  74.4  25.6 
1997 4,570  3,617  380  312 25  100  344  0  322 3,140  19,222  7,500  26,722  71.9  28.1 
1998 3,812  3,596 10  195 676  394  247 23 450 3,037  19,226  4,298  23,524  81.7  18.3 
1999  4,200 3,736 415  70 1,692  207 185  12  425 2,163  20,445  6,750  27,195  75.2  24.8 
2000 3,450 3,261 575  94  442  127 159 315 375 2,089  19,653  6,740  26,393  74.5  25.5 
2001 3,500 3,551 160  60  342  133 289 674 410 2,067  18,006  11,000  29,006  62.1  37.9 
2002 3,400 3,781 231  56  751  313 377 489 700 2,434  18,420  11,900  30,320  60.8  39.2 
2003 3,100 4,436 200  625 173  357 412 964 400 3,292  19,403  13,758  33,161  58.5  41.5 
2004 3,950  4,081  550  800 30  152  284  1,557  600 3,678  20,550  14,409  34,959  58.8  41.2 
                            
Mean 4,781 1,756 929  336 704  660 589 530 698 7,699  20,082  6,198  26,485  76.4  23.6 
Median  4,560 1,302 567  197 500  582 580 355 646 4,923  20,186  6,180  26,691  76.9  23.1 
Std  Dev  1,182 1,248 876  311 789  476 282 528 426 4,554  3,146  2,453  4,369  7.5 7.5 
Min 3,100 372  10  11  0 9 159 0  85 2,067  13,259  1,960  16,966  58.5  7.0 



















U.S. Share of 
Total World 
Harvested Area 
U.S. Share of 
Total World 
Production 
Ratio of US to 
Foreign Ave. 
Yield 
  million acres  lb/acre  million lbs  %  %  lb/acre 
          
1965 68.6  294  20,159 16.5 26.2 1.79 
1966 67.5  304  20,499 12.4 18.3 1.58 
1967 68.4  310  21,176 10.5 14.4 1.44 
1968 68.7  321  22,065 12.9 19.2 1.61 
1969 69.2  308  21,282 13.8 18.4 1.41 
1970 67.4  323  21,783 14.2 18.3 1.36 
1971 70.1  333  23,364 14.1 17.7 1.31 
1972 69.9  331  23,118 15.7 22.2 1.53 
1973 69.2  343  23,762 14.7 20.8 1.51 
1974 70.2  357  25,093 15.2 18.1 1.24 
1975 65.0  337  21,923 11.9 15.4 1.34 
1976 64.5  342  22,054 14.5 18.7 1.36 
1977 69.7  341  23,769 16.0 22.5 1.52 
1978 68.9  339  23,347 15.3 18.2 1.24 
1979 66.8  365  24,392 16.1 22.4 1.50 
1980 66.8  376  25,085 16.5 17.5 1.08 
1981 67.5  378  25,533 17.0 22.7 1.43 
1982 67.8  385  26,097 12.5 18.0 1.53 
1983 69.1  407  28,083  9.6  11.7 1.25 
1984 73.0  498  36,348 12.5 14.6 1.20 
1985 67.8  472  32,026 13.1 16.8 1.33 
1986 64.1  454  29,102 11.7 13.8 1.22 
1987 66.3  483  32,010 13.1 18.1 1.46 
1988 71.5  462  33,029 14.3 18.3 1.34 
1989 68.4  474  32,410 12.2 15.3 1.30 
1990 70.2  490  34,386 14.3 17.8 1.29 
1991 73.0  511  37,287 15.1 18.5 1.28 
1992 69.5  456  31,723 13.8 19.7 1.53 
1993 63.1  468  29,526 16.8 20.8 1.30 
1994 66.2  483  31,964 16.7 22.8 1.47 
1995 72.9  499  36,395 18.0 19.1 1.08 
1996 70.5  484  34,122 15.5 21.0 1.46 
1997 70.1  503  35,252 16.1 20.4 1.34 
1998 70.6  487  34,360 13.1 16.3 1.28 
1999 66.3  512  33,961 16.8 19.3 1.19 
2000 66.1  521  34,398 16.5 19.3 1.21 
2001 69.5  542  37,655 16.6 20.6 1.30 
2002 62.8  543  34,101 16.5 19.5 1.23 
2003 68.0  542  36,868 15.0 19.2 1.35 
2004 75.6  617  46,635 14.7 19.3 1.39 
          
Mean 68.5  425  29,154  14.5  18.8  1.36 
Median 68.7  455  29,314  14.7  18.6  1.34 
Std Dev  2.7  87  6,376  2.0  2.8  0.15 
Min 62.8  294 20,158 9.6 11.7 1.08 
Max 75.6  617 46,635 18.0 26.2 1.79  
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  million lbs.  %  million lbs.  %  million lbs.  %  million lbs.  %  million lbs.  %  million lbs.  %  million lbs.  %  million lbs. 
1980 7,147 10.59 23,095  34.22 31,427  46.57  3,732  5.53 123 0.18  1,389  2.06 569 0.84 67,482 
1981 7,064 10.52 23,869  35.54 30,474  45.38  3,781  5.63 126 0.19  1,347  2.01 492 0.73 67,153 
1982 6,493  9.74  22,368  33.57 31,993  48.01  3,765  5.65 121 0.18  1,437  2.16 459 0.69 66,636 
1983 6,457  9.42  24,418  35.64 31,560  46.06  3,821  5.58 121 0.18  1,733  2.53 406 0.59 68,516 
1984 6,605  8.14  26,023  32.08 42,552  52.45  3,869  4.77 123 0.15  1,512  1.86 443 0.55 81,127 
1985 6,462  8.22  27,533  35.00 38,541  49.00  3,849  4.89 150 0.19  1,642  2.09 481 0.61 78,658 
1986 6,304  8.42  28,499  38.06 33,880  45.24  3,975  5.31 139 0.19  1,605  2.14 485 0.65 74,887 
1987 6,229  7.58  30,293  36.85 38,891  47.31  4,079  4.96 139 0.17  2,108  2.56 474 0.58 82,213 
1988 6,385  7.47  31,784  37.16 40,514  47.37  4,202  4.91 141 0.16  2,039  2.38 465 0.54 85,530 
1989 6,488  7.72  32,512  38.68 38,280  45.54  4,431  5.27 146 0.17  1,799  2.14 397 0.47 84,053 
1990 6,079  6.97  32,838  37.67 41,808  47.96  4,359  5.00 146 0.17  1,570  1.80 364 0.42 87,164 
1991 5,365  5.91  33,678  37.12 45,636  50.29  3,931  4.33 148 0.16  1,541  1.70 439 0.48 90,738 
1992 5,130  5.95  35,629  41.31 39,650  45.97  3,783  4.39 148 0.17  1,484  1.72 432 0.50 86,256 
1993  5,171 6.12 36,566 43.31  37,234  44.10  3,682  4.36 150 0.18  1,369  1.62 260 0.31 84,432 
1994 5,087  5.60  39,549  43.51 41,229  45.35  3,419  3.76 152 0.17  1,261  1.39 209 0.23 90,906 
1995 5,320  5.56  40,514  42.30 44,868  46.85  3,269  3.41 247 0.26  1,426  1.49 123 0.13 95,767 
1996 4,980  5.14  43,574  45.01 43,208  44.63  3,265  3.37 194 0.20  1,448  1.50 137 0.14 96,806 
1997 5,079  4.91  49,375  47.73 44,170  42.70  3,120  3.02 187 0.18  1,365  1.32 148 0.14  103,444 
1998 4,910  4.83  51,266  50.38 41,255  40.54  3,047 2.99  225  0.22  935  0.92  121  0.12 101,759 
1999 4,572  4.35  53,980  51.38 42,084  40.05  3,020  2.87 216 0.21  1,078  1.03 117 0.11  105,067 
2000 4,883  4.44  57,803  52.56 42,856  38.97  2,976  2.71 236 0.21  1,116  1.01 112 0.10  109,982 
2001 4,592  4.00  58,162  50.70 47,344  41.27  2,851  2.49 289 0.25  1,341  1.17 134 0.12  114,713 
2002 4,676  4.11  61,747  54.29 42,547  37.41  2,765  2.43 291 0.26  1,549  1.36 170 0.15  113,745 
2003 4,982  4.16  65,032  54.24 45,040  37.57  2,714  2.26 306 0.26  1,625  1.36 187 0.16  119,886 
                              
Mean 5,686  6.66  38,754  42.01 39,877  44.86  3,571 4.16  178  0.19 1,488 1.72  318  0.39  89,872 
Median 5,343  6.04  34,654  39.99 41,242  45.46  3,749  4.37  149  0.18 1,466 1.71  381  0.44  86,710 
Std Dev  815  2.05  12,999  6.99  4,767  3.82  498 1.14  57 0.03 264 0.47 156 0.23 15,458 
Min 4,572  4.00 22,368 32.08  30,474 37.41  2,714  2.26  121  0.15 935 0.92 112 0.10 66,636 







Table 7: U.S. Cotton Exports and Imports, 1965-2004 
Year Production  Exports 
Export Share 
of Production  Imports 
  --------------- 1,000 480 lb bales --------------  %  1,000 480 lb bales 
1965 14,938  3,035  20.3  118 
1966 9,557  4,832  50.6  105 
1967 7,443  4,361  58.6  149 
1968 10,926  2,825  25.9  68 
1969 9,990  2,878  28.8  52 
1970 10,192  3,897  38.2  37 
1971 10,477  3,385  32.3  72 
1972 13,704  5,311  38.8  34 
1973 12,974  6,123  47.2  48 
1974 11,540  3,926  34.0  34 
1975 8,302  3,311  39.9  92 
1976 10,581  4,784  45.2  38 
1977 14,389  5,484  38.1  5 
1978 10,856  6,180  56.9  4 
1979 14,629  9,229  63.1  5 
1980 11,122  5,926  53.3  28 
1981 15,646  6,567  42.0  26 
1982 11,963  5,207  43.5  20 
1983 7,771  6,786  87.3  12 
1984 12,982  6,215  47.9  24 
1985 13,432  1,960  14.6  33 
1986 9,731  6,684  68.7  3 
1987 14,760  6,582  44.6  2 
1988 15,411  6,148  39.9  5 
1989 12,196  7,694  63.1  2 
1990 15,505  7,793  50.3  4 
1991 17,614  6,646  37.7  13 
1992 16,218  5,201  32.1  1 
1993 16,134  6,862  42.5  6 
1994 19,662  9,402  47.8  20 
1995 17,900  7,675  42.9  408 
1996 18,942  6,865  36.2  403 
1997 18,793  7,500  39.9  13 
1998 13,918  4,298  30.9  439 
1999 16,968  6,750  39.8  97 
2000 17,188  6,740  39.2  16 
2001 20,303  11,000  54.2  21 
2002 17,209  11,900  69.1  67 
2003 18,255  13,758  75.4  45 
2004 23,251  14,409  62.0  29 
Mean 14,084  6,403  45.6  65 
Median 14154  6,198  42.7  28 
Std Dev  3,752  2,775  14.8  107 
Min 7,443  1,960  14.6  1 
Max 23,251  14,409  87.3  439 
    Source: USDAb. 
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Table 8: Cotton Imports of Major Importers, 1965-2004 
Year EU-25  Russia  Japan  Indonesia 
South 




  --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1000 480 lb bales ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
1965  8,136  0 3,078  0  327 105 305 457  7  500  12,915  118 
1966  8,013  0 3,556  160 362 105 357 649  10  500  13,712  105 
1967  7,774  0 3,499 62  404 129 471 644  4  300  13,287  149 
1968  7,571  0 3,131  107 450 78 464  377  4  300  12,482  68 
1969  7,470  0 3,448  160 470 135 507 721  0  400  13,311  52 
 
1970  7,347  0 3,669  180 557 212 735 693  6  500  13,899  37 
1971  7,335  0 3,555  230 523 230 584 642  7  700  13,806  72 
1972  7,895  0 3,883  279 484 299 657 400  4 2,000  15,901  34 
1973  6,926  0 3,728  250 788 389 911 119  2 1,800  14,913  48 
1974  6,750  0 3,228  157 722 262 652 113  1  700  12,585  34 
 
1975  7,101 0  3,220 351 1,013 389 1,024 96  0  900  14,094 92 
1976  6,550  0 3,037  287 909 409 801 447  2  650  13,092  38 
1977 6,743  0  3,150  394  1,312  329  1,052  398  1  1,600 14,979  5 
1978 6,508  0  3,382  404  1,363  457  855  44  4  2,125 15,142  4 
1979  7,070  0 3,336  474  1,627  376  1,248 2  4 4,100  18,237 5 
 
1980 6,234  0  3,207  490  1,527  402  965  0  5  3,550 16,380  28 
1981 6,556  0  3,504  490  1,496  243  1,135  36  5  2,199 15,664  26 
1982  6,883  0 3,137  492  1,562  397  1,044 3  4 1,085  14,607  20 
1983 7,081  0  3,338  603  1,602  558  1,171  0  240  664  15,257  12 
1984 7,260  0  3,125  538  1,601  614  1,294  0  9  85  14,526  24 
 
1985 7,171  0  3,054  808  1,682  703  1,534  0  6  1  14,959  33 
1986 8,276  0  3,688  919  1,901  1,290  2,357  0  3  16  18,450  3 
1987 8,299 5,395  3,431  882  1,957  872  1,608  107  4  86  22,641  2 
1988  7,936  5,827 3,491 1,112 2,145 1,252 1,781  171  5  1,448  25,168  5 
1989  7,643  5,878 3,165 1,292 2,040 1,207 1,301  15  17  1,873  24,431  2 
Continued on next page 








Table 8 (continued) 
Year EU-25  Russia  Japan  Indonesia 
South 




  --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1000 480 lb bales ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
               
1990  6,172  5,290 2,949 1,490 2,052 1,624 1,479  0  2  2,205  23,263  4 
1991  5,823  3,900 2,705 1,873 1,801 1,641 1,484  214  20  1,630  21,091  13 
1992  6,256  2,650 2,228 1,989 1,711 1,522 1,264  102  24  242 17,988  1 
1993  6,261  3,000 1,993 2,039 1,689 1,613 1,236  222  350  808 19,211  6 
1994  6,040  2,159 1,650 2,075 1,747 1,440 1,114  442  696  4,060  21,423  20 
               
1995  5,777  1,100 1,514 2,139 1,661 1,545 1,380  85  122  2,908  18,231 408 
1996  5,832  1,000 1,342 2,147 1,504 1,414 1,300  15  279  3,491  18,324 403 
1997  5,694  1,225 1,341 1,910 1,322 1,236 1,209  145  120  1,725  15,927  13 
1998  4,783 850  1,263 2,323 1,472 1,207 1,375  508  925  332 15,038 439 
1999  4,863  1,600 1,280 2,076 1,524 1,696 1,438 1,600  475  117 16,669  97 
 
2000  4,720  1,650 1,138 2,650 1,420 1,573 1,040 1,567  450  230 16,438  16 
2001  4,425  1,800 1,063 2,356 1,616 1,882 1,531 2,388 1,000  449 18,510  21 
2002  3,923  1,650 1,013 2,228 1,492 1,945 1,219 1,216  850  3,127  18,663  67 
2003  3,103  1,475 778 2,150  1,274  1,678  1,011 800 1,850  8,832  22,951 45 
2004  3,022  1,450 815 2,400  1,343  2,282  1,337 800 1,400  6,385  21,234 29 
               
Mean  6,481  1,197 2,678 1,074 1,311  894  1,106  406  223  1,616  16,985  65 
Median  6,747  0  3,134  706  1,494  659  1,153  193 6 854  15,914  29 
Std  Dev  1,342  1,784  994 878 533 655 420 523 429  1,839  3,503  107 
Min  3,022  0  778  0  327 78 305  0  0  1  12,482  1 
Max 8,299  5,878 3,883 2,650 2,145 2,282 2,357 2,388 1,850 8,832 25,168  439 







Table 9: U.S. Processed Cotton Consumption, Total and Per Capita, 1986-2004
1 
Year 
















Share of U.S. 
Consumption 
Net Import 









Total  U.S. 
Consumption 
Per Capita 
  ------------------------------------------- million lbs ----------------------------------------------  %  %  ------------------- lb ---------------------- 
1986 3,337.0  1,910.5  274.8  1,635.6 4,972.6  67.1  32.9 13.9  6.8  20.7 
1987 3,743.0  2,336.2  298.0  2,038.2 5,781.3  64.7  35.3 15.4  8.4  23.8 
1988 3,519.4  2,118.8  330.3  1,788.5 5,307.9  66.3  33.7 14.4  7.3  21.7 
1989 4,052.2  2,304.8  467.2  1,837.6 5,889.8  68.8  31.2 16.4  7.4  23.8 
 
1990 4,115.5  2,370.2  623.8  1,746.4 5,861.9  70.2  29.8 16.5  7.0  23.4 
1991 4,347.5  2,586.6  676.3  1,910.3 6,257.8  69.5  30.5 17.1  7.5  24.7 
1992 4,761.6  3,180.0  795.0  2,385.0 7,146.6  66.6  33.4 18.5  9.3  27.8 
1993 4,937.7  3,576.8  914.7  2,661.1  7,599.8  65.0  35.0  19.0  10.2  29.2 
1994 5,230.6  3,826.5 1,080.8 2,745.7  7,976.3  65.6  34.4  19.9  10.4  30.3 
 
1995 5,183.5  4,089.5 1,330.8 2,758.7  7,942.2  65.3  34.7  19.4  10.3  29.8 
1996 5,226.8  4,222.8 1,524.7 2,698.1  7,924.9  66.0  34.0  19.4  10.0  29.4 
1997 5,441.4  5,084.1 1,792.4 3,291.7  8,733.1  62.3  37.7  19.9  12.1  32.0 
1998 5,234.3  6026.2  1,957.1 4,069.1  9,303.4  56.3  43.7  19.0  14.7  33.7 
1999 4,962.3  6,711.4 2,073.5 4,637.9  9,600.2  51.7  48.3  17.8  16.6  34.4 
 
2000 4,747.0  7,541.4 2,443.0 5,098.4  9,845.4  48.2  51.8  16.8  18.1  34.9 
2001 3,848.4  7,545.2 2,136.8 5,421.4  9,269.8  41.5  58.5  13.5  19.0  32.5 
2002 3,693.8  8,502.2 2,186.1 6,316.1 10,009.9  36.9  63.1  12.8  21.9  34.7 
2003 3,227.5  9,231.7 2,317.1 6,914.6 10,142.1  31.8  68.2  11.1  23.8  34.9 
2004 3,130.8  9,523.3 2,342.9 7,180.4 10,311.2  30.4  69.6  10.7  24.4  35.1 
Mean 4,354.7  4,878.3  1,344.9  3,533.5 7,888.2  57.6  42.4 16.4  12.9 29.3 
Median 4,347.5  4,089.5  1,330.8  2,745.7 7,942.2  65.0  35.0 16.8  10.3 29.8 
Std Dev  778.7  2,586.0  787.6  1,850.5 1,792.6  13.4  13.4  3.0  6.0  4.9 
Min 3,130.8 1,910.5  274.8  1,635.6 4,972.6  30.4  29.8 10.7  6.8  20.7 
Max 5,441.4 9,523.3 2,443.0 7,180.4 10,311.2  70.2  69.6  19.9  24.4  35.1 


























Share of U.S. 
Consumption 
Net Import 









Total  U.S. 
Consumption 
Per Capita 
  ---------------------------------------- million lbs --------------------------------------------  %  %  ---------------------- lb ------------------------ 
1986 8,652.7 1,703.0  519.3  1,183.7 9,836.4  88.0  12.0  36.0  4.9  40.9 
1987 9,065.7 1,805.4  591.9  1,213.5 10,279.2  88.2  11.8  37.3  5.0  42.3 
1988 9,207.9 1,758.9  681.6  1,077.3 10,285.2  89.5  10.5  37.6  4.4  42.0 
1989 9,228.1 2,670.2  1,162.6  1,507.6 10,735.8  86.0  14.0  37.3  6.1  43.4 
 
1990 9,052.6 2,708.5  1,530.5  1,178.0 10,230.6  88.5  11.5  36.2  4.7  40.9 
1991 8,535.7 1,861.6  1,397.9  463.7 8,999.4  94.8  5.2 33.7  1.8  35.5 
1992 9,173.2 2,095.8  1,438.3  657.5 9,830.7  93.3  6.7 35.7  2.6  38.3 
1993 9,566.2 2,329.2  1,493.3  835.9 10,402.1  92.0  8.0  36.8  3.2  40.0 
1994 10,217.6 2,611.7  1,554.3  1,057.4 11,275.0  90.6  9.4  38.8  4.0  42.8 
 
1995 9,832.7 2,714.6  1,671.0  1,043.6 10,876.3  90.4  9.6  36.9  3.9  40.8 
1996 10,053.4 2,886.2  1,833.4  1,052.8 11,106.2  90.5  9.5  37.3  3.9  41.2 
1997 10,675.0 3,464.2  2,119.8  1,344.4 12,019.4  88.8  11.2  39.1  4.9  44.0 
1998 10,744.0 3,881.1  2,176.2  1,704.9 12,448.9  86.3  13.7  38.9  6.2  45.1 
1999 11,075.8 4,250.5  2,161.9  2,088.6 13,164.4  84.1  15.9  39.7  7.5  47.1 
 
2000 11,144.3 4,825.2  2,466.5  2,358.7 13,503.0  82.5  17.5  39.5  8.4  47.8 
2001 10,040.5 4,910.6  2,370.2  2,540.4 12,580.9  79.8  20.2  35.2  8.9  44.1 
2002 10,402.4 5,586.6  2,269.1  3,317.5 13,719.9  75.8  24.2  36.1  11.5  47.6 
2003 10,082.3 6,093.3  2,149.1  3,944.2 14,026.5  71.9  28.1  34.6  13.6  48.2 
2004 10,182.5 6,546.2  2,354.1  4,192.1 14,374.6  70.8  29.2  34.6  14.3  48.9 
Mean  9,838.6 3,405.4  1,681.1  1,724.3  11,562.9  85.9  14.1  36.9  6.3  43.2 
Median  10,040.5 2,714.6  1,671.0  1,213.5  11,106.2  88.2  11.8  36.9  4.9  42.8 
Std Dev  784.8  1,543.8 615.5 1,082.6 1,622.6  6.9  6.9  1.7  3.6  3.6 
Min  8,535.7 1,703.0  519.3  463.7  8,999.4  70.8  5.2  33.7  1.8  35.5 
Max  11,144.3 6,546.2  2,466.5  4,192.1  14,374.6  94.8  29.2  39.7  14.3  48.9 
1  The trade and consumption data are expressed in raw cotton fiber equivalents. 






Table 11: U.S. Total Fiber Consumption, Total and Per Capita, 1986-2004 
































  -------------------------------- million lb ----------------------------------- -------------------- % ------------------ -------------------  lb --------------------  ------------------ % ----------------- 
1986 11,989.7  3,613.5  794.1 2,819.3 14,809.0  81.0  19.0  49.8 11.7  61.6  33.6  66.4 
1987 12,808.7  4,141.6  889.9 3,251.7 16,060.5  79.8  20.2  52.8 13.4  66.2  36.0  64.0 
1988 12,727.3  3,877.7  1,011.9  2,865.8 15,593.1  81.6  18.4  52.0 11.7  63.7  34.0  66.0 
1989 13,280.3  4,975.1  1,629.8  3,345.3 16,625.5  79.9  20.1  53.7 13.5  67.2  35.4  64.6 
 
1990 13,168.1  5,078.7  2,154.4  2,924.4 16,092.5  81.8  18.2  52.7 11.7  64.4  36.4  63.6 
1991 13,157.0  5,311.5  2,253.9  3,057.6 16,214.6  81.1  18.9  51.9 12.1  64.0  38.6  55.5 
1992 14,192.8  6,174.1  2,431.0  3,743.1 17,935.9  79.1  20.9  55.2 14.6  69.8  39.8  54.8 
1993 14,765.6  6,892.5  2,614.1  4,278.4 19,044.0  77.5  22.5  56.7 16.4  73.2  39.9  54.6 
1994 15,723.8  7,507.6  2,870.6  4,637.0 20,360.8  77.2  22.8  59.7 17.6  77.3  39.2  55.4 
 
1995 15,304.7  7,840.8  3,264.4  4,576.4 19,881.1  77.0  23.0  57.4 17.2  74.6  39.9  54.7 
1996 15,601.9  7,990.4  3,659.5  4,330.9 19,932.8  78.3  21.7  57.8 16.1  73.9  39.8  55.7 
1997 16,430.5  9,601.0  4,263.8  5,337.2 21,767.7  75.5  24.5  60.2 19.6  79.8  40.1  55.2 
1998 16,264.7  10,960.2  4,496.5  6,463.7 22,728.4  71.6  28.4  58.9 23.4  82.3  40.9  54.8 
1999 16,278.4  12,032.6  4,601.1  7,431.5 23,709.9  68.7  31.3  58.3 26.6  84.9  40.5  55.5 
 
2000  16,097.6 13,627.2  5,334.6  8,292.6 24,390.2  66.0  34.0  57.0 29.4  86.4  40.4  55.4 
2001 14,087.9  13,591.3  4,897.0  8,694.3 22,782.2  61.8  38.2  49.4 30.5  79.9  40.7  55.2 
2002 14,220.9  15,289.9  4,815.9  10,474.0 24,694.9  57.6  42.4  49.3 36.3  85.7  40.5  55.6 
2003 13,437.8  16,693.1  4,786.6  11,906.5 25,344.3  53.0  47.0  46.2 40.9  87.1  40.0  55.3 
2004 13,434.0  17,628.1  5,004.3  12,623.8 26,057.8  51.6  48.4  45.7 43.0  88.7  39.6  55.2 
Mean 14,499.0  9,400.7  3,387.7 6,013.0  20,512.0  72.2  27.8  54.2 21.9  76.0  39.0  57.3 
Median 14,206.9 7,915.6  3,462.0 4,606.7  20,146.8  77.1  22.9 54.5  17.4  75.9  39.9  55.4 
Std Dev  1,320.9  4,460.5  1,451.1 3,174.0  3,557.7  10.0  10.0 4.5  10.2  8.7  2.1  4.0 
Min 12,727.3  3,877.7  889.9  2,865.8 15,593.1  51.6  18.2  45.7 11.7  63.7  34.0  54.6 
Max 16,430.5  17,628.1  5,334.6  12,623.8 26,057.8  81.8  48.4  60.2 43.0  88.7  40.9  66.0 
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Calculation of  
Assessment Rate  Per RB
2 Per  Pound 
  ------------------- ¢/lb ----------------------   $/RB  $/lb 
1976  64.1  38.9  64.1  $1 per RB + .006 x value  $2.92  $0.00585 
1977  53.4  44.6  53.4  $1 per RB + .006 x value  $2.60  $0.00520 
1978  57.6  48.0  57.6  $1 per RB + .006 x value  $2.73  $0.00545 
1979  62.1  50.2  62.1  $1 per RB + .006 x value  $2.86  $0.00573 
 
1980  74.0  48.0  74.0  $1 per RB + .006 x value  $3.22  $0.00644 
1981  56.4  52.5  56.4  $1 per RB + .006 x value  $2.69  $0.00538 
1982  59.9  57.1  59.9  $1 per RB + .006 x value  $2.80  $0.00559 
1983  66.3  55.0  66.3  $1 per RB + .006 x value  $2.99  $0.00598 
1984  59.0  55.0  59.0  $1 per RB + .006 x value  $2.77  $0.00554 
 
1985  57.2  57.3  57.3  $1 per RB + .006 x value  $2.72  $0.00544 
1986  53.5  55.0  55.0  $1 per RB + .006 x value  $2.65  $0.00530 
1987  61.7  52.3  61.7  $1 per RB + .006 x value  $2.85  $0.00570 
1988  55.8  51.8  55.8  $1 per RB + .006 x value  $2.68  $0.00535 
1989  63.5  50.0  63.5  $1 per RB + .006 x value  $2.91  $0.00581 
 
1990  67.4  50.3  67.4  $1 per RB + .006 x value  $3.02  $0.00604 
1991  57.0  50.8  57.0  $1 per RB + .006 x value  $2.71  $0.00542 
 1992
3  53.9  52.4  53.9  $1 per RB + .0055 x value  $2.48  $0.00496 
1993  60.0  52.4  60.0  $1 per RB + .005 x value  $2.50  $0.00500 
1994  74.6  50.0  74.6  $1 per RB + .005 x value  $2.86  $0.00573 
 
1995  75.6  51.9  75.6  $1 per RB + .005 x value  $2.89  $0.00578 
1996  69.2  51.9  69.2  $1 per RB + .005 x value  $2.73  $0.00546 
1997  65.8  51.9  65.8  $1 per RB + .005 x value  $2.65  $0.00529 
1998  59.3  51.9  59.3  $1 per RB + .005 x value  $2.48  $0.00496 
1999  46.3  51.9  51.9  $1 per RB + .005 x value  $2.30  $0.00460 
 
2000  48.1  51.9  51.9  $1 per RB + .005 x value  $2.30  $0.00460 
2001  30.8  51.9  51.9  $1 per RB + .005 x value  $2.30  $0.00460 
2002  43.4  52.0  52.0  $1 per RB + .005 x value  $2.30  $0.00460 
2003  59.6  52.0  59.6  $1 per RB + .005 x value  $2.49  $0.00498 
2004  44.2  52.0  52.0  $1 per RB + .005 x value  $2.30  $0.00460 
1 Upland cotton 
2 RB = Running Bale which generally weighs 500 lb. 
3 Assessment changed in August 1992.  Average calendar year assumed to be average of .006 and .005. 













  $ 1000  lb $/lb 
 1992
1 4,346,256  845,575  0.00514 
1993 14,319,289  2,806,380  0.00510 
1994 13,833,760  2,987,981  0.00463 
1995 14,934,106  3,028,836  0.00493 
1996 18,735,007  3,338,497  0.00561 
1997 19,299,015  3,322,875  0.00581 
1998 20,855,888  3,798,294  0.00549 
1999 23,441,363  4,434,036  0.00529 
2000 22,536,343  4,762,643  0.00473 
2001 22,211,764  4,980,039  0.00446 
2002 24,234,799  5,799,761  0.00418 
2003 24,157,639  6,315,593  0.00383 
2004 24,720,900  6,462,980  0.00383 
1 Importer assessment began in August 1992. 
Source:  National Cotton Council and USDAa. 
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Table 15: Cotton Incorporated Annual Marketing and Research Expenditures
1, 1986-2004 
 
   Expenditures     
 
Share of Total CI  Expenditures    Assessments   















istrative     Imports  Producer  Imports Producer 
 -------------------------------------------  $  ---------------------------------------------    ------------------------ % ---------------------------    -------------- $ --------------    ---------- % ---------- 
 
1986 12,157,924 3,924,016  807,938 1,465,898  18,355,776 
 
66.2 21.4 4.4  8.0    NA 18,355,776    NA 100.0 
1987 11,610,134 4,166,364  855,385 1,777,437  18,409,320    63.1 22.6 4.6  9.7    NA 18,409,320    NA 100.0 
1988 14,784,245 4,507,161  1,091,429 1,758,128  22,140,963    66.8 20.4 4.9  7.9    NA 22,140,963    NA 100.0 
1989 15,474,691 4,205,688  1,026,656 1,696,965  22,404,000    69.1 18.8 4.6  7.6    NA 22,404,000    NA 100.0 
1990 17,888,468 5,708,869  1,174,591 1,778,072  26,550,000    67.4 21.5 4.4  6.7    NA 26,550,000    NA 100.0 
1991 18,887,491 6,574,114  1,219,089 1,872,051  28,552,745    66.1 23.0 4.3  6.6    NA 28,552,745    NA 100.0 
1992 28,031,978 8,536,696  3,559,076 2,086,473  42,214,223    66.4 20.2 8.4  4.9    4,346,256 37,867,967   10.3  89.7 
1993 29,481,154 9,179,814  4,037,752 2,130,284  44,829,004    65.8 20.5 9.0  4.8    14,319,289 30,509,715   31.9  68.1 
1994 30,709,947 9,977,975  4,399,945 2,290,980  47,378,847    64.8 21.1 9.3  4.8    13,833,760 33,545,087   29.2  70.8 
1995 35,757,359  10,866,604 5,503,535 2,245,353  54,372,851    65.8 20.0  10.1  4.1    14,934,106 39,438,745   27.5  72.5 
1996 42,360,691 9,746,135  6,501,893 2,270,865  60,879,584    69.6 16.0  10.7  3.7    18,735,007 42,144,577   30.8  69.2 
1997 41,683,949  10,086,715 6,777,091 2,729,671  61,277,426    68.0 16.5  11.1  4.5    19,299,015 41,978,411   31.5  68.5 
1998 42,640,979 9,131,940  6,750,132 2,812,962  61,336,013    69.5 14.9  11.0  4.6    20,855,888 40,480,125   34.0  66.0 
1999 39,154,136 9,062,859  6,538,030 2,967,687  57,722,712    67.8 15.7  11.3  5.1    23,441,363 34,281,349   40.6  59.4 
2000  40,277,315 9,242,313  6,691,148 3,092,212  59,302,988    67.9 15.6  11.3  5.2    22,536,343 36,766,645   38.0  62.0 
2001 42,117,341 9,759,805  7,061,347 3,147,837  62,086,330    67.8 15.7  11.4  5.1    22,211,764 39,874,566   35.8  64.2 
2002 41,191,178  10,216,087 7,071,020 3,168,988  61,647,273    66.8 16.6  11.5  5.1    24,234,799 37,412,474   39.3  60.7 
2003 40,347,871 9,510,292  8,070,376 3,276,592  61,205,131    65.9 15.5  13.2  5.4    24,157,639 37,047,492   39.5  60.5 
2004 43,977,405  10,416,252 8,378,760 3,216,127  65,988,544    66.6 15.8  12.7  4.9    24,720,900 41,267,644   37.5  62.5 
                              
Mean 30,975,487 8,148,405  4,606,063 2,409,715  46,139,670    66.9 18.5 8.9  5.7    18,575,436 32,653,331   32.8  77.6 
Median 35,757,359  9,179,814  5,503,535 2,270,865  54,372,851    66.8 18.8  10.1  5.1    20,077,452 35,523,997   34.0  69.2 
Std Dv  12,023,027  2,427,456  2,773,842 610,981  17,575,635    1.6 2.8  3.2  1.6    5,611,409 7,844,086  8.0  16.9 
Min 11,610,134  3,924,016  807,938 1,465,898  18,355,776    63.1 14.9 4.3  3.7    4,346,256 18,355,776  10.3  59.4 
Max 43,977,405  10,866,604 8,378,760 3,276,592  65,988,544    69.6 23.0  13.2  9.7      24,234,799 42,144,577     40.6  100.0 
1 Nominal dollars 
NA = Not applicable because importer assessments began in 1992. 









Man-made All Cotton Man-made Income Short- Long- Short- Long-
Variable Short-run Long-run Fibers




South East 0.21 4.02
Southwest Irrigated 0.20 b




Yangtze River 0.21 0.79
Yellow river 0.25 0.65
Other 0.56 0.91
India



















Man-Made Fiber Mill Use




United States (Cotton) -0.41 0.87 0.05 0.17













U.S. Fiber Textile Import Supply 
Cotton 0.62
d   0.93
e
Man-made fiber 0.58































































a Polyester.    
b  Not statistically different from short-run elasticity.   
c Not statistically different from zero.  
d Short-run price elasticity.  
e Long-run price elasticity. 
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Table 17: The Four Key U.S. Demand Equations in the MCERI Model
a 
a See definition of variable names in Table 18.  Estimated standard errors are reported in parentheses below the corresponding coefficients.  
Two-sided p-values associated with the corresponding estimated coefficients are reported in brackets. 
 
(1) TCFCUS  =  6520.30 - 36.59*RCTFPIUS + 1.04*RDPI - 361.14*QUOTA - 411.91*DSTRUC5  
        (2074.39) (19.83)                      (0.17)            (191.74)                  (176.05)                        
          [0.005]   [0.081]                     [0.000]            [0.075]                    [0.030] 
   - 49.79*RCPIE + 943.95*D2004 + 17.87*RMEXPt + 23.83*RMEXPt-1 + 17.87*RMEXPt-2  
                (6.28)                   (345.79)               (4.45)                    (5.93)                      (4.45)                       
               [0.000]                  [0.013]               [0.001]                  [0.001]                    [0.001]                      
   Adj. R
2 = 0.992    DW = 2.00 
 
 
(2) MMFCUS  =  7012.19 - 33.47*RMMFPIUS + 1.06*RDPI + 488.02*WTOLIB - 1636.37*D80 - 1578.59*D81 
                                       (2595.13) (20.34)                        (0.22)           (318.35)                    (371.99)            (361.78) 
          [0.0146]  [0.117]                       [0.000]          [0.143]                      [0.000]               [0.000] 
      - 898.48*D899091 - 945.40*D2000 + 2.99*RMEXPt + 3.99*RMEXPt-1 +  2.99 * RMEXPt-2 
                                         (225.31)                 (367.43)             (5.64)                 (7.52)                   (5.64) 
                                          [0.001]                   [0.019]            [0.602]                [0.602]                 [0.602] 
 Adj.  R
2 = 0.979    DW = 1.90 
 
 
(3) CTMILLUSE  =  242.79   +  21.21*RCTFPIUS - 598.62*RECMPUS - 17.40*RPOLYP - 857.54*WTOLIB 
        (701.29)     (11.50)                        (498.29)                    (6.27)                   (105.32) 
         [0.734]     [0.085]                         [0.248]                     [0.014]                  [0.000] 
   + 0.83*CTMILLUSEt-1 - 4109.93*DSTRUC4 + 365.15*D9495 + 443.26*D99 + 379.09*D2004 
           (0.05)                              (71.43)                         (90.07)                (143.64)           (155.58) 
          [0.000]                             [0.000]                         [0.000]                 [0.008]             [0.028] 
  + 19.60 * RNAEXPt-1 + 26.13 * RNAEXPt-2  + 19.60* RNAEXPt-3 
           (13.23)                        (17.65)                         (13.23) 
                                         [0.159]                        [0.159]                         [0.159] 
 Adj.  R
2 = 0.990    DW = 2.49 
 
 
(4) MMFMILLUSE  =  2359.92 + 24.16*RMMFPIUS - 1488.48*RECMPUS - 31.97*RPOLYP- 696.85*WTOLIB  
             (1730.47)  (17.97)                        (939.15)                      (9.31)                    (128.60) 
                            [0.193]    [0.199]                         [0.134]                      [0.004]                    [0.000] 
 
             + 0.83*MMFMILLUSEt-1 - 1331.41*D82 - 847.17*D2000 + 9.24*RNAEXPt-1 + 12.32*RNAEXPt-2   
                                          (0.10)                               (325.90)          (267.05)                (18.01)                     (24.02) 
          [0.000]                               [0.001]             [0.006]                 [0.616]                    [0.616] 
 +  9.24*RNAEXPt-3 - 0.451*AR(1) 
           (18.01)                     (0.24)   
           [0.616]                    [0.084] 
         Adj. R
2 = 0.962    DW = 2.17  
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Table 18: Definitions of Variables in the Four Key Demand Equations of the MCERI Model 
Variable   Description 
AR(1)  =  Coefficient in the autoregressive process (AR) of order 1 for the 
residuals,  e(t)-AR(1)*e(t-1) 
CPIE  =  Consumer price index for energy, 1982-84=100 
CPIU  =  Nominal CPI for all items in the U.S., 1982-84=100 
CTFPIUS =  Cotton  textile  fiber price index, 1991-92=100 
CTMILLUSE  =  Mill level consumption of cotton fiber (million lb) 
CTMPUS  =  Nominal price of cotton paid by domestic mills  ($/lb) 
CTSWPUS  =  Nominal price of cotton related to the two-step program 
D200x  =  Dummy variable = 1 for year 200x; 0 otherwise 
DSTRUC4 =  D81+D84-D89-D91 
DSTRUC5 =  D85+D87+D89   
Dxx  =  Dummy variable = 1 for year 19xx; 0 otherwise 
MEXPND  =  Nominal advertising and promotion expenditures (million $) 
MMFCUS  =  Total man-made fiber textile consumption (million lb) 
MMFMILLUSE  =  Mill level consumption of man-made fiber (million lb) 
MMFPIUS  =  Nominal man-made fiber textile price index, 1991-92=100 
NAEXPND =  Nominal  non-agricultural  research expenditures (million $) 
POLYESTERPUS  =  Nominal price of polyester in the U.S., ¢/lb 
RPOLYP  =  Real price of polyester (POLYESTERPUS*100/CPIU) 
QUOTA  =  D2000 + D2001 
RCPIE  =  Real CPI for energy (CPIE*100/CPIU) 
RCTFPIUS  =  Real cotton textile fiber price index (CTFPIUS*100/CPIU) 
RDPI  =  Real disposable personal income in the US (billion $) 
RECMPUS  =  Real price of cotton paid by domestic mills ((CTMPUS-
.85*CTSWPUS)*100/CPIU) 
RMEXP  =  Real advertising and promotion expenditures (million $) 
(MEXPND*100/CPIU) 
RMMFPIUS  =  Real man-made fiber textile price index (MMFPIUS*100/CPIU) 
RNAEXP   =  Real non-agricultural research expenditures (million $) 
(NAEXPND*100/CPIU) 
TCFCUS  =  Total cotton fiber textile consumption (million lb) 
WTOLIB  =  Dummy variable 1 for years 1998 and beyond; 0 otherwise 
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Table 19: Cotton Checkoff Program Expenditure Intensity, 1977-2004 
Crop Year  Farm Receipts
a 
Nominal Expenditures 




  million $  million $  % 
1977 3,610  12.5  0.3 
1978 3,041  20.5  0.7 
1979 4,387  17.8  0.4 
1980 3,988  21.9  0.5 
1981 4,073  22.9  0.6 
1982 3,423  22.5  0.7 
1983 2,486  18.0  0.7 
1984 3,668  18.0  0.5 
1985 3,628  18.1  0.5 
1986 2,449  18.4  0.7 
1987 4,553  18.4  0.4 
1988 4,186  22.1  0.5 
1989 3,877  22.4  0.6 
1990 5,073  26.6  0.5 
1991 4,909  28.6  0.6 
1992 4,275  42.2  1.0 
1993 4,524  44.8  1.0 
1994 6,791  47.4  0.7 
1995 6,576  54.4  0.8 
1996 6,406  60.9  1.0 
1997 5,973  61.3  1.0 
1998 4,120  61.3  1.5 
1999 3,814  57.7  1.5 
2000 4,257  59.3  1.4 
2001 3,120  62.1  2.0 
2002 3,774  61.6  1.6 
2003 5,538  61.2  1.1 
2004 4,812  66.0  1.4 
     
Mean 4,333  37.5  0.9 
Median 4,153  27.6  0.7 
Std Dev  1,125  19.3  0.4 
Min 2,449  12.5  0.3 
Max 6,791  66.0  2.0 
a Excluding government payments 
b Ratio of program expenditures to farm receipts. 
Sources: USDA and Cotton Incorporated  
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ave. annual % 
change
Cotton Production (million lbs)
Delta 3.4 63.1 46.0 1.7
Southeast 11.4 164.8 121.0 7.3
Southwest irrigated 6.1 21.2 35.2 2.6
Southwest dryland 3.5 21.3 16.3 1.5
West 12.8 149.5 110.4 7.5
Total production 40.8 458.7 339.3 4.0
Mill Use (million lbs) 285.7 808.7 659.3 15.8
Exports (million lbs) -218.2 -353.3 -314.7 -7.1
Prices (cents/lb)
Farm price 4.0 10.0 8.2 13.2
Effective Price Paid by Mills 4.3 10.8 8.9 13.5
Foreign Cotton Markets
Production (million lbs) 193.9 1,232.3 935.7 2.3
Mill Use (million lbs) -56.5 739.9 512.4 1.2
Exports (million lbs) 264.2 231.0 240.5 1.9
World Price (A-index) (Cents/lb) 0.0 1.9 1.4 1.8
U.S. Cotton Fiber Textile Market
Consumption (million lbs) 428.4 1,029.9 858.0 10.2
Net Imports (milion lbs) 142.6 221.1 198.7 4.6
Cotton Fiber Textile Price Index 2.7 -3.7 -1.9 -2.0
 
U.S. Man-made Fiber Market
Production (million lbs)
Synthetic -0.8 -5.5 -4.1 -0.1
Cellulosic -1.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.1
Mill Use (million lbs) -118.5 -341.5 -277.8 -2.9
Polyester Price (cents/lb) -1.4 -0.6 -0.9 -1.2
U.S. Man-made Fiber Textile Market
Consumption (million lbs) -8.0 -93.1 -68.8 -0.6
Net Imports (million lbs) 110.5 248.4 209.0 22.4
Man-made Fiber Textile Price Index 0.4 4.6 3.4 5.2
All Years of Expenditures 
(1986/87-2004/05)
----------------average annual change ----------------
Table 20:  Simulated Effects of Cotton Marketing Promotion and Non-Agricultural Research 
Expenditures on U.S. Cotton and Cotton Fiber Textile Markets, Man-made Fiber and Textile  











































1 Includes effects of expenditures on indicated variables in each year in the given time periods in not only the corresponding years but also in the 












Added Net Revenues to Cotton Producers ($ million)
Non-Participants in Farm Program 251.2 41.9 321.8 24.8 573.0 30.2
Farm Program Participants -31.1 -5.2 6,084.6 468.0 6,053.5 318.6
All Cotton Producers 220.1 36.7 6,406.4 492.8 6,626.5 348.8
Historical Cotton Producer Revenues ($ million) 25,047.2 4,174.5 63,898.8 4,915.3 88,946.1 4,681.4
Ratio of Added Net Revenues to Historical Revenues
Farm Program Cost Savings ($ million) 1,328.1 221.4 6,523.7 501.8 7,851.8 413.3
Historical Cotton Farm Program Cost ($million) 5,893.7 982.3 23,659.7 1,820.0 29,553.4 1,555.4
Ratio of Cost Savings to Total Cotton Program Costs
Ratio of Cost Savings to Total Cotton Producer Revenue
Total Added Revenue (Producers + Government) ($ million) 1,548.2 258.0 12,930.1 994.6 14,478.3 762.0
Total Cotton Check-off Expenditures
1 ($ million) 140.3 23.4 629.3 48.4 769.6 40.5
Net Benefit-Cost Ratios ($ Added Net Revenue/$ Spent)
Producer Net BCR (Added Net Revenue/$ Spent)
2
Government Net BCR (Cost Savings/$ Spent)
Total Net BCR (Producers and Government)
2
Discounted Benefit-Cost Ratios ($ Added NR/$ Spent)
3
Producer Discounted BCR (Added NR/$ Spent)
2
Government Discounted BCR (Cost Savings/$ Spent)









Mandatory Period        
1992/93-2004/05
0.5
Entire Period of Analysis    
1986/87-2004/05
















































1 Non-agricultural research and marketing/promotion expenditures. 
2 Producer assessment has been subtracted from added net revenue of producers. 






Added Sales Revenue to Importers
Cotton Fiber Textile Products
Man-Made Fiber Textile Products
Total
Added Importer Profit (5% of Revenue)
Total Cotton Check-off Expenditures
1 ($ million)
Importer BCR
2 ($ profit/$ spent)
Discounted Importer BCR
2,3 ($ profit/$ spent)
Cotton Fiber Textile Products
Man-Made Fiber Textile Products
Total
14.4
   Retail Textile Product Sales Revenue
19.5











Added Sales Revenue as a Percent of Historical
9.1%
5.5%




























1 Non-agricultural research and marketing/promotion expenditures. 
2 Importer assessment has been subtracted from added profit. 







Table 23: Financial Data of Eighteen Major Apparel and Home Furnishings Retailers, 1994-2003 
























  ----------------------------------------------------- % ------------------------------------------------------ 
Federated Dept. Stores      4.0  1.3  2.9  6.1  7.3  7.6  0.6  5.0  6.8  7.1 
Kohl’s  Dept.  Store  7.6 8.4 7.2 7.7 8.6 9.2 9.8  10.7  11.3  9.2 
Dillard’s  7.1 4.4 5.9 6.0 2.7 3.2 1.6 1.3 2.6 0.2 
May  Dept.  Stores  10.6 10.6 10.3 10.1 10.4 11.0  9.7  8.1  6.1  4.6 
TJX  Companies  3.7 2.4 5.5 7.1 8.9 9.7 9.0 8.2 7.8 8.0 
Limited  Brands  10.2  15.0  7.8 4.4  25.3  8.5 7.5 9.7 9.9  13.1 
Abercrombie  &  Fitch  8.3  10.1 12.5 15.4 20.9 23.9 21.1 20.3 19.8 19.5 
Nordstrom’s  8.6 6.6 5.6 6.3 6.7 6.5 3.0 3.6 3.3 6.1 
The  Gap  14.2 13.3 14.2 13.1 14.6 15.3 10.1  1.7  5.5  10.6 
Sears  3.1 4.9 5.5 5.1 4.6 5.9 5.4 3.0 5.9  13.3 
J.C.  Penney  8.1 5.3 3.8 3.0 3.1 1.5 -2.8 0.5 1.8 3.1 
Target  Stores  3.4 2.1 3.1 4.8 5.0 5.7 5.6 5.6 6.1 6.1 
Wal-Mart  5.1 4.6 4.6 4.6 5.3 5.4 6.2 4.9 5.2 5.5 
K-mart  0.5 -2.1 1.0 1.1 2.2 2.7 -1.0  -7.5  -9.5 2.3 
Saks,  Inc.  4.3 -0.3 3.7 3.9 1.1 4.9 1.8 -0.4 1.9 1.8 
Ross  Stores  4.9 5.1 8.0 9.8  10.1  10.0  9.2 8.5 9.4 9.6 
Linens  ‘N’  Things  6.6 0.2 3.7 5.1 5.6 6.5 6.7 2.7 5.1 5.1 
Bed,  Bath  &  Beyond  11.6 11.1 11.1 11.4 11.6 11.5 11.8 12.2 13.4 14.5 
            
Total  Major  Retailers  4.8 4.2 4.7 4.9 5.8 5.8 4.4 3.5 4.6 5.5 












Added Net Revenues to Cotton Producers ($ million)
Non-Participants in Farm Program 398.2 21.0 290.4 15.3
Farm Program Participants 4,622.4 243.3 3,675.7 193.5
All Cotton Producers 5,020.5 264.2 3,966.1 208.7
Historical Cotton Producer Revenues ($ million) 88,946.1 4,681.4 88,946.1 4,681.4
Ratio of Added Net Revenues to Historical Revenues
Farm Program Cost Savings ($ million) 7,095.1 373.4 6,131.6 322.7
Historical Cotton Farm Program Cost ($million) 29,553.4 1,555.4 29,553.4 1,555.4
Ratio of Cost Savings to Total Cotton Program Costs
Ratio of Cost Savings to Total Cotton Producer Revenue
Total Added Revenue (Producers + Government) ($ million) 12,115.7 637.7 10,097.7 531.5
Total Cotton Check-off Expenditures
1 ($ million) 769.6 40.5 769.6 40.5
Net Benefit-Cost Ratios ($ Added Net Revenue/$ Spent)
Producer Net BCR (Added Net Revenue/$ Spent)
2
Government Net BCR (Cost Savings/$ Spent)
Total Net BCR (Producers and Government)
2
Discounted Benefit-Cost Ratios ($ Added NR/$ Spent)
3
Producer Discounted BCR (Added NR/$ Spent)
2
Government Discounted BCR (Cost Savings/$ Spent)















One Standard Deviation      
Below Estimated Values






Table 24:  Sensitivity Analysis of Producer and Government BCR Calculations:  Long-Run Marketing and Non-Agricultural 
































1 Non-agricultural research and marketing/promotion expenditures. 
2 Producer assessment has been subtracted from added net revenue of producers. 














Added Sales Revenue to Importers
Cotton Fiber Textile Products 201,759.0 15,519.9 62,356.9 4,796.7
Man-Made Fiber Textile Products 65,198.4 5,015.3 49,294.1 3,791.9
Total 266,957.4 20,535.2 111,651.0 8,588.5
Added Importer Profit (5% of Revenue) 13,347.9 1,026.8 5,582.6 429.4
Total Cotton Check-off Expenditures
1 629.3 48.4 629.3 48.4
Importer BCR
2 ($ profit/$ spent)
Discounted Importer BCR
2,3 ($ profit/$ spent)
Cotton Fiber Textile Products
Man-Made Fiber Textile Products
Total 7.2% 3.0%
 ------------------------ $ million -------------------------
One Standard Deviation   
Below Estimated Values
One-Half                
Estimated Values







Added Sales Revenue as a Percent of Historical
   Retail Textile Product Sales Revenue
Table 25:  Sensitivity Analysis of Importer BCR Calculations:  Long-Run Marketing and Non-
Agricultural Research Elasticities Set at One Standard Deviation Below and One-Half of Their 

























1 Non-agricultural research and marketing/promotion expenditures. 
2 Importer assessment has been subtracted from added profit. 
3 Present value of added profit calculated assuming a 5% cost of capital in each year. 
124 













  ----------------------------- average % ------------------------------ 
Producer Assessment:       
  U.S. Cotton Producer Share  67.1  54.0  58.1 
  U.S. and Foreign Cotton Buyer Share  32.9  46.0  41.9 
      
Importer Assessment:       
  U.S. Cotton Fiber Textile Consumer Share  --  49.0  49.0 











Table 27: Effects of Cotton Checkoff Agricultural Research Expenditures on 








Length of Time for 
Cumulative Effect 


















   - Dryland 
 
333 0.04  10  years 
Southeast 
 
599 0.08 9  years 
Delta 
 
683 0.11 9  years 
1  Percentage change in yields due to a 1% change in cotton checkoff agricultural research expenditures. 